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If we threw a handful of children on an island and they raised themselves I think 
they would believe in God (Barrett cited in Beckford, 2008). 
 
A child raised on a desert island…would come out as Geertz envisioned, 
something of a monster, something other than a fully human intentional and 
moral agent (Tomasello, 1999: 215). 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis defines and resolves some persistent criticisms of Justin Barrett and Jessie Bering’s 
shared contention that religious beliefs are compelled by ‘default’ cognitive systems. I contend 
that the source of these criticisms is correctly the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis. 
This metathesis justifies the methodological reductions that both use to account for ‘intuitive 
religious beliefs.’ 
 Through a review of the critical literature sourced from various methodologies including 
anthropology, hermeneutics, and social neuroscience, I uncover a recurrent set of criticisms 
that I contend theories of ‘intuitive religion’ need to confront in order to strengthen the 
theoretical, and by inference, empirical validity of their theories. Yet I also discuss why it is that 
Bering and Barrett fail to incorporate insights relative to persistent criticisms of their research, 
emphasising that it is because they fail to see the experimental plausibility of alternative 
methodologies and theories.  
Somewhat proactively, I argue that Mathew Day’s proposal for a psychosocial theory of religion 
offers a step in the right direction. Day’s psychosocial theory rejects the ‘naturalness of religion’ 
metathesis.  My own revision and application of psychosocial theory allows for the 
reinterpretation of Bering and Barrett’s findings from the vantage point of cultural psychology. I 
close by offering a developmental theory of ‘intuitive religious beliefs’ that includes the 
numerous theoretical perspectives addressed throughout this thesis and, crucially, is 
empirically grounded in research from cultural psychology. I propose a tentative empirical test 
to trial my claims.  
 
Key words: Developmental Psychology, Cultural Psychology, Religious Belief, Cognitive Science 
of Religion, Consilience, Intuition. 
 
 
  5 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
Précis: The Problem and the Solution      7  
o Box 1: Justin Barrett’s Major Hypotheses     13 
o Box 2:  Jesse Bering’s Major Hypotheses     14 
 
Chapter One: The Naturalness of Religious Beliefs   16 
             
1.1 Theoretical Basis of the Intuitive Model      17   
1.2 The Naturalness of Religious Belief       26 
1.3 Key Terms: ‘Belief,’ ‘Intuition,’ and ‘Religious Belief’    29 
o Reflective and Non-Reflective Beliefs     30 
o Practiced and Non-Practiced Naturalness     33 
1.4 The Intuitive Model’s Empirical Methodologies      34 
1.5 Theoretical divergences Between Bering and Barrett    36 
o Differing Understandings of Ontology and Explanation   37 
o Different Emphasis on Evolutionary Theory     37 
o Different Folk Psychological Models      40 
1.6 The Internal Critical Literature: Three Themes     42  
o Experimental Findings are Problematic     44 
o The Universality of Theory is Debatable       51 
o The Intuitive Model Ignores Sociocultural Causations    56 
Conclusion           63 
 
Chapter Two: The Humanities and the CSR     65 
 
2.1 Criticism versus Consilience?       66 
o Box 3: Critical Perspectives       69 
2.2 How Consilience Alienates the Intuitive Model     75 
o Minimal Consilience: Mode’s Theory      80 
2.3 The Role of Humanities’ Criticisms in Intuitive Model Research   84 
o Negative Reduction                86 
o Artificial Conceptual Frameworks       88 
o Metathesis as Narrative `      92 
2.4 The Constructive role of Humanities’ Criticisms      96  
Conclusion          97 
 
 
 
 
  6 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Alternative Theories of Cognition    99 
 
3.1 Bodies, Brains and Causal Worlds      100 
3.2 The Naturalness of Religious Beliefs Revisited     104 
o Mathew Day’s Criticisms of the CSR      106 
o The ‘Naturalness’ of Atheism       111 
3.3 Problems with Alternative Models of Cognition     115 
3.4 The Intuitive Model’s Protective Strategies     118 
3.5 Consilience Revisited: Psychosocial Theory     123 
3.6 Psychosocial Theory and the Intuitive Model     129 
o Breaching the Intuitive Model’s Protective Strategy    130 
o Limitations of Psychosocial Theory      133 
3.7 The Pragmatics of a Psychosocial Theory of Intuitive Religious Belief  136 
3.8 Revision of Intuitive Model Conceptual Terminology    139 
o A Psychosocial Approach to Atheism      144 
Conclusion          147 
 
 
Chapter Four: Implicit Cultures       149  
    
4.1 Cultural Psychology: The ‘View from Manywheres’    150 
o Critique of Mainstream Psychology      155 
4.2 Universals in Psychological Research      158 
4.3 Distinguishing Universals in Intuitive Model Theory     160 
4.4 Experimental Evidence of Cultural Variations     163 
o Box 4: Empirical Evidence for Attendance Schema     166  
4.6 The Developmental Psychologies of Religious Beliefs    169  
4.7 Empirical Predictions        174 
o Analytic vs. Holistic Theological Correctness     174 
Conclusion          176  
       
Thesis Conclusion         178 
 
Appendix: Summary of Intuitive Model Research    180 
 
References             210  
 
 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  7 
 
 
 
Précis 
  
o The problem 
 
The classic Cognitive Science of Religion (here after: CSR) rests on the claim that panhuman 
cognitive processes constrain the forms religious beliefs take. This metatheoretical claim is 
overt in the nascent CSR subfield: the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ (Bloom, 
2007, 150), particularly in the work two prominent researchers, Justin Barrett and Jessie Bering. 
Both theorists employ an idiosyncratic variant of the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis. 
(Barrett and Lanman, 2008: 10). Their ‘Intuitive Model’ argues that religious beliefs are 
emergent properties of innate cognitive processes. Traditionally, cognitive-developmental 
psychology was the empirical backbone of many CSR hypotheses. However, in my reading, the 
‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ is now in conflict with contemporary CSR 
research.  
 
 A key issue in the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ relates to the increasing 
prominence of alternative theories of the human mind-brain that are often at odds with the 
models developmental psychologists are using. Many contemporary models of the mind 
emphasise the enactive, embodied, and culturally embedded nature of human cognition (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998; Hutchens, 1985; Deacon, 1997; Gallagher, 2005). Cognitive models that 
incorporate such a perspective contest the methodological supervenience of computational 
cognitive psychology as an autonomous level of analysis. While alternative models of cognition 
have gained traction in some ‘cultural evolution’ theories of religion, they have yet to penetrate 
Bering and Barrett’s work.  
 
In this thesis, I investigate the relevance of criticisms of Bering and Barrett hypotheses 
stemming from a number of research domains, including social and cognitive anthropology, 
philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, comparative religion, 
hermeneutics, as well as the CSR and developmental psychology themselves. By applying a 
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number of these criticisms to their work, I identify a set of important objections that critics in 
multiple disciplines express about their research. The bulk of this thesis locates and addresses 
these criticisms before developing plausible theoretical and empirical answers.  
 
A key argument arising from my analysis is that CSR models that employ alternative theories of 
cognition present a material-scientific justification of ideas common in traditional sociocultural 
theories of culture and mind present in the works of Clifford Geertz and Emile Durkheim. This is 
despite the fact that the CSR’s metathesis stems from a materialist critique of such models.   
Emphasising this close association has important implications for my revision of the metathesis 
at a later stage of this paper.  
 
In the few instances Intuitive Model theorists consider alternative theories of cognition and 
culture, they offer a metatheoretical defence of experimentally based cognitive psychology by 
contrasting it with the more ‘rhetorical’ nature of cognitive models developed in ethnography, 
anthropology, and cognitive and social neuroscience. Bering and Barrett note how difficult it is 
to test the basic claims of cognitive-cultural theory through the methods and experimental 
models of cognitive psychology. As a result, two strands of CSR research are developing, one 
that builds on and is enriched by alterative theories of mind and culture and one that remains 
limited by classic cognitive approaches.  
 
In summary, Bering and Barrett’s research is increasing out of step with alternative theories of 
cognition gaining prominence in CSR research. I examine why this is the case and provide a 
means to bring Intuitive Model theory up to speed.  
 
o The Solution 
 
I argue that alternative models of mind will enrich Barrett and Bering’s research. Nevertheless, I 
agree with them that accepting the philosophical and theoretical perspectives of alternative 
cognitive models is quite different from proposing how such models are workable within 
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established psychological methods. In the short term, convincing Bering and Barrett of the 
immediate experimental importance and plausibility of the new approaches requires that 
recent theories of mind and cognition are empirically justified within the very same 
psychological methodologies and task designs that Intuitive Model theorists utilise. By 
translating such theories into traditional nomothetic psychological methodologies, I am able to 
establish dialogue between Intuitive Model theory and alternative theories of cognition. 
 
The originality of this thesis corresponds to the application of a diverse range of critical writings 
to Intuitive Model research. I pinpoint and accommodate common critical themes despite the 
fact these are products of markedly different analytical vantage points. Such extensive critical 
analysis is novel to Intuitive Model theories.   
 
Through this extended critical analysis, I establish a cross-domain critical perspective that 
integrates the perspectives of scholars who utilise humanities’ frameworks and scholars who 
have directly reviewed Bering and Barrett’s theories.  I also notice that alternative theories of 
cognition partially resolve some of the persistent criticisms of the CSR presented by humanities 
scholars. When combined, this literature questions Bering and Barrett’s use of the ‘naturalness 
of religion’ metathesis to bracket the obvious role that culture and social forces play in a child’s 
normative development. Bering and Barrett try to account, nearly exclusively, for the recurrent 
implicit biases and conceptual structures they contend encourage culturally persistent religious 
beliefs. While their focus on ‘cognition in the raw’ has offered numerous insights and empirical 
discoveries, the methodological reduction employed rests on a partial conceptual error. This 
error is because Intuitive Model theories have largely been a one-way street, examining how 
cognition constrains culture but not vice versa.  While a concern for such factors is developing 
organically in numerous allied CSR research domains, an adequate model to integrate 
alternative theories of cognition and culture with the Intuitive Model has been lacking. 
 
By blending all three critical perspectives (internal, external and the new theories of cognition), 
I challenge some key metatheoretical claims in Intuitive Model theory. However, the 
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importance of this thesis rests in its constructive nature. I manage to transform quite polemical 
critiques of the CSR into important revisions of the Intuitive Model’s metatheory. Unlike many 
of the criticisms I discuss, I am able to present a revision rather than a simple dismissal of the 
metathesis. I do this in a manner that is partially able to accommodate common critical strands 
by way of positing productive dialogue between them and Bering and Barrett’s theories 
 
To establish constructive dialogue I present Bering and Barrett with Dan Sperber’s recent 
writing on how to distinguish different kinds of religious belief. Sperber’s writing on belief 
already informs Barrett and other developmental psychologists who study religious belief. 
While Sperber’s inclusion of the added distinction between intuitive and semi-propositional 
beliefs seems to resolve some of the lagging criticisms of Intuitive Model research, it also 
demands a substantial revision of the conceptual framework that Bering and Barrett employ. I 
achieve this revision by highlighting subtle correlations between his theory of beliefs and the 
themes expressed in the critical literature. I suggest that the controversial religious studies 
scholar Mathew Day’s recent psychosocial theory when blended with Dan Sperber’s writing on 
beliefs may offer the means to revitalise Intuitive Model research.   
 
I close by introducing cultural psychology. This is essential because I am finally able to present 
the empirical evidence that Bering and Barrett demand is necessary to challenge their 
hypotheses. Crucially, unlike my two examples of contemporary CSR theories which employ 
alternative models of cognition, theorists within cultural psychology employ the same 
methodological processes as Intuitive Model scholars. As such, cultural psychology weakens the 
recurrent Intuitive Model claim that alternative models of cognition encourage an empirical 
vacuum. Using findings from the same methodologies that Bering and Barrett et al. utilise, I am 
able to contest the acultural methodological reduction behind Intuitive theories of religion, and 
begin to show, counter to the foundational ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis, that 
sociocultural processes affect the most basic cognitions and perceptions.   Critically, and 
distinctly from the service of cultural psychology in contemporary ‘cultural evolution’ theories, 
the strong tradition in cultural psychology argues that culture and socialisation affect both 
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content and cognitive processes. While this is not controversial in itself, research within cultural 
psychology provides some clear and compelling insights into the magnitude of these effects on 
human cognitions. This allows us to incorporate perspectives from the humanities, which are 
currently marginalised in the Intuitive Model. 
 
 The dismissal of the metathesis does not require the dismissal of Barrett and Bering’s extant 
research. It merely requires that the Intuitive Model is open to direct consideration and 
revitalisation from alternative theoretical vantage points. I highlight the productive nature of 
this revision by proposing empirical research along such lines.   
 
I propose and defend four interrelated thesis claims: 
 
- Many ‘developmental psychologists of religious belief’ argue that the advent and 
acquisition of cross-culturally recurrent religious convictions are explicable by way of 
the study of developing cognitive processes and the implicit reasoning biases that 
these encourage. Yet this assumption derives from the increasingly implausible claim 
that cognitive development is a universal and stable process only peripherally 
influenced by cultural peculiarities and sensitivities. Despite theorists’ insistence that 
this is not the case, I argue that the theories of ‘intuitive religion’ recreate a nature-
nurture divide that is radically at odds with the contemporary philosophies, sciences 
sociologies, and psychologies of mind.   
- This important conceptual error in the metathesis destabilises the validity of many of 
the methodological reductions and task designs that motivates experimental research. 
It renders empirical findings partial, questionable, and inconclusive. 
- Furthermore, it has encouraged many criticisms of the project and promoted a 
number of attempts within CSR aligned literature to revitalise relations between 
cognitive development and cultural normalisation.  However, I argue that extant 
attempts to integrate cognition and culture remain incomplete and are increasingly 
unworkable from a developmental perspective. For example, Sperber’s ‘epidemiology 
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of representations’, which establishes the Standard Model CSR, along with Harvey 
Whitehouse’s ‘mode’s theory’ problematically continue to see children’s minds as 
conceptual slot machines (Bering, 2003).  I explain why Intuitive Model theory must 
blend and balance psychosocial causal variables. Furthermore, the emerging field of 
cultural psychology offers clarification and may directly complement nativist theories. 
- Intuitive theory will rest on a sounder empirical footing if the ‘naturalness of religious 
belief’ metathesis is revised, if not completely discarded. I show how a general 
psychosocial theory can invigorate research into normative ‘religious intuitions.’  
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Justin Barrett’s Major Hypotheses1 
                                                     
1
 For a detailed discussion of Bering and Barrett’s hypotheses please refer to the appendix. 
 
 
Hypothesis  Evidence 
 
The Theological Correctness Hypothesis: 
 
Spontaneous or time pressured (‘online’) reasoning 
about religious ideas and agents differs, often 
drastically, from explicitly expressed, reflectively 
pondered, and theologically bounded (‘offline’) 
reasoning about such ideas and agents. ‘Online; 
reasoning is frequently ‘theologically incorrect’ (Slone, 
2004) as it necessitates the use of simple heuristics 
often at odds with reflective knowledge. 
 
 
 
In story processing tasks, American subjects employed 
an anthropomorphic God concept that was 
inconsistent with their stated theological beliefs. They 
also anthropomorphised the narratives without any 
awareness of doing so (Barrett and Keil, 1996, Barrett, 
1999). This effect was also found in Hindu populations 
(Barrett, 1998). 
 
 
The Hyper-Agency Detection Device (HADD): 
 
HADD involves the rapid perception and computational 
processing of agency. It grants the perceiver the ability 
to consider the best course of action to take 
(classically: fight or flight) in response to the potential 
agent. Unexpected or ambiguous events with no clear 
physical cause routinely evoke the HADD. Belief in 
supernatural agents is encouraged when the HADD 
interacts with the theory of mind system. 
 
 
 
 
Relevant research in evolutionary psychology.  
 
No specific experimental evidence. 
 
(Barrett, 2000, 2004; Barrett and Lanman, 2008; 
Guthrie, 1993, 2008). 
 
The Preparedness Hypothesis: 
 
Differentiated concepts about ‘humans’ and ‘gods’ 
build on a default, intentional agency base. This 
conceptual base allows children to perceive at an early 
age that gods and humans not only have different 
abilities, they also have different desires, intentions, 
and beliefs. Thus, non-human concepts appear to 
develop alongside (rather than out of) human 
concepts, becoming specified as children cognitively 
and experientially mature. As such, children appear 
‘prepared’ to entertain ‘god concepts’ because of the 
close affinity between the default intentional agency 
template and such concepts. 
 
 
 
Barrett and researchers use the false belief task and a 
modified perspective-taking task to test children from 
Christian and secular backgrounds. The tasks include 
human and non-human agents (animals and gods). 
The results consistently show that children from as 
young as three are able to distinguish between the 
perceptual and reasoning abilities of animals, humans, 
and gods. The omniscience that the youngest children 
grant to agents means that their earliest agency 
representations are closer to ‘god concepts’ than 
‘human concepts’ (Barrett and Richert, 2001; Barrett, 
Newman, et al., 2003; Barrett, Richert, et al., 2003; 
Richert and Barrett, 2005; Knight and Sousa, et al., 
2003). 
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Jesse Bering’s Major Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Evidence 
 
Theory of mind, language, and the intentionality 
system are unique responses to selection pressures in 
ancestral hominid social environments.  These 
adaptations indicate that human minds are 
qualitatively dissimilar from chimpanzee minds. 
 
 
 
Review of the ethological and evolutionary 
psychology literature. 
 
Studies conducted by Bering and Daniel Povinell et al. 
(2003). 
 
 
Afterlife beliefs that feature immortal souls are the 
result of a number of socio-cognitive reasoning 
errors. These include: 
 
Pancultural simulation constraints (e.g., the inability 
to imagine psychological non-existence) which 
encourage a tendency to attribute mental states to 
the dead. This constraint results in type 1 errors as 
people defer to familiar mental states they presume 
to be analogous (e.g., sleeping and/or resting).  
 
This early emerging normative bias also encourages 
inferences that the dead continue to have mental 
states, such as beliefs, desires, and knowledge states.  
 
Relevant research on simulation theory of mind and 
the ‘simulation constraint’ hypothesis. 
 
Related developmental research. 
 
American children aged between 4 and 12 watched a 
puppet show featuring a mouse. Suddenly an alligator 
appears and kills the mouse. The experimenters 
asked the children about the implications of death for 
the mouse (e.g., Is it still hungry, does it miss its 
mother?) While stating that the mouse would no 
longer needed to eat, many assumed that it would 
still miss its mother. It was only the older children 
who stated that both psychological and biological 
processes cease at death. This suggests that young 
children intuitively believed in the continuation of 
psychological states after death (Bering and 
Bjorklund, 2004; Bering and Blasi et al., 2005) 
.  
 
The habit of thinking about goal directed cospecifics 
in their physical absence encourages humans to 
entertain the illusion that the dead maintain 
intentionally.  
 
 
No direct experimental evidence. 
 
Anecdotal evidence and personal experience. 
 
Studies examining how the elderly cope with the loss 
of a long-term partner. 
 
 
In all cultures and historic periods, people appear 
biased to believe that the world is designed for a 
purpose. A natural outcome of this assumption is for 
people to believe that they also have a pre-destined 
purpose with obligations in line with their creation. 
 
 
No direct experimental evidence. 
 
Kelemen’s research on ‘promiscuous teleology’ and 
Evan’s work on cognitive predispositions toward 
creationism. Commentary on the role of suicide in 
Judaic-Christian traditions and martyrdom in Islam. 
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Jesse Bering’s Major Hypotheses Continued 
Hypothesis Evidence 
 
People are cognitively predisposed to interpret 
natural unexpected events as strategically relevant 
communicative attempts by culturally postulated 
supernatural agents, rather than viewing them as 
meaningless or the results of chance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant research on ‘just world beliefs.’  
  
Children aged between three and nine years were 
told that they would receive help during a forced-
choice game by an invisible agent named Princess 
Alice. They were informed that Alice would tell them 
via some unspecified means whenever they chose the 
wrong box. During game play the experimenters 
triggered unexpected events (such as flicking a light 
on or off or knocking a painting from a wall). The 
experimenters observed the child’s behavioural 
responses to the unexpected events. They found that 
of the children who had been primed, it was the older 
children who reliably inferred communicative intent 
behind the random events, while the younger 
children often failed to make communicative 
connections (Bering and Parker, 2006). 
 
 
Belief in supernatural agents with privileged 
epistemic access encourages prosocial behaviour 
because it encourages a believer to suppress selfish 
impulses. 
 
Citations of suggestive religious texts, traditions, and 
religious studies scholars. 
 
Citation and modification of Barrett’s research on 
‘god concepts.’ 
 
American college students were asked to complete a 
competitive computer task that gave them the 
opportunity to cheat. Subjects who were primed by 
being shown a fictitious memorandum dedicated to 
an experimenter involved in the computer task  or 
shown the memorandum and then told that the ghost 
of the dead researcher had been seen in the room 
were less likely to cheat than those who had not been 
primed (Bering, McLeod et al. 2005). 
 
 
Natural selection, operating though theory of mind 
mechanisms and the broader intentionality system 
encouraged both belief and fear of supernatural 
agency because these beliefs suppress evolutionarily 
ancestral, antisocial behaviours which were out of 
step with the sophisticated socio-cognitive demands 
of human interactions and the advent of language. 
Cooperating with cospecifics proved evolutionarily 
beneficial to the individual human. Thus, a god-
fearing person is likely to out-compete a person with 
no such beliefs. 
 
Related research on religion and cooperation (Sosis 
and Alcorta 2003; Sosis and Bressler, 2003; Sosis and 
Ruffle, 2003; Johnson, 2005, Wilson, 2002). 
 
A comparison and evaluation of the intentionally 
system and the resultant behavioural strategies it 
encourages: ‘Ancestral’ ‘God-fearing’ or 
‘Machiavellian.’   In their analysis, God-fearing 
strategies offer the greater fitness advantage (Bering 
and Johnson, 2006). 
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Chapter One: The Naturalness of Religious Beliefs 
 
In this introductory chapter, I examine Barrett and Bering’s hypotheses and experimental work 
in relation to the immediate2 critical literature. The point of this analysis is not to merely 
question the hypothesis-specific validity of each theorist’s research. My aim is to pinpoint a set 
of recurrent criticisms that are expressed about their work as a whole. I believe these criticisms 
locate problems with the joint use of a metatheoretical framework that justifies the 
methodological reductions employed in their empirical research and theoretical 
interpretations. In subsequent chapters, I develop this argument through engagements with 
alternative fields of criticisms before presenting my own resolution in the final chapter.  
 
Of course, before I begin, a more pressing task is to justify my focus on the two theorists work. 
Bering and Barrett’s theories express a similar variant of the ‘naturalness of religion’ 
metathesis, which features in the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief.’ Importantly 
the depiction of the metathesis in the developmental research is distinct from the naturalness 
metathesis found in the Standard Model CSR.3 For clarity, and to distinguish their variation of 
the metathesis from how it is conceptualised in the dominant Standard Model from which it is 
frequently conflated, I define Barrett and Bering’s explanatory model as the Intuitive Model4 of 
religious beliefs. Bering and Barrett are arguably the most prominent promoters of the Intuitive 
Model. 
 
                                                     
2
 I define the criticisms discussed in this chapter as ‘immediate’ or ‘internal’ criticisms because the critiques are 
investigating the same subject matter or employ the same exploratory methodologies as Bering and Barrett. 
Crucially these internal criticisms do not examine the metathesis.  
3
 This thesis assumes knowledge of both fields and thus a generic overview of the CSR and Bering and Barrett’s 
theories are not included within the thesis. However, a detailed overview of Bering and Barrett’s theories is 
offered in the appendix.  
4
 It will become clear throughout the remainder of the thesis that this is not an ideal term for the model because 
Intuitive Model theorists need to conceptually distinguish the development of cognitive and inferential processes 
and the development of intuitive content. Barrett, on occasion, describes Bering and Barrett’s approach as 
‘nativist’ (2003) though I think this produces the very nature vs. nurture confusion that  he is trying to avoid. 
Intuitive in the sense I use it here, equates to Barrett’s understanding of maturationally natural cognition. The term 
represents the definitional issues that I believe permeate the Intuitive Model. Bering’s recent description of his 
work as the study of ‘intuitive religion’ supports my use of the Intuitive Model to describe their work (Bering, 
2010).  
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Yet both Bering and Barrett argue, accurately, that there are important differences between 
their theories.  Even so, I think it is important to consider both theorists because they construct, 
engage with, and support a similar metathesis, despite arriving at their conclusions through 
different theoretical frameworks.   
 
The critical literature discussed below highlights that while critics contest the findings of one 
particular hypothesis, they rarely direct attention to the metathesis that guides Bering and 
Barrett’s work. Thus, before I begin the analysis of the internal literature, I make explicit this 
metathesis and its role in the methodological reductions, objects of study and task designs of 
Intuitive Model  research, noting the different ways Bering and Barrett arrive at their shared 
conclusions.  
 
1.1 The Theoretical Basis of the Intuitive Model 
 
The validity of the Intuitive Model’s metathesis rests on a synthesis of theories and empirical 
findings in a number of research domains including cognitive psychology, ethology, 
comparative psychology, existential philosophy, developmental psychology, and evolutionary 
psychology. Conspicuously, and of importance to my own argument, it is the metathesis which 
compels and justifies Intuitive Model experimental research; the metathesis has not developed 
organically out of the research itself. Therefore, locating the theoretical antecedents of the 
metathesis is critical. 
 
Both Bering and Barrett express arguments in support of psychological nativism and core 
knowledge theories. For present purposes, the following are the most important:  
 
The first is computational research. The computational theory of mind was a central 
component of modern cognitive psychology. It also informs later connectionist models of mind, 
which differed from early computational models by emphasising non-linear processing 
trajectories. The computational model involved a synthesis of disparate research undertaken in 
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the 1910s – 40s particularly research which examined the machine computations of symbols. Of 
greatest importance was Alan Turing’s cybernetic work on binary code and machine 
computation, John Von Newman and Norbet Wiener’s work on autonomous programs and 
symbolic logic,  Walter Pit’s and Warren McCulloch’s contention that nerve cells and their 
connections could be modelled through logic and Claude Shannon’s ‘detached’ theory of 
information processing (Gardner, 1987: 22). These theoretical models were supported by 
laboratory research on brain damage, which highlighted cross-cultural cognitive similarities in 
pathologies like aphasia (language recognition) despite variations in language typologies 
(Gardner, 1987: 22). Early computational models contended that the human mind and its 
mental processes could be examined in relation to computations alone. This was important not 
only to psychology but also to research into artificial intelligence as it suggested that minds 
could be realised via computational interactions. 
 
The idea that computers and brains are analogous is prolific in early cognitive psychology. The 
analogy stems from the fact that both process information. As the CSR scholar Bensen Saler 
notes, computers and minds are both physical instances of a formal system with stipulated 
elements and sets of rules or principles for operating on those elements (2001: 58). For another 
CSR scholar Todd Tremlin (2006), the correspondence is again not just a metaphorical 
association, it a literal one. Human cognition consists of discrete cognitive systems that 
manipulate distinct internal mental states (concepts, representations) in a rule based/ 
algorithmic manner. Critically, such cognitions cause behaviour.   
 
David Broadbent’s theoretical ‘filter model,’ outlined in his 1958 work Perception and 
Communication, first applied cognitive science to the study of human perception. While in 
1967, Ulric Nessier described humans as dynamic information processing systems, whose 
mental operations were computational. The computational model of mind was popularised in 
the philosophy of mind by Hilary Putnam in 1961 and refined throughout the 1960s and ‘70s by 
Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor.5  
                                                     
5
 See Gardner: 1997 for a more detailed overview. 
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Noam Chomsky’s (1959) critique of ‘mind blind’ Skinnerian behaviourism is the most important 
of such applications.6 Behaviourism dominated psychological research in the 1950 through to 
the mid 1960s. Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’ thesis sought to explain panhuman language 
acquisition through innate cognitive structures. It led to the Chomskian Turn (alternatively the 
‘Cognitive Revolution’) in psychology. Chomsky’s critique of behaviourism stemmed from his 
thesis that all normatively functioning infants are born with innate competences for acquiring 
and mastering language. This was in radical contrast to behaviourism, which denied the study 
of internal states in psychological research. Chomsky provides compelling evidence that 
children are predisposed to acquire language and that this predisposition develops organically, 
encouraged by innate syntactical structures. Chomsky believed that while such cognitive 
language processing systems encourage the mastery of language they also constrain the forms 
language takes cross culturally (Chomsky, 1959, 1966). 
  
The key point of Chomsky’s thesis is that not everything related to language is learned and 
appears anticipated by panhuman evolved cognitive processes. Furthermore, the theory 
postulates that the mind is neither a blank slate nor a general-purpose information-processing 
device. The theory encouraged psychologically minded researchers to reassume that it was 
empirically possible to map what was in the head of a cognitiser. Chomsky’s hypothesis, while 
subsequently contested and revised, reasserted the presence and relevance of internal 
cognitions (such as mental states, attention, memory, perception, conceptual thought, and 
decision-making) in psychological research. Such foundational assumptions infuse both Bering 
and Barrett’s developmental research.  
 
Importantly, until the ascent of cognitive method and theory, variants of Piagetian theory 
dominated developmental psychology. Piaget supposed that babies perceive the world as 
William James famously describes as ‘one great blooming, buzzing, confusion’ (James, 
1891/1950: 462). In light of new cognitive perspectives, developmental psychologists began to 
                                                     
6
 Though in Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar Chomsky argues that his theory has little to do with 
modern computational research and is closer to classic linguistic theory (Chomsky, 1966: 9).  
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examine early competences and reasoning biases in children’s thinking. The following quote 
recalling the computer analogy expresses this aim clearly: 
 
[O]ur job as developmental psychologists is to discover what programs babies 
run, and someday, how the program is coded in their brains, and how it evolved. 
If we could do that, we would have solved the ancient philosophical problems of 
knowledge in a scientific way (Gopnik and Kuhl et al., 1999: 6). 
  
Jerry Fodor’s (1983) treatment of the mind as modular also presages core knowledge research 
in cognitive developmental psychology. Fodor initially proposed that low-level cognition is 
composed of basic ‘modules’ or ‘organs.’ These modules are congenitally specified and 
functionally dedicated to specialised tasks such as perception and linguistic processing. Fodor 
draws directly on Chomsky’s theory of ‘generative grammar’ (reformulated as a ‘language 
acquisition device’ (Chomsky, 1966; Fodor, 1983)), as well as experimental data on how optical 
illusions like the Muller-Lyer Illusion work (See Fodor, 1983 for discussion and citations).    
 
Since drawing inspiration from cognitive science the major focus of cognitive developmental 
psychology is on the ways human conceptual structures constrain and inform cultural 
expressions (Barrett, 2007). Within the cognitive developmental literature, the focus is less on 
the modular mind and more on specialised domain cognitions.7 Core knowledge theorists 
propose that the evolved information processing domains shape and constrain the conceptual 
architecture. The mind from the core knowledge perspective is an inferentially rich information-
processing device with inbuilt biases, which encourage humans to see the world in certain 
predictable ways (Slone, 2004: 44). 
                                                     
7
 Domains are not the same as modules. The modularity thesis only indirectly informs cognitive developmental 
psychology (see: Karmiloff-Smith (1996). Modules relate to functional specifications in the mind-brain while 
domains refer to specifications for different types of knowledge. Domains may include a set of interconnected 
modules. Hirschfeld and Gelman state: 
 
 [A domain] is a body of knowledge that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena assumed 
to share certain properties and to be of a distinct and general type. A domain functions as a 
stable response to a set of recurring and complex problems faced by an organism. This response 
involves difficult-to-access perceptual, encoding, retrieval, and inferential processes dedicated to 
that solution (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994: 72).   
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According to the cognitive development literature, domains occur at a supervenient level of 
processing. They are specialised adaptations dedicated to the processing of specific types of 
perceptual information. Domains do not necessarily map back to specific brain regions.  
Domains can be described as normatively emerging inference systems or ‘learning devices’ 
(Barrett, 2007) dedicated to the processing of specialised kinds of information. Many inferential 
domains are active very early in cognitive development and some appear to manifest at birth.  
Such inferential systems encourage all human beings to perceive, think, feel, and behave in 
particular limited ways. They are the products of evolutionary pressures on our early ancestors 
and reflect biologically adaptive responses to the kinds of dangers, challenges, and 
opportunities commonly found in the environments in which our species evolved (see: Plotkin, 
2007; Carruthers, 1992).  
 
The domain-specificity thesis has a number of implications for theories about human cognitive 
processing and conceptual development. It suggests that tacit spontaneous intuitions are 
themselves localised to a given domain with a content bias toward a restricted range of specific 
stimuli.  A domain produces cognitive heuristics in each domain, which structure experiences 
and inspire courses of actions in unique ways from the heuristics in other domains (Gelman, 
1990, Boyer, 1994: 110). Furthermore, domains do not process objects holistically but rather 
focus on certain aspects of the observed object. For example, the human processing of faces is 
a highly sophisticated and subtle cognitive skill; it provides important strategic information 
about the intentions of cospecifics. Such evolved adaptations place emphasis on the processing 
of faces, while relegating other features of the visual environment to the periphery. Thus, 
human faces may not be as readily distinguishable by other organisms, highlighting the species 
parochialism of our domain processing (Boyer and Barrett, 2005: 4). This is an important point; 
inference ‘systems’ need not map reality faithfully; rather their job is to provide useful, often 
tacit, heuristic interpretations. Domains will encourage misrepresentations of the perceived 
entity if such a distortion proves beneficial to the perceiver. Boyer and Clark Barrett argue that 
the human brain is ‘philosophically incorrect’ (Boyer and Clark Barrett, 2005: 4). As such, 
domain boundaries are not the product of natural distinctions within the human organism’s 
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environment but are cognitively prescribed and biased through the functional bias of the 
adaptation. An important feature of domains is that they also process information they were 
not designed to process. 
 
Domain-specific core knowledge theory contends that babies and young children are 
cognitively equipped to represent and order the world in certain predictable and limiting ways 
(see Gopnik, Meltzoff and Kuhl, 1999 for overview). In particular, theorists argue that children 
approach the world with maturationally natural inferences about objects, language, and 
people. Persuasively, the work of Spelke and collaborators found that babies, infants, young 
children, and adults hold a stable and tacit system of object representation.  This system 
governs object motion: including knowledge of cohesion (objects move as connected and 
bounded wholes), continuity (objects move on connected, unobstructed paths), and contact 
(objects influence each other’s motion when and only when they touch) (Leslie and Keeble, 
1987; Spelke, 1990; Aguiar and Baillargeon, 1998). Meltzoff and Moore (1997, 1998, 1999) also 
found that neonates can imitate the facial expressions of others, suggesting that a basic ability 
to correlate internal and external features and to represent the external world may be in place 
by birth. Furthermore, there is a wealth of evidence that children make an ontological 
distinction between animates and inanimates (see Wellman and Gelman, 1998 for review). 
According to core knowledge theory, cognition develops concurrently with perception and 
motor skills, involving enrichments around an unchanging core (Spelke and  Brienlinger et al., 
1992). 
 
The Intuitive Model affirms that the domain-specific mind encourages various a priori 
panhuman knowledge bases about the world and the objects and agents in it.   These ‘default’ 
and enduring ‘folk’ cognitive domains precede experience,8 are unwilled and are held 
regardless of whether or not they are reflectively pondered  (Cosmides and Tooby, 2005: 18; 
Boyer, 2001: 26).  The three basic bodies of implicit knowledge are:9 
 
                                                     
8
 Though require experience and learning to arise. 
9
 See Tremlin: 2006: 66ff for an extended overview. 
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Folk Physics/Mechanics – the naïve ability to predict the general properties and 
behaviour of physical objects and substances (such as object boundaries, gravity, mass 
and movement constraints).  
 
Folk Biology – the naïve ability to locate the characteristics of plants and animals (in 
particular, species essences and the taxonomic relations between species).10  
 
Folk Psychology – the intuitive ability to reason about the mental states of other people 
and agents (such as seeing people as interactive and goal directed through their beliefs 
and desires). 
 
While dedicated to processing and interpreting specialised environmental knowledge, folk 
bodies of tacit knowledge are routinely interactive. They also develop at different periods. For 
example, theory of mind does not develop until between the ages of four and five, while 
intuitive knowledge about objects is in place by six months. Innate domains of knowledge play a 
crucial role in the development of human thinking. Bering states: 
 
Most developmentalists envision a process in which such supportive, implicit 
knowledge is conceptually enriched and elaborated with experience (“adding 
flesh to bones”) to give weight to the mature folk systems seen in older children 
and adults (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Importantly, these experiences will be largely 
the same, because the world is governed by certain ontological regularities that 
are seldom, if ever, actually violated. Thus, the mature, adult endpoint of 
conceptual change will reenact culturally recurrent trends, regardless of 
superficial differences in cultural forms (Bering, 2002b: 266). 
 
Core knowledge theory is the empirical backbone of Intuitive Model theory and directly informs 
the guiding metathesis of this research. For present purposes, it will suffice to survey core folk 
psychological competencies. Certainly, the knowledge domain or ‘inferential system’ of folk 
                                                     
10
 Susan Carey and her collaborators do not regard folk biology as a separate domain. They present a persuasive 
argument that folk biological reasoning is an extension of folk psychological reasoning (Carey 1985; Carey and 
Spelke, 1995; Johnson and Carey: 1998) Atran disagrees (see Medin and Atran, 2004, 2009 for discussion).  
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psychology receives the most attention in Bering and Barrett’s theories and experiments.11  
Both assert the pervasiveness of ‘nativist,’ largely unlearned, developmentally stable, 
historically and cross culturally invariant folk psychological reasoning heuristics.  
 
Nativist folk psychology theory posits the presence of a kind of ‘mind-reading’ (Baron-Cohen, 
1995) device or system, which allows all non-cognitively impaired humans12 to automatically 
and implicitly reason about the occluded beliefs, desires and goals of other humans. It provides 
immediate information and grants the perceiver the ability to act or modify their behaviour 
accordingly. In cognitive developmental psychology, the theoretical construct of theory of mind 
describes the cognitive platform behind mature human folk psychological skills.  
 
Folk psychology also allows a person to predict, and on occasion manipulate, the future 
behaviour of others. Cognitive developmental psychology and evolutionary psychology agree 
that folk psychological inferences, particularly those activated by theory of mind, are the 
foundation of successful social interactions. Theory of mind reduces cognitive complexity and 
encourages the repetition of reliable heuristic reasoning patterns.   
 
The false belief test is one of the primary ways developmental psychologists study folk 
psychology. The false belief test tracks when children are able to express knowledge that 
another agent may entertain different (specifically false) beliefs than the beliefs they 
themselves hold. The simplicity of the task design belies the importance of the competences it 
uncovers. Developmental psychologists focus on children’s awareness of false beliefs because 
knowledge that another agent may hold false beliefs equates to awareness that mental states 
are distinct from real world events, situations and behaviours (Wellman, 2001). An awareness 
of the fallibility of other minds is critical to mature folk psychology.  
 
                                                     
11
 Theorists fiercely contest the developmental processes of folk psychological reasoning (see Davis and Stone, 
1995 for overview). Below I highlight that Bering and Barrett have quite distinctive understanding of the 
mechanisms behind folk psychology.   
12
 For example, Baron Cohen’s research (1995) on autistic people suggests that the disorder may stem from the 
developmental failure to activate theory of mind. 
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The classic false belief test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983), of which there are now numerous 
variations (the most famous is the Sally-Ann test), presents a child with the following set-up: 
 
1) Maxi places his chocolate in the kitchen cupboard and then leaves the room to play. 
2) While playing out of sight of the cupboard, his mother moves the chocolate from the 
cupboard to the draw. 
3) Maxi re-enters the room. 
4) The child is then asked where they think Maxi will look for the chocolate. 
 
The ability to pass the test (i.e., answer correctly that Maxi will look for the chocolate where he 
left it in the kitchen cupboard) is reliably sensitive to age. Between the ages of four and five 
children begin to pass the test; suggesting that children of this age are aware that Maxi relies 
on his beliefs to motivate his actions. In contrast, three-year-old children present no awareness 
of the role of belief in shaping action. However, they do not just answer randomly, they assume 
that Maxi will look for the chocolates in the kitchen drawer.  
 
Barrett and Bering tweak the false belief test, as well as similar tasks such as the appearance 
reality task, to make them pertinent to testing the emergence of religious concepts and ideas. 
For example, Barrett’s employs the Sally-Ann false belief task to test for intuitions about God’s 
abilities (Barrett and Keil, 1996; Barrett and Richert et al., 2001, Barrett and Newman et al., 
2003 etc). Thus, unlike other nascent fields in the cognitive sciences (for example: cognitive 
neuroscience) CSR research builds on developmental psychology’s rich body of work on human 
cognition, utilising its experimental designs which seek to suppress cultural intrusions and 
attempt to map ‘cognition in the ‘raw.’ 
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1.2 The Naturalness of Religious Beliefs 
 
The Intuitive Model’s ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis (Barrett and Lanman, 2008: 
10) argues that human minds generate ‘precursor’ religious beliefs as a by-product of 
normative cognitive development, such as the advent of theory of mind reasoning.  It also 
proposes that the cross-cultural recurrence of certain kinds of religious beliefs and ideas (such 
as belief in ‘god’ and belief in ‘souls’) evidences the causal significance of panhuman 
developmental trajectories and the inferential biases and constraints these produce. The 
intuitive model studies ‘natural cognition.’ Firstly, ‘natural cognition’ means cognitions that 
occur regardless of cultural variations and secondly, cognitions that are characteristically tacit, 
rapid, and reflexive. Research on ‘natural cognition’ suggests that minds are tuned to 
accommodate certain kinds of culturally prescribed religious ideas because so much of the 
inferential work is already in place.  Bering also argues that religious concepts do not just 
activate intuitive inferences in minds. Instead, these ‘default’ inferences may actually give rise 
to them. 
 
Bering and Barrett follow the Standard Model’s investigative strategy. They endeavour to 
identify the universal features of cognition argued to have causal effects on cultural thought 
and behaviour (Barrett, 2003). They also engage with the same template of posited religious 
universals; including a belief in supernatural agency, belief in misfortune and belief in ritual 
efficacy (Whitehouse, 2010). Yet, in contrast to the Standard model, Barrett and Bering seek to 
account for how universal cognitions actually produce religious thought and behaviour. This is 
the key difference between the two CSR models. Barrett and Bering criticise the Standard 
Model for failing to account for the ‘origins’ of religious ideas.  
 
The Standard Model employs a tailored version of Sperber’s ‘epidemiology of representations’ 
(1975, 1996). It focuses attention to the transmission of religious concepts between minds. 
Research highlights how evolved cognitive interests, constraints, biases, and mnemonic systems 
allow the spread of ‘cognitively optimal’ religious representations like supernatural agent 
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concepts (Boyer, 1994, 2001, etc; Barrett and Nyhof, 2004; Tremlin, 2006; Pyysiäinen, 2001, 
2006). In Pascal Boyer’s explanatory model, recurrent religious beliefs are ‘parasitic’ on evolved 
cognitions; they are successful recalled and transmitted because they have a mnemonic 
advantage. Namely, they minimally breach intuitive expectations (Boyer, 1990, 1994 etc). The 
actual ‘origins’ of such beliefs are a secondary question in Boyer’s model and the wider 
Standard Model his research helped shape.  In the Intuitive Model and the developmental 
psychology of religion in general, the origins of such beliefs are central. In further contrast, 
Intuitive model theory argues that the same religious beliefs are pervasive, not because of their 
breach of intuitive expectations but because such beliefs are completely intuitive.  
 
Bering and Barrett argue that the cognitive processes, which encourage the generation and 
transmission of religious ideas, are non-cultural features of the human mind.  They contend 
that the study of early emerging cognition (hence, the focus on children’s reasoning) can 
methodologically suppress environmental factors because cognition, at these early stages at 
least, is an internal process (Barrett, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). Yet, as Barrett and Bering frequently 
remind critics, claiming that basic panhuman cognitions are acultural is not the same as arguing 
that they are present at birth or biologically hardwired (Barrett, 2003). Rather it is the 
contention that early emerging, maturationally innate, cognitive processes produce rich 
inferential biases that compel the acceptance and believability of explicit propositions.  Both 
Bering and Barrett argue that the concepts that interest them (Bering: ‘ghost’ and ‘soul’ 
concepts, Barrett: ‘god’ concepts) build upon generic skeletal concepts themselves created by 
the mundane operations of universal cognitions. Bering and Barrett contend that cultures play 
only an epiphenomenal role in enhancing or suppressing these intuitive concepts.  Cultures only 
provide declarative access (descriptions, meanings: interpretations) to the ‘default’ inferences 
that are spontaneously and normatively generated. In its more radical form, Intuitive Model 
theories propose that cultural inputs may not even be necessary; the intuitive knowledge bases 
are so rich that they may produce such concepts even in the absence of explicit supporting 
propositions:  
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The acquisition of explicit concepts through cultural means of transmission 
appears to be critical for “filling In”’ general inferential processes with content 
enriched information about agency, but the inferential processes themselves are 
neither enabled, nor activated, by such concepts. Instead, explicit religious 
concepts might be epiphenomena that shadow the operation of intuitive 
patterns of reasoning (Bering, 2003: 252). 
 
 Bering states that declarative beliefs are shaped by the socioeconomic demands of a given 
cultural group and ‘play no causal role’ in generating patterns of belief. This is the same for 
declarative religious beliefs, which merely allow conscious access to intuitive patterns of 
reasoning about religious concerns (Bering, 2003: 245). This is a more plausible model than the 
Standard Model because in the Standard Model:  
 
It is unclear how culturally acquired religious concepts can actually endow 
individuals with the cognitive incentive to, for instance, envision personal 
consciousness as surviving death, or to envision life events (which are the 
“actions” of the gods), as being purposeful or meaningful (Bering, 2003: 245). 
 
The majority of developmental psychologists of religion agree that children entertain naïve 
precursor theories about the agents, ideas, and beliefs that feature in many religious traditions.  
A number of theorists have also proposed developmental cognitive biases and default 
inferences that, as a by-product, may have encouraged many cross-culturally recurrent religious 
beliefs. For example, Paul Bloom argues that children present an ‘innate dualism,’ which can 
readily account for the separation of the ‘body’ and the ‘soul’ in the vast majority of human 
cultures (2004, 2005, 2007, with Wiesberg, 2007).  Deborah Kelemen argues that a 
‘promiscuous’ predilection for reasoning in teleological terms emerges early and endures 
throughout the life course (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 2003, 2004; with Carey, 2007; Casler 
2008; DiYanni, 2005a, 2005b; Lombrozo, 2007; Rosset, 2009, Widdowson et al., 2003), while 
Margret Evans found that children prefer creationist accounts of species origins over 
mechanistic accounts (2000a, 2000b, 2001; with Poling, 2002, 2004). Akin to Bering and 
Barrett’s theories, these theorists suggest that the roots of religious beliefs stem from default 
reasoning behaviours.   Thus, because of a rich inferential skeleton ‘many concepts central to 
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major religious traditions are not as opaque to young children as often thought’ (Barrett, 2000: 
30).  
 
Combined these perspectives compel Intuitive Model research. I now examine the Intuitive 
Model’s key conceptual terms. 
 
1.3 Key Terms: ‘Belief,’ ‘Intuition,’ and’ ‘Religious Belief’ 
 
 It is crucial to focus on the Intuitive Model’s conceptual definitions of key terms such as ‘belief’ 
‘intuition’ and ‘religious belief’ because, much like other fields in the CSR, the ‘developmental 
psychology of religious belief’ is driven, and governed by, conceptual terminology.  It is the 
definitional understandings of beliefs that justify the focus and task designs that scholars use.  
As such, the Intuitive Model is a form of philosophical psychology not just an extrapolation of 
experimental psychology. While only Barrett has offered a detailed conceptual discussion of the 
terms employed in Intuitive Model theories, Bering’s conceptual understandings appears to be 
quite similar.13 Anticipating my reformulation of the Intuitive Model’s understanding of intuitive 
religious beliefs in chapter three, it is necessary to review the Intuitive Model’s understanding 
of belief in detail here. This will also highlight that the Intuitive Model is as much a conceptual/ 
theoretical project as it is an experimentally driven one. 
 
Barrett and Lanman ‘minimally define’ belief as ‘the state of a cognitive system holding 
information (not necessarily in propositional or explicit form) as true to the generation of further 
thought and behaviour’ (2008: 110, italics in original). Belief is ‘fundamentally a mental process’ 
(Barrett, 2004b) that encourages ideas about the ordinary objects, agents, and events that 
populate human worlds.  Barrett, citing early work by Sperber (1997), splits beliefs into two 
kinds, reflective beliefs and non-reflective beliefs (2004b; Barrett and Lanman, 2008).  
 
                                                     
13
 Given the importance of definitional clarity in the Intuitive Model, I find it striking that Bering has given little 
space to explaining what he means by key terms such as ‘belief’ and ‘intuition’ in his theories. 
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o Reflective and Non-Reflective Beliefs 
 
Reflective beliefs are the kinds of beliefs that people consciously hold and reason through. 
Typically, such beliefs are communicable to other people. They are normally meta-
representational in the sense that they are deliberate, evaluative responses that allow a person 
to make a judgement or reach a decision. Characteristically held in semi-propositional form,14 
reflective beliefs are individually and culturally idiosyncratic. Simple reflective beliefs include: 
‘Green potatoes should not be eaten,’ ‘this car is red,’ pigs are dirty animals,’ ‘it is hygienic to 
wash your hand after going to the toilet’ and ‘Marlborough gets a lot of sun.’ These beliefs are 
predominantly the product of personal experience and/or tutelage. Reflective beliefs also 
include difficult and complex knowledge that requires great effort to grasp. The Western school 
curriculum transmits reflective knowledge about complex sciences, such as algebra, chemistry 
and biology. An essential feature of reflective beliefs is that they do not necessary correlate to 
relevant behaviours. For example, a person may reflectively ‘know’ that smoking cigarettes is 
carcinogenic, but continue to smoke regardless. 
 
Reflective religious beliefs are simply reflective beliefs associated with religious themes. Indeed, 
the only thing that distinguishes reflective religious beliefs from other reflective beliefs is that 
religious beliefs are determined to be about ideas that feature in religious traditions. According 
to Barrett, religious beliefs are simply particular types of information that motivate ‘religious’ 
actions, sidestepping the problematic understanding of religious belief in religious studies.  
These may include ‘Mana is the primary link between humans and the Atua,’ ‘Joseph Smith 
discovered the Book of Mormon,’ and ‘Kali is vengeful.’ The Standard Model CSR focuses on 
reflective beliefs, looking to the underlying structures and relating these back to the cognitive 
by-products that enable their transmission and acquisition. In contrast, Intuitive Model theories 
have only a secondary interest in reflective religious beliefs of this nature.  
                                                     
14
 A semi-propositional belief is a belief a person holds even though they may not have specific reasons or 
knowledge to justify their belief. Even without such knowledge, the belief is a reflective response that compels 
behavior.  I develop the role of semi-propositional religious beliefs in chapter three, where I examine and apply 
Sperber’s writing on semi-propositional beliefs to Intuitive Model theory.  
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Non-reflective beliefs are beliefs that a person entertains regardless of whether or not they 
know they are doing so. As should be clear from the previous section, the study of non-
reflective beliefs is the focus of Intuitive Model theories. These beliefs are forms of unlearned 
tacit or ‘folk’ knowledge (Barrett and Lanman, 2008). They are inferential outcomes of the 
normative processing activities of the mind-brain. Barrett emphasises that when developmental 
psychologists state that a child ‘knows’ or ‘understands’ or has a ‘belief’ about something, they 
really mean they hold a non-reflective belief about the object or event or agent that child is 
thinking about (Barrett, 2003). Non-reflective beliefs arise via core knowledge structures and 
encourage certain assumptions and intuitions about the contents and actions of objects and 
entities that populate the world. These include assumptions that stones are inedible, snakes are 
dangerous, and that the sun revolves around the earth. 
  
Experimental designs attempt to trace such implicit beliefs. For example, the participants in 
Barrett and Keil’s (1996) foundational ‘theological correctness’ experiments were observed to 
entertain non-reflective beliefs about God’s humanlike qualities (specifically, humanlike 
limitations), despite counterstatements expressed in their reflective beliefs. 
 
There is a much closer correlation between a non-reflective belief and behaviour than between 
reflective beliefs and behaviour. Intuitive Model theory posits that many early emerging non-
reflective beliefs endure throughout the life course. Contradictory, or more elaborate reflective 
beliefs, may suppress inferential beliefs but they never do so completely. They are likely to re-
appear in circumstances where a person does not have the time or means to entertain 
reflective beliefs. For example, Kelemen and Rosset (2009) found that teleological reasoning 
biases grew stronger in scientifically educated dementia suffers as they lost access to learned 
reflective knowledge. 
 
Because non-reflective beliefs are the direct outputs of mental processes that are the same for 
all non-impaired humans, they are also universal, with little, if any, interpersonal and intra-and-
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inter-cultural variation. Barrett states: ‘No matter where you go or to whom you talk, people 
believe that rocks can only be in one place at a time, cannot pass through other solid objects, 
and must be supported or else fall down’(Barrett, 2004: 9). These folk inferences allow 
spontaneous decision-making because they greatly lesson the burden of cognitive processing: 
 
Producing such beliefs is the job of such [cognitive] tools and the utility of such 
beliefs cannot be underestimated. What if every time we move an object from 
one place to another (as when we feed ourselves, get dressed, wash dishes, and 
so forth) we had to reason consciously that objects require support or else they 
fall toward the ground until their path is blocked by another physical object of 
sufficient density to stop their descent. Isn’t it much more convenient that we 
have an unconscious device that forms beliefs about how gravity operates on 
concepts so that we don’t have to clutter our minds with such mundane issues? 
(Barrett, 2004b: 7)  
 
Though Bering does not describe belief in the same way as Barrett, his focus is also on 
pancultural non-reflective beliefs. He describes these more generally as content-free cognitive 
processes. He means that non-reflective beliefs or inferential biases are very general; the 
culturally acquired content that fills them is not deterministic. For example, a bias toward tacit 
beliefs in psychological immortality does not correlate immediately to ‘body’ and ‘soul’ dualism. 
 
In Barrett and Bering’s reading, non-reflective beliefs correlate directly to ‘intuitions,’ as a key 
feature of non-reflective beliefs is that they are ‘instinctual,’ allowing behavioural responses 
without reflective deliberation. The term ‘intuitions’ can therefore substitute non-reflective 
beliefs or the more broad term ‘implicit knowledge.’ Hence, Barrett and Bering contend that 
they study ‘intuitive religious beliefs.’  
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o Practiced and Non-Practiced Naturalness 
 
A second, and related, division is between ‘practiced’ and ‘non-practiced’ cognitions (McCauley, 
2000). These basic forms of cognitive naturalness account for the key ways intuitive beliefs 
arise. Despite being the result of two pathways and involving idiosyncratic content, non-
reflective beliefs have the same reflexive and intuitive properties as non-reflective beliefs. 
 
The maturationally natural pathway involves non-reflective beliefs promoted by evolved 
cognitive mechanisms. These adapted responses arise during exposure to normative human 
environments. They arise in the absence of instruction, supportive cultural practices, and/or 
enabling artefacts or technologies. Examples include native language fluency, basic numeracy 
skills and distinctions between ontological kinds. 
 
Practiced natural non-reflective beliefs, which may overlap or work in tandem with 
maturationally compelled assumptions, are quite different: 
 
Practiced naturalness captures the idea of acquiring mastery of certain concepts 
or skills through intensive training and practice. A chess master may acquire 
practiced naturalness regarding chess strategy and play. Given enough practice, 
automaticity and fluency results, so that knowledge of how various pieces move 
can become non-reflective beliefs. Similarly, an expert in Shakespearean 
literature might develop such well-rehearsed representations of various 
characters in Shakespeare’s plays that their motives, desires, and idiosyncrasies 
become non-reflective beliefs. More mundanely, growing up in a particular 
cultural setting can endow us with non-reflective beliefs about the proper way to 
order food at a restaurant, how to purchase food at a grocery store, how to drive 
a car, or how to behave during a worship service (for example, when to stand, 
kneel, sit, etc). These non-reflective beliefs become non-reflective through 
practiced naturalness (Barrett and Lanman, 2008: 112). 
 
Nearly exclusively, the Intuitive Model studies the maturationally natural pathways of non-
reflective religious belief formations. Yet Intuitive Model theories readily acknowledge that 
‘religiosity’ involves much more than non-practiced ‘intuitive religion’ (Bering, 2010). Even so, 
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Intuitive Model explanations do not attempt to go beyond this explanatory boundary line.15 The 
‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis makes no direct claim about how latent biases are 
encouraged or suppressed by cultures or the individuals who experience them; religiosity is 
thus not seen an isomorphic outgrowth of underlying cognition (Bering, 2010: 167). Barrett, in 
particular, cedes the study of practiced natural non-reflective beliefs to ‘cultural evolution’ 
theories. However, the Intuitive Model does rest on a probabilistic claim.  While the 
‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis is non-deterministic, the inferential cognitions 
which excite the generation of religious beliefs suggest that such beliefs will appear in 
numerous, if not all, cultural settings.  
  
1.4 The Intuitive Model’s Empirical Methodologies  
 
The ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis and the Intuitive Model’s definition of key 
concepts such as ‘belief,’ ‘intuition,’ and ‘non-practiced’ and ‘non-reflective beliefs’ justifies the 
methodological reductions and choice of human subjects that feature in Bering and Barrett’s 
work.  The Intuitive Model, while analysing general cognition, does not study religion in general. 
Like all CSR research, scholars fractionate and deflate religion (Boyer, 2005; Whitehouse, 2008) 
focussing on one recurrent belief or set of interrelated beliefs.  
  
Barrett affirms that nomothetic cognitive-development psychology is the preeminent way to 
study ‘intuitive religion.’ Indeed, both Bering and Barrett believe that it is controlled 
experimental research that puts the ‘science’ in the CSR (Barrett, 2008b).   Barrett, in particular, 
has long criticised the CSR for the paucity of experimental evidence behind key hypotheses 
proposed by cognitive anthropologists: 
 
Unfortunately, I perceive in my field a general tendency to attempt to solve 
theoretical problems through argumentation alone. Rather than systematically 
test Lawson and McCauley’s claim, for instance, we would rather explain how 
they just don’t  seem right (or do seem right), cherry picking historical cases or 
ethnographic anecdotes instead of doing the hard work of systematic data 
                                                     
15
 However, Intuitive Model theories of atheism are an exemption to this rule. I discuss atheism in chapter three. 
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collection. Where is the science in the cognitive science of religion? (Barrett, 
2008b: 297) 
 
Barrett argues that controlled experimental studies ensure that Intuitive Model theories, in 
contrast to more ‘speculative’ anthropological theories rest on a more reliable empirical 
footing. Not only are they supported by a strong research tradition in experimental psychology 
but the emphasis on precise, controlled testing of predictions, allows for reliable empirical 
studies of posited hypotheses.  
 
Nomothetic developmental psychology is essential to Intuitive Model research because of the 
contention that cognitive biases and inferences are maturationally natural. Children are thus 
the necessary subjects of such research. In addition, against a strong neo-Piagetian tradition, 
which argues that a fundamental cognitive shift occurs between the cognitions of children and 
adults, Intuitive Model theories propose that maturationally default non-reflective beliefs 
endure throughout the life course, thus increasing the relative salience of studies conducted on 
children. 
 
Crucially, experimental science grants access to people’s tacit religious beliefs through task 
designs that separate spontaneous or time-pressed reasoning from explicit reasoning 
behaviours. This is critical in Intuitive Model research because Intuitive Model theories propose 
that the study of religious texts and interpretive, ethnographic research provide no information 
about an individual’s tacit religious beliefs. It is only the experimental ‘lab’ and not 
observational anthropology or comparative religious studies that allow access to a person’s 
implicit beliefs.    Because you cannot ask a believer about the tacit beliefs she entertains, a 
religious expert and an adult lay believer encultured in a specific religious tradition, in a purely 
cognitive sense, differ little from a five-year-old child who has absolutely no explicit knowledge 
of the religious tradition. It is this supposition that justifies why Intuitive Model theorists are 
able to study the causal role of cognition in isolation from cultural causations.  
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Similarly, Intuitive Model theories have little interest in consilience theorising between 
interpretive and explanatory approaches as the subject matter of investigation, the cognitive 
development of ‘religious’ thinking in young children, removes interest in the holistic and 
detailed study of the child’s world and socialised context. Intuitive Model theory posits that the 
singular focus on panhuman cognitive development offers a rich basis for the generation of 
recurrent religious ideas in various cultures. 
 
Intuitive Model theories prefer ‘artificial’ rather than naturalistic studies. In fact, key to the 
Intuitive Model is the artificially or contextual neutrality of the experimental setting. The 
experiments are artificial in the sense that children are encouraged to ponder questions they 
may not have explicitly considered in their normative world engagements and thus have not 
had time to reason through initial interpretative reflections. Justifying this, Intuitive Model 
theorists note that children display only very basic understandings of death and the reasoning 
behaviours of other agents.  Experimental devices such as time constraints and the inability to 
source authoritative advice grant psychologists a glimpse at the implicit assumptions that 
children entertain.  Thus, ‘developmental psychologists of religious belief’ employ uncommon 
questions and task designs to spark default intuitive responses. Furthermore, the ‘lab’ setting 
ensures that religious contextual influences play only a minimal role in resultant reasoning and 
behaviour.   
 
1.5 Theoretical Divergences between Bering and Barrett  
 
I noted at the outset that despite similarities in perspectives, there are also crucial distinctions 
between Bering and Barrett’s research methods and resultant hypotheses. These now need to 
be emphasised to ensure I do not collapse the work of either in the following pages.  
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o Differing Understandings of Ontology and Explanation 
 
Firstly, Barrett and Bering have different expectations about the explanatory scope of their 
theories. Barrett restricts his hypotheses to the experimental findings themselves: the 
‘preparedness hypothesis’ is a statement about the available developmental data. Bering’s ‘folk 
psychology of souls’ places his developmental research amongst a theoretical survey that 
includes ethnography, comparative psychology, existential psychology, and evolutionary 
psychology. His developmental research preempts the larger evolutionary hypotheses.   
 
While Barrett’s research relates to the classical cognitive interest in the information processing 
of concepts, Bering departs from this investigative framework through his focus on the 
evolutionary origins of existential concern. 
 
o Different Emphasis on Evolutionary Theory  
 
The role of evolutionary theory in Bering and Barrett’s hypotheses reflects a distinction in 
ontological commitments. Barrett is a practicing Christian who does not believe that the natural 
scientific study of religion is able to answer ultimate ontological questions. He remains 
‘agnostic’ (Barrett, 2004b: 9) on evolutionary theorising about the origins of religious beliefs. He 
has no problem with the claims that religious beliefs are prolific because they are the by-
products of everyday cognitive processing. However: 
 
The relationship between CSR and evolutionary science is…more opportunistic 
than necessary. That is, CSR could explore how natural human cognition informs 
and constrains religious expression without explaining why human cognition is 
how it is. Such an explanation, perhaps provided by evolutionary psychology, 
increases the depth of CSR’s accounts, but in fact amounts to a secondary 
project (Barrett, 2007: 12). 
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In contrast, Bering positions himself as a member of the ‘new atheist movement’ (personal 
communication). Bering wants to explain the peculiarity and pervasiveness of beliefs from an 
evolutionary perspective. His research is overtly entrenched in the theoretical propositions of 
classic evolutionary psychology, including David Buss, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and Steven 
Pinker. The evolutionary model behind his hypotheses is critical. He states: 
 
It is unclear to me how one could ever begin to construct such a methodology 
without first having a general evolutionary theory capable of generating 
hypotheses and offering an interpretive lens through which to view the findings 
(Bering, 2006:489). 
 
Evolutionary perspectives have major implications for Bering’s understanding of the 
‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis. Bering’s causal account is bottom up. His interest is in 
aligning the evolutionary foundation of human cognitions with religious beliefs as they appear 
across cultures. The ‘folk psychology of souls’ is clearly an attempt at a general evolutionary 
psychology of existential reasoning.  It is an ambitious macro-level theory that necessarily 
correlates the empirically sourced with the theoretically speculative. He argues that beliefs in 
meaningful supernatural agents are an ex-adaptation. Like Barrett, he argues that early 
intuitions about supernatural beings were a by-product of a mind adapted to police predation 
and to reason strategically about other agents. However, Bering also contends that the basic 
building blocks of such cognitions became a system favourable to evolutionary processes due to 
their fitness enhancing social inhibitions.16 He has studied the cognitions of chimpanzees 
hoping to uncover the deep roots of religious beliefs (Bering, 2001). 
                                                     
16
  For the purposes of this thesis, I am putting aside the rich internal and external debates about the position of 
evolutionary theory in the CSR. Certainly, the role of evolutionary theory in CSR research is both basic and richly 
contested. However, it is my contention that the recurrent focus on the validity and relevance of evolutionary 
theorising ensures that equally recurrent questions remain unanswered. By bypassing evolutionary evaluations I 
can address the criticisms directly and locate commonalities between research areas that are often alienated from 
each other due to different emphases on evolutionary frameworks.  Engaging with the critics on their own terms 
offers a way to consider and accommodate critical perspectives without the ontological search for the evolutionary 
plausibility of subjects under discussion.  I am inspired by some CSR researchers such as Whitehouse (2008) and 
Barrett (2008) who argue that the evolutionary basis of cognitive processes need not be a central focus in the CSR. 
I accept that temporarily placing aside the rich and fertile discussions on the place of evolutionary theory in 
cognitive studies of religion is admittedly risky. However, it is not a regression as my thesis encourages Intuitive 
Model theorists to interact directly with the critical literature on the critics own terms. Because these criticisms 
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As noted above, Barrett is critical of such evolutionary considerations (Barrett, 2007).He is also 
critical of the easy alignment of research conducted in different explanatory fields.   
Developmental studies may be of interest to scholars working in these fields but it is not 
necessary for scholars to be jacks-of-all-trades, as this has the potential to destabilise 
experimental evidence.  
 
Barrett is not overly concerned with explaining the evolutionary developments of these 
mechanisms. Similarly, he believes that the existential meaning of religious beliefs is a 
theological question beyond the instrumental investigative framework of the natural sciences. 
Put simply Barrett is interested in ‘how’ questions, whereas Bering is interested equally in ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions.  
 
Still, Barrett argues that Intuitive Model theories complement Standard Model theories 
because the Intuitive Model introduces a missing ingredient within ‘cultural evolution’ or 
‘selectionist’ models; namely the actual developmental origins of such beliefs. Bering disagrees. 
He contends that concept acquisition, as features in Barrett’s theories and the dominant 
Standard Model hypothesis, Boyer’s theory of minimally counterintuitive representations, 
should only be of peripheral interest in cognitive studies of religion. He states:  
 
I remain unconvinced that the ontogenetic expression of implicit religious beliefs 
turns on children’s conceptual slots being filled by such counterintuitive 
representations… Rather, it seems equally, if not more (based on recent data, 
Barrett et al. 2001; Bering 2002a; Bering & Bjorklund 2004; Kelemen 1999), 
plausible that the generativity of religious concepts is nothing more than an 
epiphenomenal process that maps descriptive, memorable ontological 
properties onto already existing causal inferences that are spontaneously 
generated by individual minds (Bering, 2003: 244/245).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
can be observed from numerous disciplines, I think it is valid for scholars to examine them unburdened by the 
fruitful and extensive evolutionary debates.  
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Uniquely, Bering contends that research in the CSR has failed to distinguish between 
environmental and subjective events, such as the ways in which people derive existential 
meaning from perceptual inputs. He argues that the CSR ignores the existential meanings that 
people grant their religious beliefs (Bering, 2003: 250). In his reading, this existential meaning is 
vital to the everyday experience of religion. Bering’s ‘folk psychology of souls’ seeks to 
overcome this absence by focusing on how cognitive mechanisms allow people to make sense 
of random events in terms of individual meaning. He sees key hypotheses, such as the 
‘simulation constraint’ hypothesis, directly contesting the Standard Model. He argues that the 
experimental data suggests that beliefs in psychological immortality arise spontaneously 
because of the inability of children and adults to simulate the experience of death.   
 
o Different Folk Psychological Models: Simulation vs. Theory Theory of Mind 
 
Bering’s interest in the onset of an ‘existential theory of mind’ draws attention to a major 
difference between Bering and Barrett’s theoretical frameworks. As I highlighted earlier, both 
agree that theory of mind and folk psychology is a decisive human adaptation; it is required for 
skilful social interaction and plays a primary causal role in explaining behaviour. 
 
Barrett’s focus on conceptual development in religious thinking builds upon classic theory of 
mind literature. Barrett subscribes to the theory theory of mind, the contention that children 
understand the beliefs and desires of others through the utilisation of ‘theory like’ principles 
(McCauley, 2000). Children are described as little scientists because they draw conclusions 
about the mental states of others by observing and interpreting their behaviour. From such 
tacit inferences, they develop predictions, expectations, and further inferences before applying 
these in novel scenarios and hypothetical situations. In particular the ‘rules’ that govern how 
beliefs and desires motivate behaviour encourage predictions about the internal mind states of 
entities perceived as intentional agents. Paul Churchland describes these rules: 
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Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit 
command of an integrated body of lore concerning the law like relations holding 
among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior. Given its 
nature and functions, this body of lore may quite aptly be called “folk 
psychology” (1990: 207). 
 
In contrast, Bering’s focus is not on conceptual development and the interpretation of agency 
but on inferential reasoning behaviour relative to social interactions. Bering contends that the 
key mechanism underlying theory of mind competence is a simulation mechanism.  
 
Simulation theory of mind is an alternative model of theory of mind aptitudes. Simulation 
theory denies, or at least appends, the key ‘theory theory’ claim that people understand others 
through the deployment of theories. Bering follows Paul Harris and Goldman’s argument that 
humans routinely generate analogous internal experiences of others in order to comprehend 
them.  
 
Intuitive reasoning about other agents is a result of such simulations. The simulation hypothesis 
asserts that people must recognise their own mental states before they can ascribe them to 
other people/ agents. Simulation theorists argue that it is essential to social coordination and 
may underline empathy experiences (Goldman, 1992). The ability to defer to one’s own 
thoughts while interpreting the behaviour of others massively reduces complexity.  
 
 Bering’s interest in simulation theory encourages him to propose a new variant of theory of 
mind competence.  This is a new model because of the central focus on ‘meaningful mentalistic 
interpretations’ (Bering, 2002: 3). Bering’s ‘existential theory of mind’ integrates thought, 
emotion, and motivations in pursuit of a fuller understanding of intuitive reasoning. 
Introspection is thus the basis of such reasoning and it develops and matures as a person does.  
 
However, simulation theory expects that people interpret events, agents, and objects in terms 
of subjective meanings compelled by innate mental apparatuses. Such cognitively compelled 
subjectivity plants religious themes and ideas onto an indifferent external world. As expected in 
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‘theory theory,’ such simulations are predictive and explanatory. It is the generated subjective 
meaning, which realises the simulation and motivates behaviour.  Subsequently, as in ‘theory 
theory,’ the default-reasoning stance remains dormant throughout a human’s life and is 
exposed in rapid or real-time thinking behaviours.  
 
However, Bering’s focus is not so much on simulation but on simulation constraints.  The 
‘simulation constraint’ hypothesis encourages him to focus on the effects these constraints and 
errors have on subjective reasoning. For example, because children cannot imagine 
psychological non-existence they ‘simulate’ analogous experiences such as ‘sleeping’ or 
‘resting.’  The effects of such simulation constraints on existential reasoning are the focus of his 
theories. 
 
Considered together, these three distinctions (ultimate ontological commitments, relative 
centrality of evolutionary psychology and alternate understandings of innate folk psychology) 
encourage very different emphases and conclusions in their research.  
  
Crucially though, despite these differences, Bering and Barrett agree at a metatheoretical level. 
Both psychologists assume structural similarity in the mind-brain and its generic development 
in all healthy humans. They concur that many religious beliefs are truly intuitive.    
 
1.6 The Internal Critical Literature: Three Themes  
 
Having described the explanatory framework above, I now examine the core critical writings on 
Bering and Barrett’s theories. Despite their various differences, I note certain commonalities in 
the critiques of each theorist’s work that apply to both theorists in equal measure. My aim in 
this section is not to defend or add further criticism to their specific hypotheses, nor is it to 
uncover whether specific criticisms of a particular hypothesis are warranted. Rather, my aim is 
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to discover what the critical literature, as a collective body, contends are the major unresolved 
issues in Intuitive Models of religious beliefs. 17 
 
I begin by citing the three dominant objections to Bering and Barrett’s work. I then consider 
how each theorist has and/or would respond to these objections.  I argue that these recurrent 
criticisms isolate significant issues at a metatheoretical level.  In subsequent chapters, 
motivated by these criticisms, I explain why Bering and Barrett need to consider and respond to 
scholars who use humanities’ frameworks or alternative models of cognition. The three 
recurrent criticisms of Bering and Barrett’s theories are: 
 
1) Experimental task designs are problematic and findings are ambivalent and/or 
inconclusive.   
2) Bering and Barrett imply universality without appropriate ethnographic or experimental 
evidence. They appear to universalise a uniquely modern and American understanding 
of religion and religious belief. 
3) The Intuitive Model excludes the obvious, and critical, role of sociocultural causations. 
 
These criticisms represent what I consider the major unresolved criticisms of their research.  I 
now examine each of these criticisms individually:  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17
 I exclude criticisms which discuss one of Bering and Barrett’s hypotheses and have no immediate relevance to 
their experimental research on children (such as Lisdorf’s criticism of Barrett’s HADD system (2007 and Robbins 
and Jack’s (2006) critique of the simulation constraint hypothesis). Furthermore, I ignore criticisms that only 
pertain to one theorists (for example, the evolutionary framework of the ‘folk psychology of souls’ is heavily 
contested, see: Hegde and Johnson 2006; Pyysiäinen, 2003, 2006, Boyer, 2006). Finally, my decision to investigate 
the metathesis is strategic. Because I do not have training in developmental psychology, I do not have the ability to 
analyse the experimental work in terms of its experimental validity. I necessarily rely on those that have had such 
training and from them source a set of recurrent criticisms, which I approach from novel angles in the following 
chapters.   
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o Experimental Findings are Problematic 
 
The most significant criticisms focus on the ambivalent nature of the Intuitive Model’s 
experimental findings.  Critics contest every Intuitive Model experimental study arguing that 
they involve questionable task designs and discordant and/or contradictory results in the 
subsequent replication of experiments. Many critics argue that Bering and Barrett are guilty of 
‘over-interpreting’ experimental findings.   
 
A related problem is that Bering and Barrett’s theories call into question long established 
hypotheses and empirical evidence. For example, Barrett must compete with the neo-Piagetian 
argument that ‘god concepts’ are always by-products of human concepts (Piaget, 1951: 111 and 
below for discussion). 
  
Peter Westh (In Press) contests the validity of the ‘theological correctness’ experiments. He 
notes that in the majority of the experiments, participants completed the task at their own 
paces, and some even had the story in front of them. He concludes that ‘there is no reason to 
think that the anthropomorphic bias in the story comprehension task was caused by a pressure 
to perform “fast on-line reasoning” or by limited memory capacity. If indeed there was 
‘cognitive pressure’ it was due to the complexity of the task rather than a demand for simple 
and fast heuristics’ (Westh, In Press: 11, italics in original). Thus, in his reading, the fundamental 
Intuitive Model claim that ‘people's knowledge about how the gods operate does not turn on 
any specifically cultural content’ (McCauley, 2000: 78) does not have experimental support.  
 
Nikos Makris and Dimitris Pnevmatikos also question the Intuitive Model’s experimental 
evidence.  They cross-checked Barrett and Richert et al.’s claim that children are able to 
conceptualise the representational properties of supernatural entities prior to the development 
of a representational understanding of the human mind. The critics replicated two of the three 
experiments published as ‘God’s Beliefs vs. Mothers’ (2001), involving a modified perspective-
taking task. Makris and Pnevmatikos were motivated by Pnevmatikos’ earlier findings (2000) 
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which support the contradictory neo-Piagetian claim that before developing the cognitive 
ability to pass the false belief task children routinely attribute human properties to all non-
human entities, whether plants, animals and/or gods.  
 
Makris and Pnevmatikos take specific issue with the claim that ‘when children reason about 
God’s and a person’s knowledge, they are able to reason more accurately about God than they 
can about human beings’ (Barrett, 2003: 231). They argue that extant experimental results are 
ambiguous and can actually explain the opposite of what Barrett and Richert claim. The same 
studies highlight children’s strong tendency to project human mental properties onto their 
concepts about God. 
 
Margret Evans and Henry Wellman argue the same point; children only grasp God’s 
omniscience once they can reason about false beliefs (Evans and Wellman, 2006: 471).  They 
locate a methodological shortcoming in the experimental design, arguing that the results 
(Barrett and Richert, et al., 2001) do not make clear whether three-year-old children attribute 
the human agent with superhuman qualities or whether they anthropomorphise God.  
 
Certainly, the use of the false belief test to track the onset of mature theory of mind 
understandings is problematic. A body of developmental literature (Wellman and Cross et al., 
2001; Wellman and Liu, 2004) view the development of second order representational ability as 
one of gradual progression rather than an abrupt shift in cognitive development. In particular, 
Pratt and Bryant’s (1990) experiments imply that by the age of three children understand that 
‘not seeing’ equals ‘not knowing.’ Wellman and Liu also found that children have basic 
understandings of ignorance much earlier than four-and-a-half-years old as maintained in the 
false belief literature. Both experiments point to the presence of some abilities necessary for 
the representation of human minds much earlier than expected in the theory of mind 
literature.  In light of this research, Makris and Pnevmatikos argue that Barrett and 
collaborators should have employed a task that allowed them to consider early emerging skills 
in the representations of human minds.   
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Thus, Makris and Pnevmatikos’ experiments include a task that tracked an early emerging 
component of a representational understanding of the human mind: the knowledge that 
perceptual limitations inhibit knowledge. They argue that the inclusion of a task that traces this 
early emerging understanding is critical to establishing the validity of the ‘preparedness 
hypothesis.’  
 
The results of their first experiment were similar to Barrett and his collaborators. Like American 
children, Greek children did not appear to be able to distinguish between God and human 
minds before the age of five. Subsequently, they did not transfer their new knowledge of 
human fallibility onto God.  
 
However, the second experiment, which included the novel task design problematise the 
results of the earlier experiments. In the second study, children did not grant God the qualities 
that Barrett contends underline the ‘preparedness hypothesis.’ They found that prior to the 
advent of mature representational ability children report similar limitations for both humans 
and gods. This suggests that the youngest children do not treat God and human minds 
differently. Rather they display a singular and indiscriminate conception of mind and thus, in 
Makris and Pnevmatikos reading, are no way ‘cognitively prepared’ to grasp ‘god concepts’ of 
mind prior to human ones:  
 
This understanding is quite general and not accompanied by reflection on its 
object so that it does not enable younger children to reason comparably for 
human and super-natural mental properties (Makris and Pnevmatikos, 2007: 
373).  
 
Their study proposes that it is only at the age of five years that children exhibit a heuristically 
sound awareness about human minds. It is only when this representational ability is 
established, and utilised, that children are capable of generating understandings about a 
differentiated supernatural mind. They conclude: ‘*b+efore that time, children seem to have 
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only one way of understanding the representational properties of mind, human or super-
natural, and that is an anthropocentric one’ (Makris and Pnevmatikos, 2007: 374).  
 
Nevertheless, Makris and Pnevmatikos’ conclusions are as tentative as Barrett and his 
collaborators.  Barrett responds that their second experiment is unable to track whether 
children are reasoning anthropomorphically or merely egoistically (Barrett, 2008a: 1). This is 
important because if it is the latter the pre-representational findings may be nothing more than 
an example of children working through what is familiar to them rather than a projection of 
human qualities onto other agents.  
 
Bering’s perceived ‘over-interpretation’ of experimental data relates to his blending of this data 
with evolutionary and existential psychological perspectives.  Evans and Wellman, whose 
experimental work Bering’s theory intimately depends, criticise his task designs and the 
conceptual frameworks that explain the experimental data (2006: 471). They also criticise the 
lack of a developmental trajectory for the existential reasoning behaviour he documents. 
Without this consideration, Bering’s evolutionary and developmental theory is unconvincing. 
Like Pyysiäinen (2006: 483), they reason that Bering needs to distinguish his existential 
psychology not only from normative theory of mind reasoning but also from intuitive 
conceptions of origins and agency if he wants his thesis to be plausible and not just derivative 
of ordinary theory of mind skills.  
 
Wellman and Evans accentuate that the few experiments that do chart the advent of existential 
concerns are not only tenuous in terms of design they are also contradictory. They observe 
discordant correlations in Bering’s own experiments. In the ‘Princess Alice’ experiments, 
existential reasoning appears to depend on the onset of theory of mind, as only the oldest 
children (seven-years and older) reliably inferred communicative intent behind natural events, 
while the youngest children struggled to reason in this way. Yet this is in contrast to the key 
findings of the ‘Mouse and Alligator’ experiment, which implies that before the onset of a 
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representational understanding of mind, children appear to grant mental functions to dead 
agents (Evan and Wellman, 2006: 471). 
 
Moreover, Evan’s own research (with Poling: 2002), as well as Clark Barrett and Behne’s (2005), 
suggests that four to five-year-olds cease to project mental attributes onto the deceased. 
Similarly, Flavell and Green et al. (2000) found that five-year-olds do not attribute thinking 
behaviour to waking persons; they actually seem to downplay the mentalistic activity of people 
engaged in mundane tasks. Wellman and Evans advise that because his finding are at odds with 
the extant, though clearly still meagre, findings in the related literatures Bering should be 
cautious of the claim that children universally project mentalist properties onto dead agents 
and that this ascription is the causal building blocks of existential cum prosocial reasoning.  
 
Evans argues that ‘creationist’ beliefs about animal origins may inform the development of an 
existential understanding of mortality as this correlates to knowledge that humans are 
responsible for the construction of artefacts without biological preconditions. Evans proposes 
that children, when pressured, transfer their knowledge of human intentionality in the 
construction of artefacts to origin considerations. Prior to an appropriate understanding of 
human intentionality, children cannot, and do not, sense a superhuman designer.  In contrast to 
both Barrett and Bering, Evans and Wellman reason that god and/or afterlife concepts require 
cognitive effort, necessitating the onset of knowledge about human intentionality, artifice, 
fallibility and the entertainment of existential questions about mortality and existence. They 
conclude that Bering has offered an evolutionary theory without offering a developmental one. 
This is a problem because Bering’s evolutionary theory depends on his developmental research. 
Without this, it is probable that existential concern is contingent on a developing theory of 
mind. 
 
Evans also notes that Bering misrepresents her own research on species origins. She takes 
particular issue with his claim that there are significant associations between belief in 
intelligent design and belief in immortal souls. In fact, Evan’s work emphasises contextual 
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factors and shows that children from Christian backgrounds prefer creationist accounts of 
origins, while young children from non-fundamentalist backgrounds are equally prone to 
spontaneous generation (in Aristotle’s classic example: dung makes flies) accounts as they are 
to creationist ones. She found that it was only once they were eight-years-old that children, 
regardless of their schooling or their parents’ religious affiliations, preferred creationist 
explanations of origins to alternatives (Evans and Wellman, 2006: 471). These finding’s lead 
Evans to propose that children younger than this age are unable to appreciate origin concepts 
because they have not developed the requisite existential knowledge about death and human 
transience.  
 
In response, Bering admits that a robust developmental trajectory for the ‘existential theory of 
mind’ is currently unavailable due to a lack of systematic experimental research on the 
questions that the model raises.  He accepts that until the experimental work is undertaken, the 
theory must remain hypothetical. However, he does not believe his two experiments are 
contradictory, as they are focussing on different reasoning behaviours and are not directly 
comparable.  
 
For example, the ‘Princess Alice’ experiments examined whether, and if so at what age, children 
begin to infer meaningful communicative messages in causally unrelated events, while the 
‘Mouse and Alligator’ experiments examined whether children separate biological and 
psychological states when reasoning about dead agents. While the ‘folk psychology of souls’ 
does bundle the two types of intuitive beliefs into a single adaptive system it is misleading to 
directly compare and contrast them.  
 
Bering also contends that Evans and Wellman are mistaken to compare his ‘Mouse and 
Alligator’ experiments with studies by Barrett and Behne (2005).  He argues that the two sets of 
studies are not comparable because they are motivated by different research questions. In 
particular, Barrett and Behne’s study did not focus on afterlife beliefs but on children’s 
understanding of death and sleeping. He states:  
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The fact that the youngest children answered “no” in reference to the dead 
animal, but “yes” in reference to the sleeping animal, is hardly prima facie 
evidence against my argument that belief in the afterlife is a cognitive default. In 
fact, if belief in the afterlife is a cognitive default, then we would actually predict 
the pattern of findings reported by Barrett and Behne (2005). That is, 
preschoolers should answer “no” to questions about the bodies of dead animals 
(notice the key word “it” in the questions posed to children) if indeed they view 
the mind as being liberated from the body at death (Bering, 2006: 491). 
 
Brian Hughes (2006: 477) argues that there are major validity issues in Bering and collaborators’ 
experimental studies. Construct validity issues arise because of potential participant-
experimenter biases. This is notable in the much-documented problem that the age and status 
of the experimenters influence the answers children give. Through the questions asked of 
them, children infer what the experimenters would like them to answer then respond 
accordingly. Appropriate designs need to put appropriate checks in place before asserting that 
children normatively believe something.18  
 
Hughes also contends that the validity of the experiments is questionable because they lack a 
control condition. He suggests that a control condition could have examined continuity 
reasoning about inanimate objects, which may have confounded Bering and collaborator’s 
results. If, as Barrett and Johnson found (2003), children readily project agency onto inanimate 
objects then it would become difficult to know whether children’s continuity reasoning is any 
more profound than the ubiquitous adult tendency to project animacy onto cars and 
computers.  
 
Finally, he believes external validity issues exist because it is not clear how a child’s belief that a 
fictional dead mouse continues to have psychological and affective mental states is 
generalisable to a belief in immortal souls. He states: ‘(c)hildren’s well established capacity to 
                                                     
18
 Hughes believes that a participant-experimenter bias may also feature in the college students experiments. The 
response delays that Bering codes as evidence of  a processing difficultly may in fact result from social 
consideration on behalf of participants who may be thinking ‘Is this a trick question?’ or ‘How do I respond to this 
question without upsetting the experimenter who appears to believe in the afterlife?’ (Hughes: 2006: 477). 
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engage in counterfactual thinking which underlies the ability to engage in pretend play, may 
lead them to think differently about dead mice in experimental vignettes compared to dead 
people in real life’ (Hughes, 2006: 477).  Maurice Bloch offers a similar, though overly dismissive 
complaint: ‘As far as I am aware, most religious systems are not much concerned with the 
survival of the souls of rodents’ (Bloch, 2006: 465).   
 
The fact that Bering and Barrett’s experimental findings are highly contested and in some 
instances, even directly refuted, must encourage us to approach Intuitive Model claims with 
caution. Undeniably, these conflicting findings are conspicuous in a field of research that 
locates its empirical rigour in its experimental findings. It is also especially important given that 
the experimental evidence is the backbone of the metathesis. This point is also significant to my 
larger thesis argument because, given the ambivalence of results, and the contradictory nature 
of alternative experimental evidence, It needs to be explained why hypotheses drawn from the 
Intuitive Model have not accommodated theory from other areas of the CSR, which may help 
resolve the current limitations of the experimental evidence. I discuss the ways in which the 
Intuitive Model depends upon broader CSR and ethnographic research in the next section. 
 
o The Universality of Theory is Debatable 
 
The second objection relates to the universal relevance of the beliefs examined in the 
experimental studies. Critics, with knowledge of the ethnographic record, focus on the 
presumption of universal beliefs across religious traditions. They argue that Bering and Barrett 
imply universality without appropriate ethnographic or experimental evidence. More seriously, 
these critics reason that the Intuitive Model appears to universalise a uniquely modern and 
‘American’ understanding of religion and religious belief (Whitehouse, 2006: 485; Bloch 2006: 
465; see also Roth 2008). 
 
For example, there is uncertainty about the cross-cultural salience of Barrett and collaborators’ 
work on ‘god concepts.’ Barrett himself is ambiguous about the universal applicability of his 
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theory. He acknowledges that the majority of his experimental research is only of immediate 
relevance to high modern Western contexts familiar with Christian traditions (Barrett, 2008: 2). 
He notes that his work has focused on the advent of monotheistic ‘god concepts’ and therefore 
may not account for cultures without deities with similar characteristics. Even so, he does 
contend that monotheistic ‘god concepts’ should exhibit a cognitive advantage over other deity 
concepts, though he leaves this as a resolved hypothetical question. By limiting his study to 
Westerners’ beliefs in God, Barrett has little issue with the fact that most of his participants are 
from such populations (Barrett, 2004b, 89ff). He also notes that the anthropomorphic bias 
uncovered in the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ may be partially due to the intrinsically 
anthropomorphic character of Christianity: God is believed to manifest himself as a human and 
is worshipped in human form. He leaves the question of whether believers from other faiths 
show a more muted anthropomorphic tendency, or whether non-believers have a tacit god 
concept, to further empirical study (Barrett, 2008: 2). 
 
Yet even with the above questions unresolved, Barrett’s understanding of the tight relationship 
between cognitive processes and maturationally natural non-reflective beliefs engenders 
universal propositions. However, even if the processes of conceptual development are 
relatively similar, supernatural agent concepts may not be. Barrett would not see this as an 
immediate problem because the ‘preparedness hypothesis’ does not rely on universal 
similarities in supernatural concepts. All it suggests is that the cultures that do feature 
omnipotent gods do so, in part, because they grow in minds with minimal cognitive effort.    
 
Nevertheless, we have seen that Barrett does not exactly mean ‘god’ concepts but rather 
supernatural agent concepts more generally. Barrett’s definition of ‘deity’ is on the surface so 
basic that it does not consider dispositional characteristics (such as Spilka, Armatas and 
Nussbaum’s classic factorial distinction between ‘Benevolent Ruler’, ‘Harsh God’, ‘Impersonal 
God’ or ‘Psalmist’s God’ (1964). It also does not accommodate event significance or the 
contextual and situational factors that alternative cognitive-cultural theories emphasise.19 
                                                     
19
 Some of these alternative models are discussed in depth in chapter three. 
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However, even in such a skeletal form, Barrett’s universal deity template does necessitate a 
cognitive bias toward agents that hold three characteristics: omnipotence, omnipresence, and 
omniscience, even if the distribution and relative strength of each characteristic varies across 
cultures and developmental periods.  Barrett’s experiments suggest that all children implicitly 
imbue all agents with such characteristics, whether the agent is another child, a house rat, emu, 
taniwha, ghost, or an adult. Barrett and collaborators crosschecked the posited characteristics 
of basic agency with an Indian sample. Despite correlations with the Western studies, the 
Indian study has major limitations. Barrett himself admits: ‘this study has a restricted age range, 
and may mask important cohort effects [therefore] interpretations must be made tentatively’ 
(Barrett, 1998: 616). 
 
Barrett contends that it is only through experience and the onset of higher order cognitive 
capabilities that children learn to separate ‘kinds of minds,’ constructing and applying concepts 
of deeper range and understanding. Yet because children already have these rudimentary, 
though erroneous, understandings of agency in place, they are cognitively prepared to process 
and accept postulated beings that have these characteristics. It is not so much that they believe 
in them but rather that such beings make intuitive sense because of the generic agency 
template.  
 
Critics also object to Bering’s universal definition of afterlife beliefs. The hypothesised universal 
relevance of his existential folk psychology demands species-wide confirmation. This is because 
the bundle of ‘inference illusions’ that comprise the folk psychological cognitive system require 
the presence of universality before it can be considered a true adaptation (Bering, 2006: 490). 
This is why his research seeks evidence in non-believing populations. Seeking cross-cultural 
evidence, Bering and Blasi et al. crosschecked young children’s continuity scores in 
psychological reasoning about death with a Spanish sample of children from secular and 
religious backgrounds (2005). They found similar results to the initial American Study (2004). 
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However, the anthropologists Bloch (2006: 465) and CSR scholar Harvey Whitehouse (2006: 
486) contend that the larger framework of the ‘folk psychology of souls’ is not supported by the 
ethnographic record. Bloch believes that Bering is universalising a uniquely American form of 
religion via his correlation of religion with existential concerns about individual purpose and his 
assertion that religion encourages prosocial behaviours. He is critical of the universal 
characterisation of supernatural agents and ancestors as morally concerned about the actions 
of the living. He points to Malinowski’s research on the Trobriand Islanders who appear to have 
rich afterlife beliefs but morally indifferent gods. This lack of interest with the moral dimension 
of the living is also notable in the gods of the Iliad, while Catholic Christianity evidences little 
concern about deceased descendants’ souls (Bloch, 2006: 465).  
 
Bloch also questions Bering’s assumption that supernatural agents are always on the side of 
‘good’ (‘good’ for Bering meaning behaviours which promote prosocial cohesion). Again, in his 
reading, the ethnographic literature does not support this claim.  He cites Meyer Fortes’ 
research that finds that the behaviours ancestors expect of believers are often highly self-
serving and only incidentally related to altruistic concerns. He argues that supernatural agents, 
are often indifferent to moral concerns and many are dedicated to causing distress in the lives 
of believers. For example, African nature spirits, the spirits of aborted foetuses in Japan and 
witches and devils in Western traditions are all antisocial. He concludes that Bering’s belief in 
the universal supernatural moral police is unproven. Whitehouse (2006: 486) also advises that 
in many instances supernatural agents are not high-moral agents. He notes that in Melanesian 
traditions the gods wantonly cause homicidal behaviour. Many gods or supernatural beings 
seek to harm believers regardless of the believer’s action. He also questions whether notions of 
a purposeful life are atypical to traditions outside of highly individualistic modern Western 
cultures.  
 
Correspondingly, Whitehouse also wonders if ‘offline’ social cognitions are less common in 
small hunter gather communities where evolutionary psychology argues that social cognitions 
were developed and refined. In this normative environment, physical separation is limited and 
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probably infrequent. Thus, it is perhaps harder to stop thinking about the implications of the 
death of familiar people. 
  
Adam Cohen and Douglas Kenrick et al. (2006: 468) also stress cross-cultural variability in 
beliefs about supernatural agents and the afterlife. Cohen and Kenrick et al. propose that 
variations in afterlife beliefs are explainable through a close analysis of variations in physical 
and social ecologies. For example, they wonder if resource scarcity and hostile or unpredictable 
environments enhance the moral capacities of supernatural agents.   
 
Superficially, the above ethnographic concerns with posited religious universals trouble 
Intuitive Model research. However, it is likely that Bering and Barrett would dismiss some of the 
arguments in this section. The ethnographic evidence Whitehouse and Bloch present are 
examples of reflective beliefs. As noted, Barrett is not interested in causally explaining explicit 
reflective beliefs in terms of intuitive latencies. Nevertheless, the ‘folk psychology of souls’ 
must take heed of these findings because of the theory’s tight relationship between intuitive 
and reflective beliefs.  
 
Bering may respond that it does not matter how the supernatural agent acts, what is in 
important is that they do, and that believers’ assume that they have access to a person’s 
socially hidden motivations and desires. The moral properties and interests of the believed 
agent are distinct from the cognitive biases that encourage belief in such agents.  This strategic 
access is the critical emphasis of the ‘folk psychology of souls’ as agents with such access 
override theory of mind reasoning.  
 
  Importantly, however, because Intuitive Model research attempts to explain universal 
patterns of belief, it is significant when ethnographic data calls into question postulated beliefs. 
This highlights the critical role that anthropologists and scholars of religion play in ensuring that 
psychologists are studying truly prolific beliefs. Furthermore, it demands cross-cultural 
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experimental testing to examine how people from different cultures and faith traditions 
implicitly imbue such agents.  
 
In summary, the concerns about the explanatory reach of isolated studies conducted 
predominantly on Western children are important because of the close relationship the 
Intuitive Model posits between the universal cognitive processing of the mind-brain and the 
probabilistic recurrence of certain religious beliefs. The criticisms in this section highlight three 
things. Firstly, that Bering and Barrett need to explain in detail the beliefs that they are 
examining. Secondly, that they need to begin to account for why these beliefs do not appear in 
some cultures and finally, that they need to obtain a wider pool of participants for their 
experiments. 
 
These criticisms are also relevant to my larger thesis aim because they articulate the difficulties 
with generalising universal beliefs across cultures and thus encourage my redefinition of the 
Intuitive Model’s treatment of beliefs in chapter three. Furthermore, they document the 
difficulty in universalising intuitions through reflective beliefs.  
 
I now review an alternative developmental theory and the problems it presents to the Intuitive 
Model. 
 
o The Intuitive Model ignores Sociocultural Causations 
 
Paul Harris and collaborators present an alternative developmental theory that downplays the 
Intuitive Model’s focus on specific intuitions. It is the most robust developmental alternative to 
the Intuitive Model. I present the theory below to highlight the persuasive alternatives to the 
Intuitive Model. 
 
Harris and Richert place especial importance on the role of testimony in establishing and 
normalising children’s religious beliefs.  In particular, they question Kelemen and Bering’s claim 
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that dedicated cognitive systems promote casual reasoning biases that compel belief in 
unobservable forces. Harris and Richert argue that it is hard to see how one dedicated 
mechanism could account for such a heterodox and pervasive phenomenon (Harris and Richet, 
2008: 547). While the cross-cultural belief in a property akin to the soul appears to support a 
bias toward assuming hidden essences, they reason that ‘other examples of religious and non-
secular beliefs in unobservables seem too ornate and narrative-like to rest on such a pared 
down mechanism.  They ask if a belief in the Virgin Birth, the caste system, or the power of 
witchcraft all to be attributed to a localised capacity for thinking about hidden mechanisms?’ 
(Harris and Richert, 2008: 547). 
 
Harris’ experimental work (Harris, 2007; Harris & Giménez, 2005; Harris and Pasquini et al., 
2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006) uncovers that children readily distinguish between real and 
imagined entities. This research suggests children only confuse ontological distinctions between 
the ‘make believe’ and the ‘real’ in extraordinary circumstances. While children frequently 
exhibit emotional reactions to their own pretence (such as fear at the imagined presence of a 
witch in a wardrobe), they are still able to maintain a distinction between reality and fantasy. 
Harris suggests that pretence emotions are not, as William James claimed, an example of 
confusion about the ‘real’ and ‘imagined,’ but stem from the same emotional reactions that 
adults entertain when engaging with fictional media, such as a willing suspension of disbelief 
through engrossment. Both children and adults respond emotionally to the content of 
pretences though are able to remain aware they are responding to them as ‘fictions’ (Harris and 
Richert, 2008: 537). For example, experimental research suggests that children who invent 
‘imaginary friends’ and engage in sustained interaction with them are aware that the imagined 
friend does not exist (Goy and Harris, 1990).20  
                                                     
20
 Maurice Bloch’s (2008) ethnographic research has established that people assume the visual perceiving of an 
entity or events is the most reliable way to ascertain its reality. Wellman and Estes (1986) have also found that 
children favour direct sensory perceptions for verification (1986). Children rely on first hand observations to draw 
conclusion about the veracity of an entity. Wellman and Estes asked children questions such as: ‘Have you ever 
seen an ant crawling on the ground?’ or ‘an ant riding a bicycle?’ If a negative answer was given for one of the 
questions (such as an ant on a bicycle), the children were asked ‘Are there any ants on bicycles? They found that 
children readily separate imaginary items and the fictitious ones, with prior first hand observation the primary 
empirical means through which the children distinguished between the two entity types.  
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The question for Harris is then: Why do children so readily believe in things they cannot directly 
perceive? This is a broader though similar question to the one that motivates Bering: why do 
people believe in the psychological existence of a soul? 
 
While Harris acknowledges that first-hand observation is the fundamental empirical strategy to 
distinguish between the real and the fictitious, it is certainly not the only one. Instead of a 
narrow empirical strategy, Harris posits that children employ a broad one. He thinks that an 
equally powerful strategy is the reliance on adult, especially parental, testimony.   Deference to 
testimony frequently overrides empirical observation. Children rely on testimony to construct 
reliable and coherent conceptualisation of entities and processes they are unable to perceive 
themselves. This departs from Piaget’s argument, echoed in core knowledge theory and 
highlights that in certain domains (e.g., those involving invisible forces and agencies) children 
assimilate evidence primarily from another person’s testimony (Harris and  Koenig, 2006: 505).  
 
Harris and his collaborators’ research on the childhood acquisition of scientific beliefs is 
important because it conflicts with Intuitive Model hypotheses. The Intuitive Model asserts that 
religious beliefs are cognitively effortless because they gel with intuitive expectations, whereas 
scientific beliefs must routinely compete with intuitive biases (McCauley, 2000). As Bering 
states: ‘It is clear that when it comes to the big questions in life, our brains have evolved so that 
science eludes us but religion comes naturally’ (Bering, 2006: 149). 
 
Intuitive Model theorists agree that testimony is critical to the acceptance of secular scientific 
truths, such as the earth revolves around the sun and the brain is for thinking. It is Harris alone 
however, that contends that the very same deference to testimony encourages children to 
accept empirically unverifiable religious ideas. 
 
Harris and Koenig (2006) argue that children do not hold experiential motivations about the 
existence of gods and souls. In direct contrast to the Intuitive Model, Harris and Koenig contend 
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that knowledge of these supernatural forces come to children not through inferences and 
automatic intuitions but at a conceptual level as acquired mental representations. The 
phenomenological enrichment and communicative experiences of these concepts develop 
significantly after the initial conceptual awareness. In contrast to the cognitive isolationism of 
Barrett and Bering’s theories, Harris proposes that adults versed in particular religious 
communities are responsible for children’s understanding of, for example, ’God’ and his 
characteristic properties, such as omnipotence and immortality (Harris and Koenig, 2006: 511). 
It is adult testimony that compels belief in ‘invisible’ agents: 
 
On this account, children’s faith in what they are told about the secular world, is 
not so dissimilar to the faith of religious believers when they are told about the 
spiritual world. Testimony to the effect that soul endures, that there is an 
afterlife, and the world of the ancestors truly exist need not be assigned to the 
mental box marked ‘pending.’ That testimony can simply be regarded as a true 
description of an unobserved hinterland, eventually accessible perhaps but for 
the moment to be taken on trust (Harris and Richert, 2008: 547). 
 
Importantly, Harris and collaborators’ experiments provide the strongest experimental 
challenge to Bering’s work on childhood continuity scores about the mind after death. These 
findings also implicate Barrett’s acultural findings. Like Evans, they suggest that the 
developmental pattern is more complex than Barrett and Bering allow (Harris and Astuti, 2006:  
475), especially because Barrett and Bering suppress the crucial role that religious tutelage and 
exposure to cultural norms play in belief formation.  
 
In fact, Rita Astuti and Harris’ studies on Vezo children from Madagascar directly challenge 
Bering’s afterlife belief hypotheses.  For example, Harris and Astuti’s research found, in direct 
contrast to the ‘Princess Alice’ studies, that continuity claims increase rather decrease with age 
(2008). Atsuti and Harris believe this increase is explicable in reference to the religious context 
in which the experimenters asked their questions (if the experimenters included words like 
‘God’ or ‘Priest’ then the children were more likely to assert psychological continuation after 
death). They argue that very young children display no judgment about which processes 
continue to function after death and by the age of seven the majority of children stated that 
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most functions, including psychological ones, cease at death (2008: 734 see also Slaughter et al. 
1999). Critically, children’s professed afterlife beliefs are sensitive to priming.  
 
In accordance with Gimenez’s earlier research on Spanish subjects, Harris and Astuti note that it 
is only older children and adults that state, regardless of the context in which the questions are 
asked, that mental processes continue after death. Harris and Astuti propose that older 
children and adults have developed a dual understanding of death. The second 
conceptualisation is the product of saturation in normative religio-cultural environments: 
 
Although such different conceptions might be regarded as objectively 
incompatible with one another, it is unlikely that Vezo experience tension or 
inconsistency. Each conception is likely to be activated in different, non-
overlapping circumstances. For example, when people are confronted with a 
dead person, they will consider it at one moment as a corpse and at another 
moment as an ancestor, behaving accordingly. When they wash and prepare the 
corpse, Vezo treat it as a non-sentient entity. The body is washed with cold 
water because “it can’t feel anything,” and the entangled hair is pulled and 
yanked because “she no longer feels any pain.” But when the children are shown 
the face of their dead parent for the last time and told never to call his or her 
name again, the dead person is treated as a sentient being capable of returning 
to, and interfering with, the everyday life of the community (Harris and Astuti, 
2008: 733/734). 
 
Astuti and Harris dismiss Bering’s key claim that beliefs in psychological immortality are a 
cognitive default. Astuti and Harris believe Bering’s findings merely highlight the development 
of an awareness that humans and animals have different fates (2006: 476). They argue that in 
the case of the Vezo, children have exposure to the realities of biological death through 
witnessing the slaughtering of animals and funerals complete ‘with the stench of 
decomposition’ (2006: 476). This exposure explains the seven-year-olds’ strongly mortalist 
understanding of death. Astuti and Harris also dismiss the ‘simulation constraint’ findings. They 
argue that it conflicts with research by Flavell who found that children find it easy to envisage 
the state of non-thought. Finally, as the above research highlights, children’s beliefs and non-
beliefs are highly sensitive to context.  
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Certainly, Bering and Barrett would not deny the importance of tutelage in stabilising and 
enriching the content of specific religious beliefs. However, they would fault Harris and 
collaborators for ignoring research into cognitively optimal representations as well as cognitive 
constraints. By positioning religious beliefs outside of mundane folk understandings of biology 
and mortality, Harris is really just reenacting a truism in sociocultural research about religious 
beliefs. However, this ‘truth’ is obvious to Intuitive Model theory. Bering and Barrett are more 
interested in the less studied cognitive processes that specifically prepare and bias the 
acquisition of religious beliefs. Harris and Astuti offer no discussion of this, focusing instead on 
learned conceptions of biological morality (through experience) and religious beliefs in the 
afterlife (through tutelage).  
 
Barrett could plausibly claim that children reject ‘impossible agents’ not because of a lack of 
supportive testimony but because such representations are maximally counterintuitive, losing 
credibility because they depart too radically from foundational ontological moorings. The fact 
that ‘impossible agents’ such as flying pigs and barking cats have little cultural support lends 
credence to Boyer’s theory of the cognitive sweet spot where minimally counterintuitive 
agents, like Santa Claus and God are located.   
 
Furthermore, because Harris and Astuti’s research only studied reflective statements by 
children and adults it is not comparable to Intuitive Model research which is seeking rapid 
intuitive responses. It is plausible to claim that Atsuti and Harris are not studying intuitive 
religion because their task designs do not suppress idiosyncratic cultural cues and grant 
children time to reflect on their answers. To be a true study of intuitive religion, Intuitive Model 
theory would want Harris to look at the non-explicit role of testimony in encouraging beliefs. 
Furthermore, the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ already expects the dual conceptions of 
death that Harris and Astuti propose.  
 
 Bering also questions how exactly Harris and Astuti’s experiments correspond to his own 
(2006; 491). The youngest children he and Bjorklund tested were three-year-olds, whereas the 
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youngest children in the Spanish study were seven-year-olds and in the Vezo study, five-year- 
olds. The ‘nativist’ claim rests with the three-year-olds, not with the seven-year-olds. He 
contends that at most, Harris and Astuti’s study gives further evidence to the expected role that 
cultural saturation places in constraining or enhancing certain beliefs. Bering suggests that 
these studies may also suffer from coding problems, which may have encouraged distortions. 
For example, Harris and Astuti did not ask follow up questions. Yet, Bering and Bjorklund found 
that these often clarified the children’s initially ambiguous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.  
 
Harris’ alternative developmental model is of immediate importance to the aim of this chapter. 
Firstly, it introduces the tension in the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ between 
core competences and the role of tutelage in shaping religious beliefs. Secondly, by 
encouraging the Intuitive Model to look beyond psychological nativism, Harris and collaborators 
preempt the discussion that dominates the rest of this thesis. In chapter four, I explain why the 
Intuitive Model and Harris’ research are unnecessarily oppositional.  
 
However, the research of Harris and his collaborators, while again providing contradictory 
experimental evidence to challenge key Intuitive Model claims, is unable to undermine Intuitive 
Model explanations, because by favouring the role of tutelage it is already beyond the scope of 
Intuitive Model research. Harris and collaborators deny the causal relevance of Intuitive Model 
theories; like Standard Model theorists, they study the stabilisation and endurance of acquired 
beliefs. Crucially though, they have empirically undercut the Intuitive Model’s naturalness 
thesis.  
 
The tension between Intuitive Model theory and Harris’ framework highlights the critical fact 
that we still do not know exactly where children obtain their religious beliefs. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter is an essential step in my reformulation of Intuitive Model theory. I have 
documented the motivations and theoretical assumptions of Intuitive Model research and 
clarified the key terms behind the theory, allowing these to serve as a template for examination 
throughout the remainder of the thesis.  
 
I have also shown that, even without taking into account the methodological and explanatory 
parameters of their research, which is the key concern of this thesis, Bering and Barrett’s work 
is controversial, with the major developmental hypotheses of each experimenter contested, 
and in Barrett’s case, directly refuted by subsequent research. 
 
The ambivalence of the experimental data is tied to a concern for the cross-cultural feasibility 
of proposed implicit beliefs and the absence of the seemingly obvious role of tutelage in the 
establishment of religious beliefs. Together, these three critical themes burden Intuitive Model 
hypotheses. They points to the fragility of individual experimental data and must encourage us 
to approach the explanatory metathesis with some caution. These tensions must call us to 
question the veracity of the metathesis itself, because, currently, the experimental evidence is 
unable to support it. This fact need not denigrate the Intuitive Model but must caution against 
strong statements on behalf of the evidence.  
 
The problem is not with cognitive developmental methodology. The internal criticisms express 
a more local concern about the experimental designs and what they purport to test, for 
example, whether forced reasoning about the mental attributes of a dead puppet correspond 
to real-time theorising about biological and human agents, or whether the standard false belief 
task is an appropriate means to test theories of multiple minds.  
 
It is not surprising that there are ambivalent findings. The Intuitive Model has set itself the 
extremely difficult of trying to locate the origins of religious beliefs in children’s mental 
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development itself.  The Intuitive Model must also justify the process by which naïve beliefs 
inform reflective religious beliefs.  Problematically, Bering and Barrett have chosen to do this 
through a methodology that restricts the role of tutelage and other sociocultural forces. 
 
The critical literature and the tensions between the Intuitive Model and Harris’ research 
highlights that the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ is still uncertain as to where 
religious beliefs arise from, nor is it certain of the variations in belief between cultures and 
contexts. Building on these facts, I propose that the shared criticisms of Barrett and Bering’s 
theories may suggest certain problems and limitations with Intuitive Model’s ‘naturalness of 
religious beliefs’ metathesis. The ambivalent and contradictory findings suggest that there is 
potential for a revision of the metathesis to accommodate differing frameworks within the 
‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ and the ethnographic record of postulated 
religious beliefs. 
 
Yet before I address this concern, we must address a more obvious issue. Namely, because the 
experimental evidence is so partial and conflicting, we must question if nomothetic 
developmental psychology really is the best method in which to study the advent of religious 
beliefs. In the next chapter, I examine theory that says it is not. 
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Chapter Two: The Humanities and the CSR: Consilience or Criticism? 
 
 ‘In field research there is too much [complexity] to allow for definite 
conclusions, whereas in laboratory research there is too little complexity to allow 
for interesting conclusions (Brehmer and Dörner, 1993: 172).  
 
This chapter builds upon the critical themes discussed in the previous chapter. I examine 
Barrett and Bering’s theories from the vantage point of humanities’ criticisms of the CSR. The 
critics I discuss focus on the CSR in general, I apply their criticisms to Intuitive Model 
perspectives. The inclusion of external critical perspectives requires a broader and more 
general analysis than found throughout the rest of this thesis. 
 
I also examine consilience theorising within the CSR. Consilience theorising has sought to make 
some areas of CSR research less tied to the study of evolved cognitive constraints. Because the 
critical literature on the CSR is quite extensive, attempting to reconcile nomothetic perspectives 
with idiographic approaches may offer the clearest path to resolving the lingering problems 
with the Intuitive Model presented in the first chapter. I query whether the introduction of 
perspectives from the humanities and/or consilience theorising in the CSR enriches 
developmental research on religion. 
 
Indeed, there are notable correspondences between the external criticisms of the CSR and the 
internal criticisms of theorists working within the Intuitive Model and related fields of research. 
This association is interesting because the critics discussed in the previous chapter are largely 
working within the same causal reductive frameworks as Bering and Barrett.  
 
While tensions between ‘interpretive’ and ‘explanatory’ approaches in anthropological and 
comparative religious studies feature prominently in the discussion below, they do not emerge 
explicitly in internal criticisms of the psychological models. Yet, the charge of ‘negative 
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reduction,21’ which dominates the external critiques, also permeates the internal literature 
though in more subtle ways. For example, few of the internal critiques argue that the 
experimental method itself invariably produces artificial results, though there is widespread 
concern that the misuse of experimental design is encouraged by constricted methodological 
and conceptual reductions. Both bodies of criticisms agree that the Intuitive Model’s 
methodological reduction destabilises the explanatory power of tested hypotheses. 
 
I highlight why the external critiques are important to Intuitive model hypotheses, even though 
broad level consilience between the two projects is not.  I argue that macro-level consilience 
between humanistic and natural science approaches is theoretically and pragmatically limited 
concerning developmental research into religious intuitions and the wider CSR (See Visala, 2008 
for an alternative perspective). All too readily, it results in confusion and distortion. As I show 
below, this is because the goals, aims and emphasises are very different. Even so, humanities 
based criticisms of the CSR are of interest because they present a novel vantage point from 
which to examine the Intuitive Model.  
 
2.1 Criticism and Consilience 
 
E.O. Wilson (1998) argues that consilience represents an attempt to reconcile the perceived 
‘culture war’ between the natural sciences and the humanities.   Wilson’s consilience seeks to 
synthesise the natural and human sciences (See Dupré, 2003; Rosenberg, 1994; for alternative 
arguments). Wilson suggests that the methods previously employed to amalgamate the natural 
sciences may eventually unify the humanities and the sciences. Whereas Sperber (1975) and 
Lawson and McCauley (1990) make the more muted claim that cultural realities are amenable 
to naturalistic and experimental study.22 Wilson’s argument for consilience places traditional 
humanities’ subjects within naturalistic explanatory paradigms. Wilson believes the humanities 
                                                     
21
 I discuss the definition and suggested implications of ‘negative reduction’ below. Concisely, ‘negative reduction’ 
houses the contention that the reduction, for example of ‘human beliefs’ results in distortions and unwarranted 
explanations of the subject that is reduced.
 
I describe this as ‘negative reduction’ to distinguish it from necessary 
reduction, which most critics do not have an ipso facto problem. 
22
 Wilson also provides a ‘selectionist’ account of culture derived from Dawkin and Dennett’s memetic theory. 
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and the special sciences (such as political science, psychology, and economics) have become 
theoretically impoverished because of their collective resistance to knowledge from the hard 
sciences of physics, biology, genetics, and belatedly cognitive science. Like Edward Slingerland 
(2008b: xiii), he contends that the natural sciences can enrich research in the humanities. More 
forcefully than Slingerland, Wilson believes that even without consilience, the natural sciences 
will replace humanities’ scholarship as the preeminent space to study human beings, their 
motivations, and their cultures.  
 
Ultimately, consilience involves addressing the questions that concern the humanities and 
social sciences from a viewpoint informed by the natural sciences. This includes ethical, moral, 
sociological and political questions that inform public policy (see D.S Wilson and O’Brien et al., 
2009; Atran and Axelroad, 2008 for such attempts). Wilson believes this is achievable because 
the sciences and humanities have the same fundamental aspiration: ‘to give purpose to 
understanding the details, to lend to all inquirers a conviction, far deeper than a mere working 
proposition that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws’ 
(Wilson, 1998: 4). 
 
The CSR is not a consilience project in the manner outlined by Wilson. As Lawson and McCauley 
note, the CSR is an attempt to correct an imbalance in research on religions (1990: 22). It does 
not seek to suppliant alternative theories and method in the study of religion, even though 
Lawson and McCauley’s ‘interactionism’ offers a sustained critique of humanistic methods.  
 
In return, many humanities’ scholars are sceptical of the CSR project. The critiques I overview 
present a defence of the full application of traditional humanistic approaches to the study of 
religion. Indeed, this defence invariably involves criticism of the perceived ‘negative 
reductionism’ argued to be evident in the CSR. To date, humanistic writings remain critical 
evaluations rather than propositions for constructive investigative models. True, there have 
been a number of attempts to integrate cognitive theory with humanistic studies, with 
Whitehouse’s ‘mode’s theory’ currently the most prominent example. However, the full 
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constructive application of traditional humanities’ perspectives such as Husserlian 
phenomenology (e.g., Kamppien, 2001) remains very rare.   
 
In this section, I examine and evaluate some recent humanities’ critiques of the CSR project 
before applying these directly to Intuitive Model theory. I investigate criticisms advanced by the 
philosopher of religion Lluís Oviedo, and the social anthropologists James Laidlaw and Tim 
Ingold.23 These three critiques present a defence within comparative religious studies and 
cultural/social anthropology for a ‘special’ or ‘interpretive’ (aka: non-natural-scientific) set of 
methods in the analysis of religion.24 
 
 I apply these criticisms directly to the Intuitive Model. I consider the rebuttals offered by CSR 
scholars and emphasise that these criticisms and counter-criticisms predominantly stem from 
misunderstandings about the scope, reach and goals of distinctive theoretical investigations 
into the why, how, ifs and buts of a cognitive-developmental religious studies. This discussion of 
the critical literature will highlight why neither the CSR nor theory from the humanities will 
benefit from broad consilience even though humanities’ perspectives offer important 
emendations to Intuitive Model isolationism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23
Ingold’s chapter examines Sperber’s epidemiology of representation, not the CSR directly. Because this features 
in Standard Model theories (Boyer was Sperber’s thesis student) I believe his inclusion in a discussion of CSR 
metatheory is appropriate.  
24
 Of course, it is the validity of, and need for, a special methodology, which the CSR challenges.  
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Critical Perspectives 
Humanities’ Criticisms of the CSR     CSR reply to  Humanities’ Criticisms 
 
The ‘bottom up’ cognitive approach massively 
simplifies religion and results in generalisations that 
are inconsequential or inappropriate for analysing 
religion.  
 
 
The humanities ignore the important influence 
biology and psychology play in causing, constraining, 
and transmitting religious phenomena. 
 
Religion is best studied from a first person (insider, 
subjective) perspective. This is achieved through the 
detailed analysis of texts, practices, and ethnographic 
research, which gives the voice/ authority to the 
believers themselves. The study of religion is an 
interpretive one geared toward understanding. 
 
 
Specific religious phenomena should be studied from 
third person (outsider, objective) perspectives 
because believers have no special insight into the 
cognitive mechanisms that shape and constrain 
religious thought and behaviour. Theories of religion 
require natural-scientific methodologies geared 
toward causal explanations 
 
 
The aim of analysis should be to reach a deeper and 
clearer understanding of why people hold certain 
beliefs in particular cultural settings. It is a search for 
‘reasons’ not so much ‘causes.’ 
 
 
 
Standard theory on religion unjustifiably excludes 
knowledge from the natural sciences. The study of 
religion needs to integrate with the sciences. The 
humanities can be analysed from the perspectives of 
the sciences 
 
 
 
The CSR’s conceptualisation of universal religious 
phenomena is a template derived from a Western, 
high modern academic setting. Thus, CSR universals 
are not actual universals but are relative to the 
sociocultural origins of these conceptualisations. 
There can be no context free study of religion. 
 
 
Humanities’ scholars belong to an ideological 
tradition that sees humans as autonomous, 
individualistic and ‘irrational,’ nature as something 
menacing and alien and science and technology as 
dangerous and corrupting 
 
 
Religious traditions are massively diverse and shaped 
by the interplay of specific political, social, historical, 
cultural, and geographical forces. Locating universals 
or ‘fundamentals’ is next to impossible; if discovered 
universals are often so general that they are 
meaningless or self-evident. 
 
 
Despite surface diversity, religious traditions share 
many foundational features. The study of religion 
requires analysis of these core features before any 
downstream discussion of the higher order cultural 
expressions of religion can be meaningful.  
 
Religion is sui generis. To be understood it requires 
specialised knowledge of particular religious 
traditions. It needs to be appreciated as a complex 
and largely autonomous domain of reality and 
experience. 
 
Religion does not exist. It is an abstract heuristic 
construct that can be done away with. It is necessary 
to examine ‘religious’ phenomena individually in a 
piecemeal fashion. 
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A debate about the most appropriate way to study human beings and their cultures long 
presages the advent of the CSR. Its endurance pinpoints the difficulties involved in consilience 
theorising. Classically, the debate is between ‘explanation’ and ‘interpretation.’ Jeppe Jensen 
locates the contemporary divide within the academic study of religion historically. He believes it 
stems from the classic distinction made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Johann Droysen (Jensen, 2009: 
334). Dilthey distinguished between the empirically based natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Recall, that in Dilthey’s 
view, the human sciences seek verstehen – understanding through ‘reasons’ while the natural 
sciences strive for explanation through ‘causes.’ ‘Reasons’ can be studied by attempting to 
understand the subjective worlds and experiences of human beings. Interpretation in this 
classic sense strives towards empathic understanding and is more akin to an art than a science. 
Jensen argues that these ideas shaped the early academic study of religion, leading to an 
implicit meta-methodological paradigm, which still permeates the academy and is most 
prominent in hermeneutical analysis (Jensen, 2009).  
 
Despite  foundational claims for ‘interactionism’ CSR scholars maintain a distinction between 
‘reasons’ and ‘causes,’ with Axu Visula going as far as stating ‘the basic ideas of the Cognitive 
Science of Religion have been formed in contrast to the interpretative or hermeneutical 
anthropology of religion’ (Visala, 2008: 111). Lawson and McCauley also argue that it was 
hermeneutical exclusivism and not natural scientific approaches, which asserted the boundary 
line between explanation and interpretation. Early CSR consilience, in line with Sperber’s 
‘minimal material’ ontological framework, demands that experimental realism constrains 
interpretive approaches: 
 
We maintain at the metatheoretical level not only that explanations of religious 
behaviour are possible, but also that the theories which motivate them can 
productively constrain interpretive efforts (Lawson and McCauley, 1990: 8). 
 
Sperber (1975, 1996), along with Lawson and McCauley (1990), argues that the incorporation of 
cognitive theory and empirical methodologies grants anthropology a research programme that 
allows for the naturalistic study of cultures. Cognitive psychology allows anthropologists to test 
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and revise hypotheses about cultural patterns through systematic empirical studies and 
comparison with other natural-scientific domains.  
 
Noticeably, a critique of Clifford Geertz’s anthropological theories and Durkheimian sociological 
theories are at the centre of cognitive science critiques of ‘mind-blind’ anthropology (Slone, 
2005; Sperber, 1975; Pyysiäinen, 2005; Lawson and McCauley, 1990). The key problem cited is 
that anthropology and sociology lack empirical accountability because they use a ‘special’ and 
independent set of interpretive methods. CSR scholar Pyysiäinen expresses his personal 
lamentation about such methods clearly: 
 
I used to be interested in mystical theories of religion and related phenomena. I 
studied phenomenology and hermeneutics and read Eliade. Religion is 
mysterious because I could not understand it. What happens when someone 
converted to Christianity? What does it feel like to believe in God? How can 
people actually believe in Heaven and Hell? How on earth can people waste their 
time attending church services...What is enlightenment and have Buddhist’s 
really achieved it? Question after question but only a very few answers... 
 
I was educated in comparative religion, but it taught me next to nothing. There 
are five ‘world religions.’ Buddhism ‘denies the soul;’ these were the things I 
learnt. But I did not gain any understanding. It was like memorising shopping 
lists. Some of my teachers explained that we have to look at things the way 
believers see them. But this was no answer as it was the very question: How can 
I get to look at things through the eyes of a believer? Converting and ‘going 
native’ surely could not constitute a scientific method (Pyysiäinen, 2004 xiii). 
 
Pyysiäinen believes that anthropology and comparative religious studies need cognitive science 
for empirical traction, explanatory relevance, and intertheoretic compatibility. Thus, the 
sciences of the mind hold explanatory superiority in CSR research. Within cognitive 
anthropology, the emphasis is on what the sciences of the mind can teach anthropology and 
religious studies scholars about the causal affects of memory systems, attentional constraints, 
and reasoning bias that impinge on the individual processing of cultural information. The 
developmental psychologist Susan Carey expresses the didactic role of the mind sciences 
vividly:  
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I apologise to the psychologists present, who will all be familiar with this 
information. My goal is to show the anthropologists in the audience the current 
development research on the mind as this is what they will be most interested in 
(Carey, 2010). 
 
Correspondingly, the desire to ground cognitive theory in evolutionary theory represents an 
attempt to deepen the scientific-materialist strength of CSR research. This is noticeable in the 
theoretical concern with ultimate explanations of proximate cognitions and their – empirically 
tractable - behavioural effects. This is overt in Bering’s work, where the causal evolutionary 
framework is discussed in detail while cultural causations, hardly at all. More generally, it 
reflects the central and enduring debate about whether religious belief is a by-product of 
adaptive processes, an ex-adaptation, or an adaptation in its own right (See Boyer and 
Bergstrom, 2008; Bulbulia, 2004; Sjöblom, 2007). Similarly, it appears in the use of evolutionary 
modelled ‘selectionist’ theory to account for the spread of ideas in populations. The aim is to 
increase the empirical rigour of the field and to provide a means for theories to be empirically 
tested, refined, and re-tested. The Achilles’ heel of such research, as recurrently expressed in 
the critical literature, is that striving to make CSR research more scientific or grounded in 
biological theory has led to the impoverishment of ethnographic social level research (Ingold, 
2001, 2010; Toren, 2001; Laidlaw, 2007; Whitehouse, 2004; Day, 2005, 2009). The main 
problem theorists from the humanities have with the CSR is that, in their reading, the nature-
sciences are neither epistemologically precise nor pertinent enough to dictate the 
methodological terms of engagement.  
 
External critiques25 of the CSR echo a general, humanities-wide scepticism of scientific 
reduction and the naturalistic investigation into experiential and cultural realities. For the 
                                                     
25
 The humanities critiques do not distinguish between, and on occasion, conflate, the Standard Model and the 
Intuitive Model. We can expect this lack of specificity in attempts to analyse the discipline as a methodological 
whole. Indeed, it is accurate from their vantage point that there are more points of methodological and 
metatheoretical similarities than differences between the Standard Model and the Intuitive Model. Certainly, 
these criticisms remain as pertinent to Barrett and Bering’s research as they are to Boyer and Atran’s research. 
Indeed, some of the criticisms become even more relevant in regards to the purely psychology based Intuitive 
Model. 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  73 
 
 
 
purposes of this thesis, I describe this as a concern for ‘negative reduction.’ More specifically, 
critiques of the field conform to the humanities’ critiques of nomothetic psychology and social 
science. These argue that psychology stifles the object under investigation through the 
barrenness of the exploratory method itself (See Mary Midgely, 2003 for one such ethically 
motivated critique). They question whether variants of an intellectually dubious form of 
Enlightenment positivism, as expressed in logical empiricism, are latent in attempts to explain 
human mentation through underlying cognitive bias and psychological traits (see Lawson and 
McCauley, 1990: 24ff for clarification on this point). Many humanities’ critiques express a 
concern for the implicit ‘dehumanisation’ found in third person ‘mechanical’ accounts of 
people. The results of such research is that subjective, active, and discrete individuals are 
reduced to generic and autonomous information processing devices rather than 
holistic Heideggerian ‘beings in the world’ (Dreyfus, 1991).  
 
It is this concern that leads to the common conflation of the CSR with the ‘dehumanising’ 
exemplar: sociobiology and its perceived politically contentious scholarly transgressions, which 
are popularly (but not factually) believed to normalise pernicious human behaviours such as 
rape and xenophobia (see Cohen and Lanman et al., 2008: 112 for discussion and clarification). 
In a postmodern reading, the natural scientific study of human experiences reflects disparate 
power relations inherent in observer-object relations and encourages socio-politically dubious 
understandings of people and their motivations (See Day, 2010; Carrette, 2007 for such 
critiques and Slone, 2004; Slingerland, 2008, 2008b for rebuttals). Hence, as a corrective, the 
common aim in academic religious and ethnographic cultural studies is to make the ‘subject’ or 
religious culture the ‘text’ and the central ‘voice’ in any analysis, thus partially pacifying this 
perhaps permanent imbalance. 
 
Despite the insistence by CSR scholars that the humanities’ critics are flogging a dead horse, the 
‘reductive’ dimension of the CSR project remains central to every external critique of the 
project (Cohen and Lanman et al., 2008). The recurrence of this criticism demands reflection. 
Indeed, concerns about ‘negative-reduction’ motivate most ‘traditional’ (hermeneutical, 
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phenomenological, and postmodern26) critiques. These critiques begin by noting what CSR 
explanations purportedly miss. The three theorists I consider argue that the theoretical and 
methodological reduction of the programme destabilise the significance of the CSR, rendering 
the accommodation of, or dialogue with, alterative research programmes difficult, if not 
impossible. For example, Laidlaw accentuates that biocognitive accounts of religion will never 
supersede or integrate humanities’ research because they are fundamentally different 
enterprises with little commonality despite ostensibly similar subject matter. He focuses on the 
consequences of this exclusion, namely ‘negative reduction’: 
 
My argument is not that actual religions are complex and scientific explanations 
must simplify. The right kind of simplification is generally a necessary part of 
explanation, whether scientific or otherwise. The point is rather that no single 
kind of simplification is in this sense right for any and every question or interest 
(Laidlaw, 2007: 230).  
 
Oviedo and Ingold express similar arguments. Oviedo forcefully contends that the CSR’s 
reductionism encourages sweeping generalisations and questionable assumptions about 
human nature, society, and religiosity. 27  Ingold argues that cognitive science approaches need 
to overcome a false distinction between innate capacities and acquired competences. He also 
believes that the reductive study of the former (as in the Intuitive Model) produces fallacious 
explanations of ontogenetic development.  He concludes that cognitive studies fail to see 
humans as self-actualising systems. Laidlaw and Oviedo agree, expressing concerns that the CSR 
denies the self (in terms of a subjective, volitional, and experientially shaped person) in its 
research on religion. 
   
All three theorists believe that cognitive studies produce anaemic theoretical abstractions by 
focusing on religious representations as causal properties of mental information processing and 
                                                     
26
 It may strike some as bizarre to conflate hermeneutical and postmodern theory. Clearly, these are markedly 
different critical spaces though I shall highlight how these appear to converge in extant CSR criticisms.  
27
 Oviedo makes three other claims, such as the theological relevance of CSR method, the therapeutic implication 
of cognitive research, and the implicit ideology of the CSR, that are beyond the scope of the critical discussion 
outlined here.  
IMPLICIT CULTURES  75 
 
 
 
little else. This is problematic because the methodological reduction employed by the CSR 
excludes much that social anthropologists mean by religion. More seriously: 
 
[R]eligion is not an object, such that ‘it’ can be defined analytically rather than 
historically, and therefore is not a proper object for the kind of explanations 
cognitive science can provide (Laidlaw, 2007: 212). 
 
From their perspective, the general, probabilistic and experience-distant methodology of the 
CSR means that the CSR does not so much explain religion away; it actually misses the basic 
elements that constitute a believer’s religion. It is not that all reduction is conceptually 
pernicious (reduction is required for clear analysis in any and every academic discipline) but 
that the reduction that the CSR employs results in a double negative. Firstly, CSR reduction 
inappropriately fragments religious phenomena and secondly, these can lead to conceptual 
distortions and warrantless explanations about religious beliefs.  
 
2.2 How Consilience Alienates the Intuitive Model 
 
 
Indeed, the recurrent criticism by the external critics is that CSR explanations of religion are 
products of the methodological reductions put in place at the outset and have little basis or 
relevance to how minds and agents ‘work in the real world.’ Certainly, in Barrett and Bering’s 
research the pendulum seems to have swung too far into abstraction, justifying ahistorical, 
acontextual and culture-blind theories in the face of the rich differentiation of cultural belief 
expressions, commitments, and developmental onsets despite the appearance of very basic 
regularities. 
 
Normatively, developmental psychology rejects consilience with the humanities and the social 
sciences, finding explanatory space only for the experimental study of causal hypotheses. There 
is no place for interpretations in this analysis because children, while wilful and unpredictable, 
are not fully reasoned cultural actors.  Questions composed in experimental designs are limited 
to the consideration of one or two key variables, which are present despite the radical 
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suppression of other variables. Proposed hypotheses are disputed through experimentation not 
through interpretive argumentation as in anthropology and non-cognitive religious studies. 
 
Barrett isolates cognitive developmental psychology from different domains of investigation in 
the CSR, such as the evolutionary theories that feature in Bering’s work, the cultural level 
analysis that Sperber encourages, as well as findings about the human-mind brain from 
cognitive neuroscience (Barrett, 2007). Correspondingly, Barrett never engages in consilience 
discussions, simply because, as he sees it, this discussion has no immediate methodological 
relevance to his experimental work. He believes that consilience is a redundant proposition at 
the level of purely psychological investigations. 
 
Indeed, theorising about cross-domain consilience is superficially irrelevant in the Intuitive 
Model as the Intuitive Model seeks to suppress the influence of conscious deliberations and 
sociocultural forces. Centre stage in Intuitive Model theory are simulated task experiments 
conducted on children, which both theorists argue provide strong empirical support of their 
wider ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis. Bering proposes consilience between natural 
science methodological domains while Barrett believes developmental psychology findings are 
sufficient for his explanatory aspirations. 
 
Nowhere in the contemporary research is the self-sufficiency of psychology expressed with 
greater clarity than in the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief.’  To a degree, this is as 
it should be, as the latter is by definition an autonomous field of psychological research with a 
(however contestable) methodology dedicated to exposing acultural cognitions.  Yet what the 
rest of cognitive anthropology and other theorists in the CSR are increasingly emphasising, and 
what many social anthropologists have known all along, is that cultural settings interact and 
interfere with any and every part of basic human psychology, from basic perceptions such as 
‘seeing’ through to complex ‘just world’ philosophies.  Humanistic explanatory attempts seek 
holism over reduction, accepting and striving to account for the complexity and cultural 
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peculiarity of any and every religious belief. The religious studies scholar Charles Paden 
captures the argument perfectly: 
 
Engagement with superhuman objects takes place at every cognitive level of 
human consciousness and in every cognitive domain,  in every form of social 
dynamic and causality, in every conceivable historical environment and cultural 
context, in every type of mythological discourse, and meaning-attribution, in 
every imaginable form of ritual performance and sensory environment – in short, 
through every genre of human behaviour. It would be religious to maintain 
fidelity to divinely endowed moral precepts. It would be religious to exercise 
altruistic care for others, in the name of the teachings of their faith and also 
religious to abandon social attachments to others in order to seek other-worldly 
communion. For those under threat of chaos, it may be religious to see the 
“superhuman” as absolute order and stability, but those bound and suppressed 
by their social identities, it may appear in the form of liberation from a given, 
corrupt order. Religion then may either bind or unbind, separate or bring 
together, invite ascetic constraint or ecstatic dance. It draws on many 
trajectories or basic behaviours – like territorial marking, submission to 
authority, bonding, offering and gift-giving, atoning for offences, sacrificing, 
communal sharing, and acts of loyalty. Even what seems like a specific 
categorical theme like sacrifice turns out to not be unitary but quickly breaks 
down into quite different modalities and collocations. The reason we have 
dozens of fairly reasonable theories of religion, myth, ritual and gods, is because 
each addresses an important aspect of the subject (Paden, 1998: 92).  
 
Thus, the holistic study of religion cannot occur after the fact of ‘reductive’ Intuitive Model 
hypotheses (See Toren, 2001 for a similar argument). More specifically, the Intuitive Model’s 
separation of culture and core cognition is not possible in such holistic research. 
 
Oviedo’s argument that the CSR should introduce the hermeneutical or phenomenological 
studies of personhood is not problematic at a rhetorical level for Bering and Barrett. The 
limitation of Oviedo’s argument that he does not clearly show how this is achieved within 
established psychological methodologies or more pertinently, why these would be of interest to 
developmental psychologists who are not studying the mature believers that Oviedo focuses. 
Ingold attempts to present such a dynamitic explanatory model. However, his holistic approach 
collapses the importance of natural scientific approaches in the process, alienating the CSR. 
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Both Laidlaw and Oviedo would reject Lawson and McCauley’s model of ‘interactionism’ (which 
is repeated in various guises through the CSR literature (see Pyysiäinen, 2004; Whitehouse, 
2004, 2007; Jensen 2009). They disagree that causal explanations can and should constrain 
interpretive projects and assert that the CSR massively biases causal explanation over 
interpretive approaches. Oviedo and Laidlaw emphasise the non-causal nature of social and 
cultural phenomena. As we have seen, they reason that the CSR’s reductionism to causal 
processes has led the CSR to try to answer questions of meaning and interpretation, not 
appropriate in reductive natural-scientific analysis. They would locate major conceptual 
inadequacy in Lawson and McCauley’s claim that ‘neither *religious+ texts nor traditions (in the 
sense most commonly associated with the most popular religions of the world) are necessary 
features of religious systems. Their interpretation and study may well contribute to a richer 
understanding of the body of phenomena in question, but both are ultimately incidental to its 
explanation’ (Lawson and McCauley, 1990: 6). Thus, what Lawson and McCauley see as ‘ad hoc,’ 
Oviedo and Laidlaw see as foundational to both the subject matter and the study of it.    
 
Laidlaw and Oviedo argue that consilience theorising is impossible because the CSR brackets 
humanistic perspectives in exactly the areas that matter. Laidlaw and Oviedo argue that CSR 
theory is akin to a sentence comprised solely of nouns and conjunctions – ignoring all the 
features of a sentence, such as tense, verb, and punctuation, which make it comprehensible 
and give it ‘meaning.’ Furthermore, humanities’ criticisms of natural scientific approaches 
contend that the bracketing of the historical, experiential, emotional, ideological, socio-
economic, and political dimensions of religious realities, while still seeking causal reduction of 
skeletal concepts in psychological, biological and or neurocognitive mechanisms, is deeply 
problematic. The exclusion of basic and obvious features of religious belief denies the reality of 
what Laidlaw describes broadly as human ‘reason, imagination and will’ (Laidlaw, 2007: 214).   
 
However, it is noticeable that it is scholars from outside of the CSR who invest the most energy 
policing an artificial boundary line between complete versus partial theories in the study of 
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religion. It is possible that the fixation on the failure of the CSR to offer a comprehensive theory 
of religion stems from the projection of the explanatory idealisms of humanities’ investigations 
themselves. 
 
Whitehouse would agree, noting that ‘scholars trained in grand theoretical traditions, such as 
Marxism, psychoanalysis, or phenomenology tend to assume that theories of religion must be 
general theories of religion as a whole’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 51 Italics in original). Certainly, a 
desire for comprehensive and non-exclusive understandings of studied phenomena seems 
characteristic of the humanities’ project, reflected even in the postmodern lamentation of this 
impossibility.  This has encouraged Laidlaw, Ingold and Oviedo to frame the reductionist 
method of the CSR (with the best work self-consciously partial and incomplete) in contrast to 
the ideal (though terminally unreachable) pursuit of holism.  Nevertheless, as Whitehouse 
states of Ingold’s criticisms: 
 
The details of what an alternative program may look like, however, are not 
elaborately or precisely defined. Ingold...makes only general suggestions of how 
we might proceed [and he] tends to collapse developmental processes into an 
undifferentiated bundle of elements. As the dichotomies between evolution and 
history, genes and environment, nature and nurture, competence and 
performance and planning and implementation come down, no structures 
appear to be left among the rubble (Whitehouse, 2001: 204).    
 
In my reading, the real problem is not the classic CSR’s explanatory boundary lines but rather its 
failure to engage with the critical perspectives offered in divergent methodological disciplines. 
The perceived irrelevance of theoretical developments in alternative programmes is 
conspicuous.28 Arguably, the lack of critical methodological discussion by either Bering or 
Barrett leads to overconfidence in findings and the intrusion of perspectives long suspect in 
cognitive anthropology.  
 
Whereas the Standard Model seeks validation through the translation of its theoretical claims 
                                                     
28
 In the next chapter how recent work in the CSR represents an attempt to come to grips with these criticisms 
while still providing a sound natural-scientific basis for cognitive-cultural investigations. 
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into testable psychological experiments, Bering and Barrett utilise well established and what 
they believe are hardly contentious research models. All that distinguishes Intuitive Model task 
designs from long established task designs is that religious beliefs are their subject matter. 
Bering and Barrett assume that the epistemological foundations of their research are firmly 
established. This leads to the absence of critical reflection and the rejection of the 
philosophically ‘speculative’ considerations of religious studies theorists, ethnologists, and 
neuroscientists. Again, the problem with this, as anthropologists point out is that ‘religion’ and 
‘belief’ are historicised and intrinsically socioculturally mediated categories that cannot be 
neatly separated into abstract, dehistoricised, and autonomous variables. 
  
Minimal Consilience: Mode’s Theory 
 
An awareness that the psychological investigation of individuals embedded in cultural systems 
will suffer without including basic elements of humanities’ research has encouraged a number 
of CSR scholars to incorporate some sociocultural variables. Such minimal consilience models 
strive to overcome the explanatory limitations of classic cognitive exclusivism (See Pyysiäinen, 
2004, 2009; Saler, Whitehouse, 2001, 2007 for examples).  However, to date, the CSR’s modest 
methodological consilience enriches the CSR project but does not and will never be a Wilsonian 
Milvian bridge between the two enterprises. Whitehouse’s recent writing on the role and 
function of the cognitive sciences in anthropology express this clearly. 
 
Whitehouse’s chapter in Religion, Anthropology and Cognitive Science updates Lawson and 
McCauley’s call for ‘interactionism’ by re-emphasising sociocultural variables in his cognitive 
study of memory systems and religious concepts.  Challenging Laidlaw, he does not see 
interpretive and scientific explanatory accounts as incommensurate because scientific 
psychology is ‘interested in fundamentally the same problems that perplex interpretive 
anthropologists, as well as historians and others’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 247).  An alternative to 
both cognitivist and interpretive extremes (Whitehouse sees the Standard Model as an example 
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of the first) is available through compromise and ‘a large dose of messy real world empirical 
inquiry’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 249).29 
 
He argues that cognitive and interpretive frameworks are able to complement each other 
provided a less rigid conception of cognition is established and if, as Lawson and McCauley 
argue, interpretive methodology is itself directed by cognitive empiricism.  
 
Whitehouse contends that the classic CSR’s account of cognition has hindered cross discipline 
collaborations.  Like Laidlaw, he argues that implicit cognitive causality is too narrow a frame of 
reference to account for many aspects of the religious spectrum. In particular, it ignores the 
creative aspects of cognition behind variations in different cultural and situational contexts.30 
His solution is to relax the CSR’s reductionist model. He believes some of the limitations (that 
Laidlaw and Oviedo pinpoint) can be overcome if the CSR’s conception of religion is expanded 
to encompass processes ‘that are often conscious and always historical’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 
260). Pragmatically, this means that the cognitive study of beliefs must also include the implicit, 
reflective, and spontaneous dimension of beliefs as well as the role of sociocultural forces and 
institutions in mediating such beliefs. Crucially, Whitehouse believes that interpretive 
anthropologists need to abandon their intractable understanding of culture as an ‘unstable 
continuously contested, mediated, disrupted network of meaning and inter-subjective states 
                                                     
29
 Whitehouse’s own criticism of the Standard Model stems from his research on the Mali Baining of Papua New 
Guinea.  He found that while a number of Mali Baining’s religious concepts conformed to the Boyerian schema; a 
significant portion were also versatile, maximally counterintuitive and appeared to involve great computational 
loading. The Standard Model was unable to account for the incidence of these concepts because this second set of 
concepts were clearly difficult to acquire and transmit. They appear, in this cognitive sense, to be strikingly 
‘unnatural.’ 
 
Whitehouse’s insight was to propose that the recall and acquisition of such cognitively difficult concepts was made 
possible by ‘man made’ sociocultural processes that acted on two types of memory mechanisms (semantic and 
episodic) creating a ratchet effect between culture and cognition.  He argues that pedagogic ritual processes that 
are frequent and repetitive ensure the uptake of difficult non-reflective, easily muddled and forgotten ‘unnatural’ 
concepts. ‘Mode’s theory’ offers a dynamic account of the transmission of religious ideas and behaviours and thus 
begins to account for sociocultural variation in religious structure and why some religious concepts are prolific in 
some settings and not others.  In sum, Whitehouse argues that the CSR needs to address the ‘unnatural’ beliefs 
prolific in religious activity and unaccounted for in the Standard Model (see Whitehouse, 2004, 2005). 
30
 Barrett and Lanman have outlined how the Intuitive Model  and ‘modes theory’ correlate (see Barrett and 
Lanman, 2008)  
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that hover somewhere mysteriously [and irreducibly] above (or at least beyond) all other 
ontological levels of reality (e.g., the psychological and biological)’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 261).  
 
On occasion, Whitehouse positions experimental psychology as the methodological bridge 
between explanatory and interpretive approaches.  If a theory (when reframed as a specific 
hypothesis) is significant then it will prove itself experimentally or if the occasion necessitates 
through naturalistic testing. A key pursuit of cognitive research should be to translate 
anthropological and social science theories into hypotheses that are experimentally testable. By 
doing this experimental psychology can separate the strong from the weak theories about 
religious phenomena. Whitehouse believes ethnographers and historians can provide the 
details of specific cultural meanings and contexts. By providing rich case studies, their research 
will make cognitive generalisations richer and increase future predications. Whitehouse 
maintains that cognitive theory answers a unique set of questions, for example, how do 
evolved mechanisms come into play in reflections on deity and how do these mechanisms 
relate to the transmission of these reflections between minds? 
 
Nonetheless, Whitehouse’s cognitive consilience does not bypass Oviedo, Ingold and Laidlaw’s 
concern that cognitive psychology is of limited relevance to the study of human relationships 
and meanings. Whitehouse partially concedes this, noting that ‘experimental psychology is just 
a fraction of the evidence needed to understand such processes’ (Whitehouse, 2007: 250). Yet, 
while Whitehouse has strived for consilience between ethnography and cognitive science, like 
most CSR theory, his theory still favours a focus on the causal constraints of a universal mind 
brain. Laidlaw and Oviedo’s criticism of the dominance of cognitive psychology is not an 
instance of special pleading because both have elucidated the ways in which causal analysis 
constrains and distorts religious subject matter. Oviedo and Laidlaw would argue that true 
interaction involves the inclusion of non-cognitive methodological perspectives; a position not 
afforded in either Lawson and McCauley’s ‘interactionism’ or Whitehouse’s ‘cognitive 
consilience.’    
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Whitehouse’s synthesis is unlikely to appease Laidlaw. Laidlaw would query whether it is 
appropriate to label explanations that scientific psychology and the experimental method 
cannot measure, depreciatingly as mere ‘interpretations.’  The humanities’ scholars would 
respond that it remains unclear why cognitive science is the soundest method to analyse 
culture, especially since Whitehouse sees cognitive science as a partially autonomous 
enterprise, reliable because of the experimental method, rather than the mind-brain and 
evolutionary theories, which link it to the natural sciences. Laidlaw, in particular, would see this 
as an example of the CSR conflating the real with the measurable. 
 
More seriously, Laidlaw believes that the humanities are interested in exactly those areas 
where cognitive psychology is irrelevant or at best peripheral.  He would commend 
Whitehouse’s attempt to flesh out the cognitive approach but would remain sceptical whether 
a ‘bottom up’ approach is of direct relevance to the complex cultural questions that concern 
him.  
 
While ‘mode’s theory’ is a step in the right direction, I remain sceptical of the methodological 
need for direct consilience.  I see this ambition as pragmatically unprofitable for either 
explanatory or interpretive ventures. As we have seen, humanistic studies can and frequently 
do offer important critical clarifications of cognitive studies, though they promote confusion 
when attempting to offer broad-spectrum evaluative commentary. It is questionable whether 
the inherent disunity in the study of religion needs to be resolved.   
 
The problem remains that methodological consilience, while enriching the cognitive project, 
does not really integrate the humanities in a way that would satisfy the interests of humanities’ 
scholars. This is at the heart of Laidlaw and Oviedo’s critique. Wilson notes that the humanities 
address questions about how humans ought to be and act, how they should live, and where 
they should locate existential meaning. Yet, these are questions not fit for Intuitive Model study 
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and only incidentally relevant to CSR scholarship.31 Even if reformed, cognitive anthropology 
cannot answer the evaluative questions that feature in humanities’ research. Mode’s theory 
and other alternative theories of cognitive-cultural relations may make cognitive theory of 
slightly greater relevance to alternative programmes. Yet even Whitehouse admits that 
scientific understandings cannot map the complexity expected in humanities’ studies.  Scientific 
research is still in its infancy and it is uncertain how to measure the relative importance of 
implicit and explicit cognitions in patterns of social behaviour and cultural efflorescence 
(Whitehouse, 2007: 250).  
 
Because the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ and the humanities approach the 
subjects they study through different methodologies, they also draw different conclusions. The 
enduring difficulty in aligning ‘reasons’ with ‘causes’ means that consilience projects still do not 
offer pragmatic solutions to the disunity of the investigative domains. This does not mean that 
the humanities have no role to play in the CSR.  In the next section, I develop the important, 
though peripheral, role of interpretive research in Intuitive Model theory. 
 
2.3 The Role of Humanities’ Criticism in Intuitive Model Research 
 
Humanities’ critiques are important to the Intuitive Model because they address foundational 
assumptions and, on occasion, pinpoint methodological shortfalls in the ‘naturalness of 
religious beliefs’ metathesis. They are significant in this thesis, because of the role they play in 
conceptual house cleaning and in highlighting what the Intuitive Model does not, and cannot 
explain. Certainly, correspondence between humanities based meta-theoretical critiques and 
the three major internal critical themes of Bering and Barrett’s work is suggestive. While 
Oviedo, Laidlaw, and Ingold address many of the same themes as the internal critics, they 
distinctly propose that the major problem is nomothetic reduction and only consequently, the 
                                                     
31
 The CSR does not need to answer such questions. Theories would enter the realm of human discourse, which as 
the above critiques have underlined, it is not fit to do because of its studied partiality (though see: Atran 2008 for a 
successful blend). 
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task designs themselves. In my reading, humanities’ scholars would express the following 
concerns with Bering and Barrett’s hypotheses and the developmental psychology of religion 
generally: 
 
• Assuming direct correlations between the generic behaviour and beliefs of children 
and culturally embedded, religiously peculiar, mature believers is conceptually and 
empirically erroneous.  Examining religion as an ‘implicit belief system’ is equally 
problematic.  
• Psychological experiments on children are not reliable templates for explaining human 
psychological processing across the life course. 
• The experimental method cannot grasp the complexities and idiosyncrasies of 
religious realities. There are simply too many variables with many critical ones emerging 
later in life.   
• The ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis is a suspect metatheoretical position. Bering, 
in particular, is not just deflating religion but also actively eliminating it. The Intuitive 
Model’s radical methodological and conceptual reductions mean that neither theorist 
can claim they are actually explaining religion and religious belief as understood by 
social scientists, religious studies scholars, and religious believers.32  
 
I now turn to some of the key issues humanities’ theorists discuss in relation to the ‘negative 
reduction’ perceived to be inherent to the CSR and by inference, the Intuitive Model. I suggest 
that these criticisms align with the criticisms introduced in chapter one. The first humanities’ 
criticism contests the methodological realism of the Intuitive Model, the second the Intuitive 
Model’s conceptual understanding of key terms such as ’belief’ and ‘religion,’ and  the third, the 
artificial  narrative constructs of the ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis.  
 
 
 
                                                     
32
 See footnote about evolutionary psychology on page 38. 
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o Negative Reduction 
 
Scholars versed in the humanities contest are psychological realism of the Intuitive Model’s 
methodology and task designs. These criticisms directly correspond to the section in the last 
chapter because like these, Bering and Barrett’s empirical evidence is rejected because of 
unsuitable task designs. 
 
Humanities’ scholars question the claim that the experimental method offers the best means to 
test particular theories. Humanities’ scholars are sceptical about how closely the experiments 
mimic psychological processes in real life. They observe that theorists use experiments 
inductively to prove metatheoretical claims even though one experiment can tell us little 
beyond its immediate findings. Furthermore, experimental studies undermine complex and 
nuanced anthropological theory because of the need to constrain such theories in terms of 
simple variables. Oviedo, Ingold, and Laidlaw’s shared concern for ontological realism would 
lead them to query the psychological realism of Barrett and Bering’s theories. We have already 
seen that Laidlaw and Ingold’s ontological concern suggests that the CSR’s methodological 
reduction denies basic ontological realities about human beings. To separate the reasoned (the 
theologically correct) from the instinctive, unjustifiably castrates hardly contestable ontological 
assumptions about the human subject. 
 
Laidlaw stresses that explaining religion exclusively in terms of selection pressures, causal 
mechanisms and the like suppresses the central focus of research on religion. It ignores the fact 
that religious traditions are socio-historical embedded processes and thus denies the 
foundational examination of how the particular ideals and values of particular religious 
traditions and practices come to be. 
 
Recall that the internal critical literature questioned the artificially of the Intuitive Model’s 
causal restrictions. Theorists noted a number of validity issues in Barrett and Bering’s 
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experimental designs. Laidlaw and Oviedo’s claim is more radical. They believe that 
experimental designs simplify religious beliefs to the point of eliminating them.  Both allege 
that CSR experimental designs are rhetorical devices, confirming abstract metaphors rather 
than reliable data about religious believers and religious phenomena. Importantly, 
hermeneutical and postmodern theories are also theories about what is objectively knowable. 
In the present instance, these perspectives raise questions about the reliability of ‘objective’ 
knowledge about other humans’ minds. Both theoretical strains emphasise that the pursuit of 
holism is unachievable.  
 
Laidlaw is also critical of the CSR’s cynicism about believers’ self-reports. We have seen that this 
is because of the experimental finding that a person’s reflective beliefs rarely match up with 
their implicit ‘beliefs.’ Implicit beliefs appear only in some circumstances when a person is 
under cognitive pressure. To remove reflective beliefs from methodological analysis does not 
serve to remove them from human thought and thus cognitive scientists should avoid 
conflating the real with the measurable (Laidlaw, 2007: 241) 
 
All three theorists suggest that in isolation, and without serious revision, the CSR explains ‘a 
constructed entity, a sort of research tool, or mental experiment, with almost no contact with 
reality’ (Oviedo, 2008b: 392). This is a bold claim because if it is accurate, then the actual 
science behind the CSR (Barrett, 2008b) is no more persuasive than the method of 
argumentation typical to studies of religions that the CSR seeks to differentiate itself.  
 
Intuitive Model theorists would reject many of the above claims. They would point to the 
reliability of the task designs like the false belief task: very simple experiments present rich and 
compelling evidence. Because of the artificially of the lab environments and isolated focus on 
one or two key variables Barrett and Bering’s experiments present significant and compelling 
results. It is the ability of the psychological method to abstract from and systemically study 
human beliefs, in spite of the complexity and variability of such beliefs, which highlights the 
importance of psychological methodologies. The results are consistent in spite of the ‘essential’ 
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features that humanities’ scholars demand.  Furthermore, while the humanities encourage 
multiple perspectives they are unable to document the very implicit processes that the Intuitive 
Model focuses on. The humanities can offer ‘reasons’ but not ‘causes.’  
 
The above discussion about psychological realism is clearly an important one.  Even when only 
considered through the gaze of critical writings, this discussion highlights that realism is relative 
to the theoretical apparatuses employed to investigate the subject under investigation. 
 
o Artificial Conceptual Frameworks  
 
Laidlaw is especially critical of cognitive scientific definitions of ‘religion’ and ‘religious beliefs.’ 
He contends that such conceptual terminology imposes limits on CSR explanations.   For 
example, Laidlaw asserts that the CSR’s object of study is not religion but what seventeenth and 
eighteenth century scholars defined as ‘natural religion.’ Like CSR researchers, scholars of 
‘natural religion’ sought to answer the question: ‘What did human reason, or nature, require or 
incline man to believe?’ (Laidlaw, 2007: 228) He argues that the CSR studies human superstition 
rather than religion proper. No discussion in the CSR, as Laidlaw understands it, makes any 
mention of how humans intentionally shape their religions. Because of this, it can never get 
past explaining cognitive errors that result in basic superstitions or at best, precursor religious 
beliefs.  
 
Laidlaw questions the validity of operationalising religion as a ‘belief in supernatural agents.’ He 
would similarly question Bering’s focus on ‘afterlife beliefs.’ Introducing his own research on 
Jain and Theravada Buddhist soteriological traditions he notes that such an intellectual 
definition of religious belief struggles to capture the basic ingredients of these traditions. He 
argues that while Barrett’s theory of implicit anthropomorphism may feature in lay and expert 
non-reflective reasoning, one cannot escape the fact that in the case of Buddhism ‘no remotely 
reflective Buddhist, including those who spend time and resources participating in such rites, 
would confuse them for a moment with the teachings of the Buddha. And whatever Buddhism 
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is, it surely must include that’ (Laidlaw, 2007: 221). Buddhist and Jain believers may ‘catch’ 
cognitively optimal religious representations but this is not what they are about or even 
remotely concerned. Furthermore, religions are clearly more than beliefs, involving institutions, 
roles and relationships, embodied practices, and material cultures. To analyse religion 
adequately these features should be included.  Moreover:  
 
Each religious tradition has its own distinctive way of describing, judging and 
shaping character in relation to historically created and developing conceptions 
of human wellbeing and worth. It is through instituted religious practices – forms 
of worship, confession, celebration, interaction, ecstasy and so on – that people 
come to  have emotions and self-understandings  that make them Christian, 
Muslim, Buddhist, Jain or whatever. And just as it is not possible to be a Jain, or 
to feel ‘disgust (with the world)’ without the language needed to form the self 
interpretation, so the language and emotion could not exist without the tradition 
and the institutions and practices through which it is cultivated and experienced 
(Laidlaw, 2007: 225).  
 
Laidlaw argues that the CSR’s treatment of religion as an artefact of ‘beliefs’ is a product of a 
Western post-enlightenment Christian framework, and is anachronistic if applied elsewhere. He 
cites Talal Asad (2003) who has argued that many Muslims find questions such as 'Do you 
believe in Allah?' odd; belief is something you do rather than actively reflect on. He argues that 
belief is a culturally inescapable product of Cartesian dualism and a post-Christian bias toward 
the category of believing (Laidlaw, 2007: 234). The search for a stable, causal, and generic basis 
of belief rests on a category error because ‘the changing history of how the word is used is 
inseparable to the history of it changing’ (Laidlaw, 2007: 227).  
 
He also takes issue with the methodological assumption that observed behaviours can be 
accounted for by postulating beliefs as causal forces, especially when there is no evidence for 
the belief other than the observed behaviour itself. Laidlaw argues that not only is this circular 
it becomes highly tenuous when it is acknowledged that an observed behaviour can be 
explained through startlingly different sets of beliefs and intentions (Laidlaw, 2007: 238). 
Ultimately, the methodological exclusion of ‘reasons’ and the singular focus on ‘causes’ results 
in distortion and a ‘radical partiality’ in the CSR’s operationalising of the concept ‘belief’ 
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(Laidlaw, 2007: 234),  especially when it is the reflective dimension of belief that appears to be 
the most vital.  
 
Laidlaw thinks that it is unhelpful to extend the concept of ‘beliefs’ to implicit processes as this 
promotes conceptual confusions about what beliefs are. Like Harris in the previous chapter, he 
wonders how cognitive science could accommodate belief pretension or the suspension of 
disbelief common to anyone who has engaged with a stirring fictional text. He celebrates 
Sperber, Barrett and recently Astuti’s attempts to account for the different kinds of beliefs that 
people hold, but concludes these still miss the empirical complexity of different modalities of 
belief. As an example, Laidlaw cites Barrett’s discussion of the widespread propensity to 
‘believe’ racial stereotypes. In his reading, Barrett is not so much describing a belief as a 
statistical tendency (2007:233). Barrett is stating that this actual belief has propositional 
content based on a generic understanding of race.  Yet, Laidlaw questions where the idea of 
race comes from in the first place. Furthermore, Barrett says nothing about variations in 
magnitude in individuals or how beliefs are reshaped through experience, or how they affect 
people differently in different circumstances.   Laidlaw maintains that it is essential to study 
context, cultural processes, and local behavioural practices before we can begin to uncover the 
complexity of different types of belief.  
 
Laidlaw believes that the CSR needs to explain why trait characteristics of human culture and 
experience do not impinge on the isolated objects of investigation. Just because the CSR cannot 
causally account for the reflective variations of belief (which for Laidlaw all belief types must 
involve), this does not mean that they can, or should be, neatly carved at their ‘natural joints.’  
 
Critically, he asserts that one cannot talk about beliefs without talking about how humans 
reason about the experiences that confront them. Bering appears to agree with Laidlaw on this, 
introducing the self and assuming close correlates between implicit and reasoned assumptions. 
Laidlaw would commend Bering for taking seriously the reflective dimension of belief though 
would criticise the ethnographic inconsequentiality of his research. Even without contesting the 
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experimental evidence, Laidlaw would remain unhappy with the causal power Bering grants to 
intuitions structured by default reasoning bias. He would see that Bering’s synchronistic theory 
still errs on the side of ‘causes’ over ‘reasons,’ with the methodological insistence of naturalist 
experimentation making a bridge into thick explanations impossible.   
 
Laidlaw’s reflection on the conceptual basis of the CSR is very important to the themes of this 
chapter. He exposes the ways in which Intuitive Model conceptual terminology is exclusionary, 
encouraging special concepts that are unique to cognitive psychology and in conflict with 
definitions in other domains of experience and research. As such, the overarching ‘naturalness 
of religious belief’ metathesis normatively transcends the domain of its own causal reductive 
methodology and intrudes into domains where it is inappropriate and/or fallacious. This 
overextension introduces some of the key critical questions discussed in the remainder of the 
thesis. For example, if the conceptual terminology is so distinctive to cognitive developmental 
psychology that it conflicts with conceptualisation in other fields, should Intuitive Model 
theorists limit the metathesis to evidence in its own domain of enquiry rather than attempt to 
influence other domains of enquiry? 
 
For example, Laidlaw would question whether children’s beliefs really bypass the complex 
psychological and cultural processes that humanities’ research takes as its staple. He would 
wonder whether what Bering explains is appropriate for children and adolescents but not for 
adult believers.  Corresponding to the argument presented earlier by Evans and Wellman, 
Oviedo, Ingold, and Laidlaw would argue that children and adults entertain markedly divergent 
existential questions. The problem lies in the operational correspondence of mature human 
qualities with proto-potentialities in children. Barrett and Bering’s hypotheses are only 
persuasive if the implicit beliefs of children and adults are locatable within the same trajectory. 
Greenberg and Sullivan et al. echo Laidlaw’s concerns. They argue that reflective adult beliefs 
are qualitatively different from children’s beliefs, both in content and in substance (2006: 474). 
They note that maturity involves dropping childish assumptions, which prove to be 
experientially mistaken. Developmental shifts of this kind highlight the tenuous relevance of 
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universalistic evolutionary and cognitive psychology to culturally bounded, interpersonal 
experience.  
 
It is clearly erroneous to seek exemplar religious experiences like mystical states in children’s 
worlds (though some have tried, e.g., Harms, 1944). Yet, given the implausibility of looking for 
religious experiences (even prototypical religious experiences) in children, it is equally 
questionable whether prototypical beliefs, at least as mature folk believers may entertain, are 
present in children’s minds. 
 
Bering and Barrett may respond that charting the insider subjective perspectives of children is 
difficult, children have not developed the linguistic, social cognitive and or motor skills to 
express themselves, and thus the nomothetic approach is highly appropriate. 
 
 Bering and Barrett have also pointed out that this is misrepresentative of what Intuitive Model 
research examines. Concepts, and for Bering actual non-reflective intuitions, may be 
maturationally innate. However, a child’s belief and an adult’s belief are associated only 
structurally, with semantic content reshaped throughout the life course.   
 
o Metathesis as Narrative  
 
The most significant criticism of the CSR focuses on the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ 
metathesis. This criticism extends the issues with methodological reduction, isolation of critical 
variables and the distorting role of conceptual terminology. Laidlaw, Ingold, and Oviedo 
emphasise the partiality of CSR perspectives.  While humanities’ scholars are off target in their 
contention that the CSR desires to offer a complete explanation of religion, they are on target 
when they pinpoint the overextension and narrative overreach of the programme.  
 
Interestingly, the interpretive nature of the metathesis engenders the relevance of interpretive 
methods and theory. Indeed, it is this ‘explanatory metanarrative’ which humanities’ scholars 
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have implicitly directed their criticism, noting the tenuous data, exclusionism, and conceptual 
issues behind such generalist comparative assertions. It is here, and arguably, only here, that 
Oviedo and Laidlaw’s interest in a biocognitive ‘complete’ account of religion makes sense 
(Oviedo, 2008a; Laidlaw, 2001: 212).  
 
Certainly, the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis does not strive to be a complete explanation 
of religion, as Laidlaw and Oviedo incorrectly presume. This assumption is radically at odds with 
the CSR empirical claim that theorists should fractionate and deflate religion. Even so, the 
‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis does have major rhetorical force well beyond the empirical 
data in support of it. While charting the causal mechanisms behind a given religious 
phenomena in the manner akin to the natural sciences, the Intuitive Model simultaneously 
utilises what may be termed a humanesque ‘narrative imagination’ to tie experimental findings 
and theoretical intuitions together into a plausible general account of intuitive religion in 
diverse cultural spaces. As a science the CSR is not unique in the use of guiding narratives, many 
disciplines such as evolutionary biology and particle physics utilise plausible and reliable meta-
narratives to predict outcomes and generate further hypotheses. 
 
However, the tension between the conceptual unity presented in the ‘naturalness of religious 
belief’ metathesis and the distinctive facet-specific hypotheses of individual authors is evident 
throughout the literature.  
 
Compare: 
 
Explaining religion it is not a matter of accounting for a single trait; it involves 
explaining a very complex and interconnected repertoire of patterns of thinking 
and behaviour (Whitehouse, 2008: 19). 
 
With: 
By virtue of our biological endowment as human beings and our environmental 
endowment from living in this world, people all over the world have similar 
minds. Regardless of culture, people tend to have minds with many basic 
structures that perform numerous mundane tasks, such as discerning the objects 
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around us, defining those objects, and observing how those objects causally 
interact. Operating largely without our awareness mental ‘tools’ encourage us to 
think similarly about many banal features of the world around us. These mental 
tools also encourage people to think about and believe in gods, the Judeo-
Christian God enjoying particularly favourable treatment, especially during child 
development. Once introduced into a population, belief in the existence of a 
supreme god with properties such as being super knowing, superpowerful, and 
immortal is highly contagious and a hard habit to break. The way our minds are 
structured and develop makes these beliefs very attractive (Barrett, 2004: viii). 
 
I have placed the two quotes beside each other because they pinpoint a major explanatory 
tension in the CSR. The first quote, as outlined in the previous section, is anti-reductionistic; it 
acknowledges the impossibility of any singular systemic explanation of all facets of religion, 
while the second presents the explanatory coherence, bold reach, and deceptive simplicity of 
many central CSR hypotheses, particularly when these are articulated through the ‘naturalness 
of religion’ metathesis.  
 
External scholars are in the best position to analyse this recurrent tension between individual 
hypotheses and the wider metanarrative.  Indeed, the tension between the metatheoretical 
narrative and individual hypotheses is only observable through the gaze of humanities’ 
perspectives. Crucially, the fact that the CSR exhibits a narrative construct behind its 
explanations has not been addressed by CSR theorists, who typically try to defend the viability 
of naturalistic explanations of religion and the methods used to empirically ground data.33 
However, from the vantage point of Laidlaw and Oviedo, the issue is not the specific nature of 
the hypotheses but the broader framework, which explains so much in spite of so limited 
empirical evidence.  
 
Narratives are arguably ubiquitous in scientific discourse (Sheehan and Robe, 1999). Their role 
is to organise disparate hypotheses and ultimately to placate the ‘strangeness of reality.’ 
                                                     
33
 Citing the narrative construct in a scientific project is not an intrinsically derogatory act nor does it suggest that 
the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis is just another ad hoc ‘just so’ story. Similarly, discussion of an  
explanatory narrative is not same as a postmodern concern for modes of discourse, although this does inform the 
scepticism witnessed in the writings of Laidlaw and Oviedo.  
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Similarly, narrative explanations seem to offer a robustness and depth unavailable in a truly 
causal science of human realities:   
 
Complex adaptive systems, out of which intentions emerge, have behavioral 
trajectories that are in principle unique, contingent, and nondeterministic even 
in stable states and unpredictable across phase transitions. Given such 
unpredictability, the only explanation can be an interpretive story that 
retrospectively retraces the actual changes in dynamics. Without narrative, 
personality traits and human actions are incomprehensible (Teske, 2010: 91).  
 
The ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis acts as a summary of observations and a 
springboard to locate further evidence. It also contains the wider sociocultural implications of 
cognitive research. Arguably, the overextension inherent to the metathesis grants the CSR 
explanatory consequence. As Boyer admits: 
 
One could not be content with theories of religion that explain the attraction of 
supernatural agency but have nothing to say about why people spend time and 
effort in rituals, why many people in the world are so concerned about other 
people’s beliefs, and why some are prepared to oppress or massacre others on 
apparently religious grounds (Boyer, 2005: 8). 
 
The claim that only experimental evidence can contest the Intuitive Model’s hypotheses is 
mistaken because Intuitive Model theories do not restrict their explanations to the empirical 
data alone. 34 Yet, as Cohen and Lanman et al.’s (2008) reply to the common criticisms of the 
CSR shows clearly, CSR scholars deflect these kinds of criticisms by locating the explanatory 
methodology in the particular methodologies of individual theories and not in the guiding 
metathesis itself.  Humanities’ perspectives, correctly, challenge Barrett’s claim that ‘(t)his 
piecemeal approach makes the field complementary to the activities of other religion scholars 
from many disciplinary perspectives, [through] a stance of explanatory non-exclusivity’ (Barrett, 
2007: 2). 
 
                                                     
34
 This fact is especially important. In the next chapter, I discuss how the Intuitive Model protects itself from 
intrusion by alternative theories of cognition and culture.  
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 In contrast, Oviedo, Ingold, and Laidlaw argue that explanatory exclusivism is apparent in the 
theoretical justifications of the metathesis itself. They worry that the narrative explains cross-
cultural macro-historical processes by way of the micro-processes of cognition. From this 
perspective, the CSR can be seen as a modern grand narrative of religion, similar to the long 
troubled theories of Marx, Taylor, and Freud. Laidlaw and Oviedo are correct to assert that such 
narratives may encourage interesting hypotheses in experimental science but are not 
appropriate as a general explanation of the science itself. It also highlights the role of 
humanities’ research in evaluating the metatheoretical claims of the CSR. 
 
At the very least, my review of the external literature presents challenges to the domineering 
paternalism of cognitive psychology in cognitive-cultural research. Whitehouse, Day and Jesse 
Jensen have sought to reconcile cognitive and evolutionary science and humanistic research, 
though many remain sceptical (most notably, Boyer 2005, and Pyysiäinen, 2005) of 
incorporating these.  
 
2.4 The Constructive role of Humanities’ Criticisms   
 
The above critical discussions, sparked by criticisms of the CSR’s methodology from scholars 
who are sceptical of cognitive perspectives are important. While addressing some of the same 
themes discussed in the internal criticisms their wide-angle vantage point introduces 
perspectives not previously discussed.  Of most relevance is the discussion on the narrativity of 
the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis, as well as the limitations of the Intuitive Model’s 
definition of beliefs. At the very least these criticisms must encourage reflection on the implicit 
assumptions underlying Intuitive model research, such as the centrality of propositional beliefs 
in non Christian religions and the differing ways ‘believing’ manifests in different cultures. 
 
 Crucially, all of these criticisms are resolvable internally, without needing to destabilise the 
Intuitive Model by accommodating the radically different metatheoretical positions of 
hermeneutics and social anthropology. These criticisms also highlight the dependence of 
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Intuitive Model research on ethnographic research and the ways in which CSR perspectives 
compete with non-scientific perspectives.   
 
The questions raised here take us much further than the minimal cognitive consilience 
proposed by Whitehouse. To be sure, Oviedo, Laidlaw, and Ingold encourage CSR theorists to 
consider sociocultural variables in their task designs and explanations. Barrett and Lanman’s 
application of the Intuitive Model to ‘mode’s theory’ is one such example.  However, we have 
seen that the Oviedo, Laidlaw, and Ingold would encourage Intuitive Model theorists to 
consider even broader influences. Bering’s interest in the advent of existential awareness 
ensures that a discussion of personhood, competence, and identity are relevant to his work. 
Both Barrett and Bering need to acknowledge the narrative overreach of the ‘naturalness of 
religious belief’ metathesis and consider how to present experimental research without 
recourse to an abstracted and still unverified grand narrative.   
 
In the next chapter, I examine the contemporary application of alternative theories of cognition 
to the CSR. Interestingly these theories work through the same critical themes that dominate 
this chapter.  
   
Conclusion 
 
The criticisms outlined above, even when overstated, and on occasion misrepresentative, are 
significant to Intuitive Model theory. We can surmise that the major unresolved charge against 
Intuitive Model theories is that the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis is dubious 
because of its reliance on non-inclusive methodological restrictions. This does not just make the 
metathesis too general to be consequential but too partial to be empirically sound. With the 
exception of Ingold, humanities scholars contend that the legitimisation of the metathesis 
requires the integration of humanistic approaches directly into CSR research. However, Bering 
and Barrett, like most in the CSR, do not see this as necessary. As Laidlaw himself admits, the 
introduction of humanistic frameworks into nomothetic research would only result in the ability 
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to construct predictive experimental design based on one or two variables (Laidlaw, 2007: 232). 
Yet humanistic theory posits multiple variables and qualitative perspectives that trouble 
nomothetic research. As I show in the instance of ‘mode’s theory,’ Whitehouse’s revised theory 
of consilience fails to resolve the most persistent questions found in both the humanistic 
criticisms and the internal criticisms.  
 
As such, the most appropriate role for humanistic research is the presentation of a set of critical 
questions that encourage self-reflection by CSR theorists. Laidlaw is certainly correct to view 
the cognitive-scientific and humanistic study of religion as different enterprises; the attempt to 
unify these can only result in confusion because of the methodological boundaries of the CSR 
project itself. Even so, Oviedo, Laidlaw, and Ingold do outline significant issues that some CSR 
scholars have attempted to resolve. In the following chapters, I develop these questions in 
relations to the frameworks of ‘distributed’ and ‘extended cognition.’  
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Chapter Three: Alternative Theories of Cognition 
 
This chapter examines some of the ways alternative theories of cognition and culture 
accommodate recurrent criticisms of the Intuitive Model and the ‘naturalness of religious 
belief’ metathesis. A perceived need to clarify why Intuitive Model theorists are not 
incorporating theoretical advancements in the mainstream CSR, particularly those stemming 
from the employment of alternative theories of cognition, motivates my examination.  
 
I evaluate two critical approaches with direct relevance to Intuitive Model theories: Mathew 
Day’s employment of ‘extended mind’ perspectives and Geertz and Markússon’s utilisation of 
‘distributed’ and biosemiotic approaches. I highlight how these conceptually resolve some of 
the recurrent issues with Intuitive Model theory, though also emphasise why they remain 
problematic for core knowledge developmental psychologists, even in the absence of the 
constraining influence of the Intuitive Model’s metathesis. 
 
Indeed, the motivation for this chapter in relation to the larger aims of the thesis is to show 
that contemporary models of the mind address many of the problems with the Intuitive Model 
discussed in previous chapters. Still, I argue that they do not go far enough. With the exception 
of Day’s most recent writings, my examples continue to present culture and socialisation 
processes as ‘appendages’ to Intuitive Model theories. A side effect of this is that the autonomy 
and isolation of Intuitive Model research is maintained. I stress how interactions between 
Intuitive Model theories and contemporary theories of cognitive-cultural consilience require 
much more than theoretical plausibility to convince Bering and Barrett of their relevance to the 
study of intuitive religion. 
 
For present purposes, two recent applications of contemporary cognitive-cultural theories to 
classic CSR theory are illuminating.  Despite the use of different guiding theorists and different 
conclusions arising from these, the theorists I discuss address the very questions I placed centre 
stage in my analysis of the Intuitive Model in the previous two chapters. Day, Geertz and 
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Markússon offer two different paths for a materialist study of religion and agree that 
alternative theories of cognition will place the scientific study of religion on a more realistic 
conceptual platform, overcoming some of the entrenched binaries established by classic 
cognitive and evolutionary psychology theorising. Importantly, I show how alternative theories 
of cognition work through the critical perspectives of the humanities’ scholars by way of 
contemporary natural-scientific studies of mind and cognition. Focussing on this element of the 
literature instead of the philosophical discussion concerning the soundness of the evolutionary 
theories presents a novel access point to align the immediate critical literature with the 
criticisms discussed in the previous chapter. The implicit and more radical claim of this chapter 
is that evolutionary studies of religion need to accommodate the stronger perspectives in the 
critical literature and not simply exclude these by claiming they are beyond the scope of 
naturalistic theory.   Addressing the critical literature on its own terms is how recurrent 
criticisms can be resolved. 
 
A selective unification of psychosocial theory with Dan Sperber’s re-conceptualisation of ‘belief’ 
resolves many recurrent criticisms of the project.  The incorporation of this new framework 
demands a major conceptual reworking of the Intuitive Model and ultimately requires the 
rejection of the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis. 
 
3.1 Brains, Bodies, and Causal Worlds 
 
Alternative models of cognition challenge key suppositions in classic CSR theory.  The 
contemporary revisitation of CSR theory via alternative theories of cognition is encouraged by 
research in neuroscience. Utilising technological advances in brain mapping, cognitive 
neuroscience strives to show ‘exactly how the mind works, rather than how it might or could 
work’ in the manner of earlier ‘speculative’ cognitive science and psychology (Barrs and Cage, 
2007; though see Weisberg and Keil, 2008; and Barrett and Bering below for sceptical 
appraisals). Indeed, recent findings from cognitive neuroscience challenge 
computational/connectivist models of the mind-brain. Noticeably, the brain’s modularity is not 
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as static or encapsulated as previously thought. Neuroscience highlights the neuronal 
interdependence of affect and cognition, the significance of motivation and experience in 
cognition and the influence of an organism’s entire body in cognitive processing and appraisal.  
Traditionally such associations were of peripheral interest to cognitive psychology because it 
focused predominantly on the mind’s information processing of representations. 
 
Neuroscience has also introduced new theory into the CSR. Pyysiäinen incorporates the 
neuroscience literature on affect and cognition into the Standard Model (Pyysiäinen, 2004). 
Lisdorf has proposed a re-conceptualisation of cognitive devices like Barrett’s HADD to gel with 
data from neuroscience (2007), while Barsalou and Barbey et al. (2005)  argue that the CSR 
needs to regard cognition as ‘embodied’ and examine ritual and belief in relation to this 
embodiment (Schjødt, 2007; Slingerland, 2008b; Bulbulia and Schjødt, In Press).  
 
A number of scholars have begun to use the tools of neuroscience to test their hypotheses. 
Boyer has christened this the ‘cognitive neuroscience of religion’ (Boyer, 2003) and while very 
much in its infancy, it is likely to be of increasing importance to scientific explanations of 
religion. Crucially, the tools of neuroscience offer a means to study relationships between 
experience and cognition. A recent example is Uffe Schjødt and Hans Stødkilde-Jørgensen et 
al.’s use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) on Danish Christians to test whether 
the brain areas involved in social cognition are activated when praying (Schjødt and Stokilde-
Jorgensen, 2009).   
 
Neuroscience has also encouraged the advent of research on ‘distributed’ and/or ‘situated’ 
cognition. ‘Distributed theory’ emphasises the causal influence that diverse social cultural 
niches have on the development of normative cognition. The theoretical similarity between 
Geertz and Markússon and Day stems from the application of ‘distributed cognitive theory.’ 
 
Day employs George Lakoff’s, Mark Johnson’s (1999) and Andy Clark’s (1997) ‘extended mind’ 
thesis to problematise the search for religion in ‘detached’ (bodiless, ‘brainless’ and acultural) 
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cognition. Cognition, from their perspective, is dependent on environments and social worlds 
because human thinking extends far beyond the confines of the brain.  Distributed models 
collapse the nature/nurture binaries by suggesting that in terms of human cognition, nature 
and nurture are the same.  This perspective also addresses apparent differences in cultural 
niches, which may also account for evolutionary based variations in cross-cultural cognition (for 
explicitly evolutionary perspectives on niche construction see Sterelny, 2004; Sjöblom, 2007). 
Matthew Day, citing Paul Griffith, summarises this critique nicely, arguing that the classic CSR 
studies ‘the ant without the distorting influence of the ant nest’ (Day, 2009: 721). 
 
Geertz and Markússon’s guides are the psychologist Merlin Donald’s variant of ‘distributed 
cognition’ theory and Terrance Deacon’s biosemotic theory. Their perspectives are very similar 
to Clark and Lakoff’s. Donald and Deacon propose alternative theories on the origins of human 
language. In the Symbolic Species and subsequent writing Deacon argues that humans are 
innately endowed with the adaptive ability to apprehend symbols and to reason symbolically. 
This ability is adaptive because it allows humans to offload memory.  
 
Donald’s biocultural theory asserts that ‘distributed cognition’ presents a more realistic model 
for the maintenance and transmission of conceptual information: ‘brains fit into the 
environment as parts of a distributed web’ (Donald, 2001: 284). He argues that minds interact 
with, offload onto, and utilise symbolic cultural storehouses, which contain information that no 
individual mind could ever completely know or remember. Individuals, or groups of individuals, 
require cultural frameworks for the normative functioning of individual mind-brains:  
 
External mnemonics, especially texts, further entail that they can be carried 
‘‘silently’’ through generations without being interacted with, much like so-called 
junk DNA in biological lineages. Historical contingencies can then lead to their 
sudden reapplication and reinterpretation, thus leading to novel concepts (or 
approximate recreations of forgotten ones) in response to unexpected 
circumstances. Just as distributed cognition is a parsimonious strategy to store 
and transmit conceptual knowledge, so would the possibility to reapply ‘junk 
text’ in novel situations increase the adaptability of religious and ideological 
systems (Geertz and Markússon, 2010: 162).  
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Alternative theories of cognition blend research in anthropology and the social sciences with 
the cognitive sciences. For example, Geertz and Markússon revive semiotic theory, while Day 
revives a social constructivist perspective that questions the universal applicability of the 
acultural ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis (Day, 2005, 2009).  Furthermore, though Day 
would likely disagree, his argument echoes Oviedo’s transcendentalist claim that science is 
unable to capture the full breadth of the experiential and natural world. Day would 
acknowledge that no one, least of all CSR scholars, believes that science could ever track such a 
complete picture of reality. Day’s concern, the same as Laidlaw’s and Oviedo’s, is that the CSR 
acts as if it could, presenting the search for a complete or unified science of religion as the 
soundest meta-method to achieve reliable answers about religion. Like Laidlaw, Oviedo, and 
Ingold, Day focuses on the explanatory consequences of radical reductionism and his writings 
are primarily a critique of the centrality of the psychological method in the scientific study of 
religion. Day’s evaluation of the CSR project appears damning until we remind ourselves that he 
is, like Oviedo and Laidlaw, arguing against an improbable construct of CSR theory in the first 
place: that the goal of the CSR is to offer a complete and exclusive explanation of religion.  
 
Like Laidlaw, Oviedo, and Ingold, Day is concerned with the most realistic and inclusive way to 
study religion. His work addresses the explanatory consequences of CSR reduction and 
questions the evidence presented in support of particular hypotheses. Like all three humanities 
scholars, he asserts that human intentionality corrupts attempts to explain human beings 
mechanistically and/or probabilistically. In even more forceful terms than Laidlaw uses, Day 
argues that psychology and the experimental method are inadequate means through which to 
study religion.35   
 
Geertz and Markússon’s blend of distributed and biosemiotic approaches have similar ties to 
the criticisms in the previous section. By treating the mind and symbolic-cultural systems as 
                                                     
35
 Day raises a number of other problems with CSR theory that fall outside the scope of this thesis, such as 
statistical probability and ontological realism (Day, 2007: 58ff) See also Laidlaw, 2007: 233) 
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interdependent and interactive, they echo Laidlaw’s claim, as well as the criticisms of task 
designs in chapter one, that religious beliefs are not explainable by way of psychology alone. 
Within Geertz and Markússon’s explanatory framework, cognitive science’s methodological 
reductions are unable to provide adequate information about human psychology. In tandem 
with the Laidlaw, Oviedo, and Ingold, Geertz and Markússon place human meaning making 
(distinctively from Bering’s interest in individual subjectivities) at the foundation of their 
investigations. By doing this, they begin to naturalise ‘reason, imagination and will.’ Deacon’s 
synchronistic biosemiotic theory rejects the core knowledge model and strives for a 
scientifically robust semiotic theory that accounts for socialised subjectivities.    
 
I will now consider the implications of these alternative cognitive perspectives for Intuitive 
Model research through a detailed application and revision of Day and Geertz and Markússon’s 
theories.  
 
3.2 The Naturalness of Religious Beliefs Revisited 
 
A metatheoretical debate about the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis is at the heart of 
Day, Geertz, and Markússon’s writings. While they arrive at dissimilar conclusions about the 
‘naturalness’ of religious belief they all agree that the Standard and Intuitive Models need to 
‘rethink’ their theories of naturalness (Day, 2005). Day thinks the CSR needs to abandon the 
conceit of naturalness because no cognition is meaningfully ‘natural,’ while Geertz and 
Markússon, like Bloch (2008) argue that the examination of cognitive naturalness should also 
include other dimensions of human cognitive skill adapted to respond to sociocultural contexts. 
They define this natural from of cognition as ‘our symbolic and systematic cognitive style’ 
(2010: 159, Italics in original).  
 
Like Whitehouse before them, Day, Geertz, and Markússon contend that the problem with the 
‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis is that it rejects the obvious causal role that culture plays in 
cognition. They slight classic CSR for ignoring the role of social and ecological inputs in the 
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development of human cognitive skill. The sidelining of ecological and social inputs encourages 
a false dichotomy. Day notes that the CSR has tended to treat the broad spectrum of rituals, 
music, relics, scriptures, ceremonies and physical representations typically associated with 
religious traditions as features that are more of less irrelevant to biologically fixed cognitive 
system (Day, 2009: 721). 
 
For Day (2005) and Geertz and Markússon (2010) the entrenchment of cognition in different 
sociocultural and historical niches disintegrates the predictive power of the Intuitive Model’s 
metathesis. They agree that Whitehouse’s ‘mode’s theory’ has gone a long way to account for 
how cultures transcend the cognitively optimal anchors that the classic CSR argues are 
constrained by panhuman cognitive mechanisms. However, both assert that ‘mode’s theory’ is 
insufficient. For Geertz and Markússon biosemiotic approaches need to be integrated because 
they think Whitehouse’s implicit argument that individuals learn and recall large chunks of 
theological information is implausible (Geertz and Markússon, 2010: 161).  While Day believes a 
rounded analysis needs to abandon the focus on psychological constraints altogether. 
 
The key differences between Day, Geertz, and Markússon’s theories are more than a 
conceptual one. For example, Day would view Geertz and Markússon’s use of ‘distributed 
theory’ as conservative and still tied to epistemologically unsound treatment of religiosity as 
‘natural.’ Day, unlike Geertz and Markússon, also recognises that talk of hierarchical cognition 
as a ‘systemic web’ almost turns cognitive theory full circle back to the cultural hermeneutics 
that Lawson and McCauley formulated the CSR in opposition (Day, 2010). Day’s non-
hierarchical theory, which avoids transcendental considerations, is radically different. In fact, it 
has major implications for cognitive-inspired studies of religion. Still, Geertz and Markússon 
offer something Day does not: a case study.    
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o Mathew Day’s Criticisms of the CSR 
 
Despite his disfavour in CSR circles, Day’s rich body of writing on CSR theory and method is the 
most relevant to the themes of this chapter. Day’s points are as pertinent when shifted from 
the cognitive anthropology of the Standard Model to the domain of experimental psychology 
where the Intuitive Model is located. Given the force of Day’s increasingly relentless and 
polemic criticisms of the CSR project, it is highly conspicuous that his most recent writings have 
received no systematic response from the theorists whose work he analyses. This obvious 
silence is perhaps as important as his writing itself. I attempt to address and respond to his 
criticisms here, separating, so to speak, the wheat from the chaff and locating constructive 
relevance to the Intuitive Model. I argue that Day’s conclusions are habitually overstated, 
invested in equal part in alienating the CSR as much as clarifying it. Day’s thesis and the recent 
proposition of a ‘unified science of religion’ stems from the infiltration of an highly problematic 
humanities’ reading of the metathesis,  which encourages a distortion of expectations about 
scientific (particularly psychological) explanation both by critics, and often by CSR theorists, 
alike. 
 
To locate the constructive relevance of Day’s work we need to distinguish between his writings 
in 2005 and his writings in 2010. I begin by discussing his early theory and its limited relevance 
to the Intuitive Model.  
 
Day proposes that ecologically sensitive theories destabilise the generic universalism of 
standard theory, corrupting correlations between the maturationally natural acquisition of 
‘religion’ and the acquisition of language. He regrets that Whitehouse’s introduction of 
sociocultural variables still defers to the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis’ inherent reliance 
on a universal understanding of cognition through a language acquisition analogy. Day suggests 
that religion is more cognitively ‘unnatural’ than Whitehouse assumes. While Whitehouse 
presents ‘mode’s theory’ as a corrective to the unipolar (implicit vs. explicit beliefs) cognitively 
optimal theory of religious representations, Day advances a more radical reading.  
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He states that the ‘naturalness of religion’ (and by my own extension the ‘naturalness of 
religious belief’) metathesis is not an analogue of Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar 
(Pinker, 1997: 15; Tremlin, 2006; Whitehouse, 2004). Quite simply, the analogy is empirically 
erroneous, as religious structures are not cross culturally stable, in the way that language 
development appears to be.36   
 
Day emphasises contextual and performance based variations in religious representations. The 
presence of these undermines an association between religious representations and language.  
He argues that the acquisition of religious ideas may in fact be analogously closer to the 
acquisition of numeracy, which Pinker (who broadened the generative grammar thesis to 
include religious ideas) initially contrasted with language acquisition. Unlike language, 
numeracy requires a great degree of specific sociocultural scaffolding. While the developmental 
literature suggest that humans may be pre-equipped with basic mechanisms for calculating 
numerical quantities, the ethnographic and historical-sociological data highlights the massive 
variation that this ‘innate’ sensitivity produces. In addition, unlike language, abstract numerical 
ability shows substantial deviation between different societies and generations, signifying that 
it is a product, in large part, of cultural invention. For Pinker, paraphrased by Day, the innate 
cognitive sensitivity to numeracy is at best a computational skeleton that cannot account for 
differences in the complexity of numerical symbol knowledge and its application. Yet, 
hyperbolically: 
 
In a community where the numerical concepts consist of one, two, many, and a 
lot, for example, problems like   or entities such as  are cognitively 
invisible. But in a richly structured sociocultural world stocked with the 
necessary mind tools, the same innate but limited mechanism for numerosity 
can be transformed into an arithmetical dynamo capable of solving   or 
tracing   to the millionth decimal point. Appreciating this dramatic 
transformation gives new life to Bo Dahlbonand and Lars-Erik Janlert’s apercu 
                                                     
36
 See Deacon 1997; Sterelny, 2003, Daniel Hutto, 2008, 2009 for similar criticisms.  
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that “Just as you cannot do much carpentry with your bare hands, there is not 
much thinking you can do with your bare brain” (Day, 2005: 100). 
 
Mathematics is therefore neither ‘natural’ nor ‘unnatural.’ Referencing Andy Clark, Day 
proposes that the development of mathematical ability requires the interdependence of 
biological, cultural, and technological properties.   He suggests that the development of 
religious beliefs occurs in an analogous way. Whitehouse’s ‘mode’s theory’ proves this,  it 
highlights that religious cognitions are readily manipulated by sociocultural processes and that 
all religious systems present varying degrees of complexity in their conceptual arrangements. 
Without environments dedicated to the production of complex mathematical and religious 
cognition, mathematics and religion would not be possible.  Accordingly, mathematics and 
religion are products of the ratchet effect between culture and cognition. Just as 
developmentally innate numerical predilections are necessary for the computation of , belief-
desire folk psychology buttresses belief in unseen agentives. However, both may be nothing 
more than key preconditions: 
 
 [T]o figure out how we get from there to religion in the round – that is to say, to 
the beliefs and practices that really matter to people – we must understand how 
the ratchet effect’s ability to generate increasing levels of complexity has worked 
in particular sociocultural conditions to produce particular religious systems – a 
move…that depends on our willingness to stop thinking of religion as a feature of 
our lives that is as natural as language and finally comes to terms with the 
peculiarities of place (Day, 2005: 101). 
 
By exposing the tenuous relationship between language acquisition and the acquisition of 
religious concepts, Day reduces the reach of the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis. He 
concludes that without ecological and sociocultural grounding, the CSR will be condemned to 
describing generic preconditions but unable to map the important questions about religions’ 
variation and complexity.  
 
Day’s desire to explain ‘religion in the round’ necessitates overcoming arbitrary ‘natural’ and 
‘non-natural’ conceptual boundaries. What is of most interest to us here is his insistence that 
there is an underlying conceptual inadequacy with the standard CSR’s metathesis; he laments 
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that not only does this make the CSR theoretically flawed it hinders it from presenting 
hypotheses beyond the level of general truisms. As such, cognitive research on religious beliefs 
is of little relevance outside the CSR. Recalling the humanities’ critics, he argues that the 
explanatory blinkers that the ‘reductive isolationism’ engenders represents a major 
methodological deficiency. He also rejects the generic universalism and lack of plasticity in the 
massive modularity thesis, which features in early CSR theories of mind. He asserts that 
scholars need to examine religious phenomena in terms of the ‘cognitive niches’ that 
encompass them.  He contends that the continued prevalence of the universally standardised 
and isolated conception of the mind-brain has hindered the CSR from explaining anything of 
any real import and may present a foundational distortion in theory:  
 
[B]y treating the cumulative effects of social structures, cultural practices, 
material artefacts, and historical trends as extraneous features of a biologically 
fixed cognitive system we may actually end up with an abnormal portrait of what 
a normal human mind actually is (Day, 2005: 88).  
 
The above quote neatly reflects the charge of ‘negative reduction’ levelled by humanities 
scholars of religion. However, his critique remains focused on methodology and not the 
tensions between idiographic and holistic perspectives advertised in humanities study (though 
see Day, 2010). His issue is that the classic CSR’s reduction of mind rests on an unsound 
theoretical footing and commits the CSR to explanatory triviality because of the anaemic 
predictive power of the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis.  
 
More forcefully, and again, like Laidlaw, and Oviedo and the criticisms of Intuitive Model task 
designs in the first chapter, he worries that the CSR describes and explains hypothetical 
constructs of its own devising. Unlike Ingold and Laidlaw’s sceptical appraisal of the relevance 
of the natural sciences to understanding higher order cultural phenomena like religion, Day 
affirms the relevancy of Darwinian inspired explanatory models of human cognition. His 
concern is that evolutionary models need to accommodate a cognitive model that includes the 
causal relevance of ecological, historical, and sociocultural particulars. 
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His argument is that the CSR needs a ‘rounded’ rather than thin (cf., Geertz, 1973) investigative 
model. He concludes that the CSR needs 1) to present a ‘rounded’ conceptual theory of religion 
and how to study it, which allows for finer grained, contextually detailed analysis and 2) to 
ensure that the models of mind that ground theory are contemporaneous with the latest 
research.  
 
However, Day’s criticisms do an injustice to Intuitive Model theory when the Intuitive Model is 
examined in isolation from the rest of the CSR.  For example, Barrett and Bering’s focus is on 
the cognitive preconditions of religion. Theorists do make probabilistic claims and in Bering 
case, actually undertake further research on the cultural effects of these causal preconditions. 
However, the developmental studies and the broader explanatory investigations are two 
separate projects. Day is right, as are theorists who focus on narrative constructs in the 
metathesis to demand that broader explanatory theory requires the inclusion of many 
perspectives if a rounded explanation is sought.  
 
However, foundationally, the Intuitive Model studies these preconditions. Like findings in social 
psychology, these preconditions may have the ring of truisms to them but this does not 
undermine the empirical value of their discovery. In fact, Bering and Barrett’s experimental 
findings challenge some truisms expressed in earlier experimental research. For example, 
human concepts require a radical reworking of early emerging assumptions about 
intentionality, while ‘god concepts’ merely mesh with a generic agency temple. Bering’s 
research uncovers that children begin life with a bias towards commonsense dualism but this 
bias decreases with age.  The empirical discovery of these counterintuitive facts establishes the 
importance of Intuitive Model theory.   
 
Day’s analogy between mathematics and religion is suspect.  The intuitive Model expects 
complexity in theological discourse and regardless, this is beyond the purview of the Intuitive 
Model. I have already discussed how Barrett and Bering do not exactly rely on the language 
analogy but on the broader claim, derived from developmental research into core competences 
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that basic inferences and biases compel adaptive solutions for human beings. They would 
respond to Day’s analogy of religion and language by suggesting that complex mathematics is 
an outlier whereas intuitive religion and complex theologies appear to have arisen 
spontaneously in a piecemeal fashion in diverse cultural communities, undermining the very 
analogy Day is constructing. 
 
Furthermore, the Intuitive Model does not downplay the effects of culture on the 
developmental modification of core competences. The ‘naturalness of religious belief’ 
metathesis represents the Intuitive Model’s specific and narrow area of research interests.  
Thus, Bering and Barrett will read Day’s thesis as an interesting extension of CSR research but 
not immediately applicable to the Intuitive Model’s study of implicit cognition.  
 
The strength of Day’s thesis is expressed in his critique of classical cognitive psychology.  His 
writing directly challenges the acultural cognitive universalism of the Intuitive Model and the 
naturalness metathesis. However, at this stage in his writing, Day is unable to present a 
constructive model to synthesise the ‘extended mind’ perspectives and Intuitive Model theory.  
 
Geertz and Markússon’s writing on atheism extends Day’s criticism and introduces constructive 
bridges that are lacking in Day’s own. I turn to their theory below. 
 
o The ‘Naturalness’ of Atheism 
 
Geertz and Markússon (2010) introduce a cognitive-cultural framework for analysing religiosity 
and atheism that shares similarities with Day’s thesis. Geertz and Markússon defend a revised 
‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis by explaining atheistic belief via ‘distributed 
cognition’ theory. 37 
                                                     
37
 While they fail to state so, the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis they analyse is the Intuitive Model’s 
‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis and not the whole CSR, nor even the Boyerian inspired Standard Model 
as they claim. Arguably, Geertz and Markússon have downplayed the centrality of epidemiological theory to the 
Standard Model, to clear the way for their unification of memetic theory and the Intuitive Model’s insistence on 
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Geertz and Markússon question the Intuitive Model’s theory of atheism. They believe it relies 
on a mere inversion of the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis and has no conclusive 
experimental evidence in support of it. The motivation for their analysis is the sociologist Phil 
Zuckman’s utilisation of population statistics on atheism to discredit the CSR’s foundational 
claim about the universality of religious beliefs.38 Geertz and Markússon reject Zuckman’s 
argument because it ignores the majority of theory in the CSR. Yet in doing so, they argue that 
extant CSR writing on atheism needs to be substantially revised.  
 
Intuitive Model theory asserts that religious concepts and ideas are easier to acquire, transmit, 
and recall than atheistic concepts. Both Barrett and Bering argue that intuitive religion is a hard 
habit to break even for those versed in highly materialist ideologies.  Elaborate cultural 
scaffolding (e.g., secular education, institutional support) is required for atheistic beliefs to 
grow in minds.  
 
According to the Intuitive Model, atheistic beliefs need to compete with and suppress a suite of 
cognitive mechanisms (hyper-agency detection, theory of mind), intuitive assumptions about 
causal relations (promiscuous teleology, moral realism) and existential experiences (death of 
loved ones) that foster ‘religious’ beliefs.39  In contrast, atheistic beliefs are necessarily a 
reflective ‘overcoming’ of panhuman cognitive biases and are always tenuously entertained in 
spite of these intuitions. This is why the prevalence of atheistic beliefs is an exceptional product 
of modern, Westernised, highly urbanised societies. In such cultural environments, naturalistic 
explanations are easily accessible, while the artefactual nature of the urban environment 
lessens the tendency to infer non-human agency as it provides less space for thinking about 
non-natural causality (Barrett, 2004a: 107ff).    
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
panhuman cognitive constraints. In saying this, Geertz and Markússon are certainly right to note that memetic 
theory, as opposed to epidemiological theory, asserts a greater causal responsibility to cultural processes. 
38
 Zuckerman’s survey of 50 countries suggests that ‘Atheism’ (500 – 700 million) is the fourth largest belief 
systems after Christianity (2 billion), Islam (1.2 billion) and Hinduism (900 million).   
39
 See Barrett, 2004b and (2010) for an outline of the Intuitive Model’s theory of atheism.  
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Geertz and Markússon begin by rejecting the Intuitive Model’s claim that non-theism is 
thoroughly modern, citing similarities in beliefs between the new atheistic movement and the 
Ancient Indian Carvākā heterodox movement (Geertz and Markússon, 2010: 158). They also 
question why non-belief is harder to acquire than belief. For example, they reason that HADD 
false alarms should encourage non-belief as often as it does religious belief. They reason that if 
HADD produces enough false alarms, surely it would be natural and less burdensome to assume 
that the trigger is not caused by an invisible agent but by some more mundane natural cause?  
 
Similarly, they note that experimental evidence on naïve theism is suspect, with the results, as 
Evans and Wellman note (2006), readily able to support the exact opposite hypothesis; children 
become teleological naturalists, only after they have had sustained cultural experience. They 
argue that the lack of cross-cultural evidence in support of Bering’s theories should also 
encourage him to avoid universal statements. In sum, Geertz and Markússon reason that Bering 
and Barrett routinely make unsupported claims about the psychology of atheists through an 
overextension of the metathesis. 
 
Through Deacon’s semiotic theory, Donald’s writing on ‘distributed cognition’, and Dawkin’s 
‘memetic theory,’ they propose that a robust account of atheism must consider niche specific 
‘cultural scaffolding,’ which interacts with, magnifies and/or suppresses intuitive ‘theistic’ 
biases. Thus, their thesis is not restricted to atheism.  It has implications for all hypotheses 
concerning the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis. Like Day, they want to make 
cognition and culture interactive through discussing the causal role that culture plays in shaping 
‘natural’ cognitions.  
 
All three theorists challenge the Intuitive Model at a conceptual level, arguing, much like 
Laidlaw and Oviedo that the study of panhuman implicit religion marginalises ‘religion’ and 
‘religious beliefs’ and thus weakens the relevance of such restricted explanations. Geertz and 
Markússon point out how this can encourage the interpretive overextension of the metathesis. 
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Finally, they argue that the metathesis appears to rely on narrative persuasion rather than 
appropriate experimental data. 
 
In contrast to the mono-dimensional focus of the Intuitive Model, Geertz and Markússon 
introduce a hierarchy of interactive causations that place cognition in a ‘web of ecological and 
cultural scaffolding’ (2010: 10). Through this interactive gaze, they propose that atheism draws 
directly on the same natural cognitive processes that inspire religious ideations. If this is true 
then atheism is no less natural than theism, becoming a ‘reasonable interpretive response and a 
natural strategy’ (2010: 11, italics in original).  
 
The ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis has failed to acknowledge this because a central 
feature of human cognitive style is missing: 
 
 This cognitive style revolves around learning signs and relating them 
systematically to one another. Thus to echo, neuroscientist and biosemitotician 
Terrance Deacon and his theory of humans as a symbolic species, we are 
perpetual systemisers: all things in our natural and cultural environment can, 
potentially, be put into symbolic-systemic relations to any other thing (Deacon, 
1997, 92ff, 433ff). This systemic quality not only enables us to use language, it 
further enables us to learn, navigate and maintain systems of ideas, making us 
the purveyors and peddlers of ideologies, morals, norms, philosophies, science, 
fiction, sense and non sense (Geertz and Markússon, 2010: 159) 
 
This ‘strikingly natural’ aspect of atheism means it is no less ‘natural’ than religiosity. Intuitive 
Model theories may be correct in stating that cognitive mechanisms, normative experiences, 
and intuitive inference encourage recurrent supernatural beliefs but this will only ever be part 
of the story. The explanations given about these intuitions are predominantly doctrinal issues 
prescribed by cultures through norms, ideologies, and institutional frameworks.   
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3.3 Problems with Alternative Models of Cognition 
 
Barrett and Bering cite a number of misrepresentations of the Intuitive Model in Geertz and 
Markússon’s theory. Because Geertz and Markússon acknowledge a foundational theoretical 
similarity with Day’s early research on the ‘extended mind,’ we can assume that the responses 
outlined by Barrett and Bering correspond, at least in some instances, with Day’s theory of 
religion as it stood in 2005. Barrett and Bering’s replies to Geertz and Markússon clearly 
establish the difficulties they see with alternative theories of cognition and the subtle way their 
developmental theory protects itself from criticisms in alternative methodologies of research. 
 
In chapter one, I noted that Intuitive Model theorists argue that there are two ways non-
reflective beliefs are established. They arise either through ‘maturational’ or through ‘practiced’ 
naturalness. Barrett argues that Geertz and Markússon fail to distinguish cogently between the 
two and thus their thesis misrepresents Intuitive Model theories of atheism (Barrett, 2010).  In 
conflating the two types of beliefs, Barrett contends that Geertz and Markússon have 
constructed the false dichotomy they accuse the Intuitive Model of promoting. While Intuitive 
Model theories are interested in the maturationally natural basis of some non-reflective beliefs, 
Geertz and Markússon’s thesis addresses practiced natural beliefs, and, as such, Geertz and 
Markússon’s conclusion, by way of an unnecessarily complex and abstract theory, is practically 
the same as Intuitive Model conclusions about atheism in the first place.   
 
The Intuitive Model’s understanding of practiced naturalness readily recognises that cultural 
norms dictate forms of practiced natural beliefs and this is thus not in conflict with basic CSR 
theory (for example: Whitehouse, 2004; Boyer, 2001; McCauley and Lawson, 2002).  Practiced 
naturalness already integrates the cognitive props ‘distributed’ theory sees as central, including 
literacy, artefacts, social structures, ritualised actions, and technological mnemonic devices. 
Intuitive Model theories acknowledge that cultures provide the dominant frameworks for 
interpreting, magnifying, and suppressing normative intuitions. However, the ‘naturalness of 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  116 
 
 
 
religious belief’ metathesis makes no direct claim about cultural variations, because this is not 
the target of study.  
 
Undeniably, the cultural and sociopolitical environment a person lives amongst encourages 
modifications, magnifications and/or the suppression of intuitive beliefs. It is particular cultural 
variations, not intuitive cognitions, which are responsible for the non-appearance and under-
representation of religious belief in some cultures. Bering sees atheism as the result of 
downstream economic, sociological, and political forces and not a default intuitive preference; 
it is a learned, practiced, exegetical reflection (2010: 167). Despite questioning the empirical 
basis of this claim, Geertz and Markússon do agree that it is likely that atheism requires more 
scaffolding than religious beliefs (2010: 163).  The metathesis applies to implicit, automatic, 
reflexive intuitions that are recurrent despite distinctive cultural variations and crucially, 
cultures do not determine these intuitions themselves. The ‘naturalness of religious belief’ 
metathesis says little about how cultures mediate, suppress, and/or encourage the reflective 
expression of these ideas. To particularise religious beliefs in cognitively scaffolded cultural and 
social niches, damages the attempt to explain cross-cultural regularities encouraged by 
panhuman cognitive mechanisms. 
 
Concisely, the Intuitive Model’s theory of atheism is a claim about the maturational naturalness 
of religious belief over non-belief. Bering reasons that the key error in Geertz and Markússon’s 
analysis is that while they correctly point out that religious beliefs are not cognitively 
determined, they do not do justice to the probabilistic nature of the metathesis (Bering, 2010). 
In probabilistic terms, religious beliefs are simply more likely, ceteris paribus, than irreligion. 
According to the Intuitive Model, the maturational naturalness of human cognitive biases, 
interests and constraints prepare minds to entertain religious beliefs; they have a natural 
cognitive advantage over non-theistic beliefs.  
 
Atheism, on the other hand, has little to do with intuitive cognition, even when presented in 
the cognition writ-large framework that Geertz and Markússon implant their claim for the 
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culturally scripted ‘naturalness’ of atheistic beliefs. Bering argues that through biosemiotic and 
‘distributed cognition’ theory Geertz and Markússon have conflated religiosity with intuitive 
religion; incorrectly correlating the metatheoretical claim that atheism is cognitively unnatural 
with the unsupported claim that it must also be culturally non-normative. Yet research in the 
study of religion has shown how cultures and beliefs systems are distinct. The Intuitive Model 
does not deny this rather it elaborates on the role of cognition in influencing cultural forms and 
describes how these cultural forms are relative to the consistency of cognition (Lawson and 
McCauley 1990).  
 
Barrett fears that ‘distributed’ theory uses the metaphor of expansive cognition to promote an 
empirical vacuum.  Ignoring the central insight of CSR theory, the arguments put forth by 
Geertz and Markússon seem to flirt dangerously with the very tautology that the CSR 
formulised itself in opposition to. As Barrett states: 
 
Recurrent cultural expression seems to require recurrent causes such as 
undergirding cognitive systems or environmental regularities. That people tend 
to be religious is not adequately explained by the fact that people are born into 
religious cultures. Religion doesn’t explain religion (Barrett, 2010: 3).  
 
Bering faults Geertz and Markússon for relying on socio-demographic data. He argues that 
reflective propositional statements are an unreliable source of data about intuitive beliefs. 
Bering reasons that such data is undependable and can tell us little about implicit, non-
reflective, psychological processes. By deferring to such data, Geertz and Markússon ignore 
relevant experimental research, which suggests that professed atheists are prone to ‘religious’ 
intuitions.  
 
The Intuitive Model’s empirical claim rests on controlled experimental work that bypasses the 
problem that people’s reflective statements are unreliable sources of information about the 
psychological underpinnings of religion (Bering, 2010: 2). Reliance on population-level data 
derived from self-classification is an error, as this cannot tell us anything about the underlying 
implicit dispositions that these people have. The most reliable data needs to locate what people 
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believe intuitively rather than reflectively.  In terms of intuitive psychology, culture does matter 
but only so far as it gives ‘a naked intuition a personality and a name’ (Bering, In Press: 2). 
Bering highlights this through reference to his early experiments, which found that self-
declared atheists on occasion commit theistic indiscretions. Both atheists and believers express 
intuitive religion implicitly. Intuitive Model task designs have shown this experimentally.  
 
While the data remains controversial, Bering is right to claim that Geertz and Markússon have 
not taken into account the full breadth of data. They fail to address Barrett’s ‘preparedness 
hypothesis,’ nor Deborah Kelemen’s rich body of work on ‘promiscuous teleology.’ Geertz and 
Markússon cite Evan’s and Wellman’s critical writing on the ‘Mouse and Alligator’ experiments 
even though this experiment is not representative of work within the Intuitive Model in general 
and there is no reason to favour Evans and Wellman’s perspective over Bering’s.   
 
While Bering and Barrett do make some valid points, of more interest to us here is how their 
responses show how the Intuitive Model deflects intrusions from alternative theories of 
cognition. Bering and Barrett’s responses provide a neat summary of both the problems 
developmental psychologists have with alternative models of cognition and the ways in which 
they protect the ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis from contradictory theoretical 
intrusions. 
 
3.4 The Intuitive Model’s Protective Strategies  
 
When confronted with alternative theories of cognition, Bering and Barrett rely on the 
rhetorical power of the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis and enact a narrative 
overextension of the thesis in such a way that it deflects alternative cognitive proposals. This is 
the very scenario Laidlaw and Oviedo observed in the previous chapter.  What is critically 
different in this case is that the alternative theories of cognition are debating the Intuitive 
Model directly on natural-scientific terms. Through their defence of the metathesis, Bering and 
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Barrett have cosseted Intuitive Model theories of religion and protected the autonomy of the 
psychological models that compel the evidence for them. 
 
Because Day, Geertz, and Markússon present a metatheoretical critique, Barrett and Bering’s 
initial strategy is to separate experimental findings and conceptual terminology from the 
exploratory reach of the metathesis. The aim is to establish methodological self-sufficiency in 
relation to the developmental evidence itself. Yet, as I have shown in the last chapters, this is a 
circular strategy, as the separation of maturationally natural cognition and culturally mediated 
practiced naturalness is justified through Intuitive Model conceptual terminology and the 
metathesis itself. Furthermore, the experimental evidence remains ambiguous and 
controversial and thus deference to the experimental evidence is an unreliable form of 
theoretical defence.   
 
However, by demanding that critics engage exclusively with the experimental evidence, 
Intuitive Model theorists assert that it is only evidence that uses the same psychological 
methodologies for argumentation purposes, and only those claims from scholars trained in how 
to interpret such knowledge that are reliable, that can destabilise the metatheoretical claims of 
the metathesis. This is still the case even when, as Geertz and Markússon highlight, Intuitive 
Model theories of atheism are based on the theoretical inversion of the metathesis, rather than 
a result of systematic experimental evidence.  Bering and Barrett would argue that because 
Day, Geertz and Markússon’s ‘distributed cognition’ theories are theoretical in nature the 
strength of their claims to ‘realism’ is weaker. Thus, Intuitive Model theories sidestep the 
recurrent criticism expressed in all three bodies of criticisms that they study an artificial 
construct through an isolated methodological reduction. Intuitive Model theories deflect 
conceptual considerations, by ignoring the very existence of these in their own task designs. As 
such, Barrett and Bering formalise alternative theories of cognition as ‘interpretive’ frameworks 
rather than sound natural scientific ones.  
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Noticeably and compellingly, the assumed autonomy of cognitive psychology is evident in 
Barrett and Bering’s joint critiques of neuroscience. Their shared problem with this research is 
that it remains questionable whether it really offers more precise heuristic findings than 
methods in traditional cognitive psychology. Bering argues that scholars who engage with 
neuroscience incorrectly treat this data as an alternative rather than a complimentary field of 
research:    
 
We must be exceedingly careful when applying neuroanatomical reasoning to 
the area of religion, else we shall find ourselves promoting the right frontal 
cortex as something like the modern-day pineal gland as the rightful holder of 
the soul. It must be remembered that no definite consensus has been reached in 
relation to the correspondence between cognitive modules and their 
regionalized appearance in the brain; organized, rule-based structures of 
information processing have been postulated as arising through either 
extraordinarily complicated networks of neural pathways or via 
compartmentalized bundles of neurons devoted to specific domains. Not 
surprisingly, there is evidence to support both sides (see contributions in 
Gazzaniga, 2000). 
 
 Given the current state of affairs, then, it is questionable that neuroanatomical 
mapping is any more heuristic an approach to studying the cognitive 
underpinnings of theism than the behavioral framework I have outlined’ (Bering, 
2002). 
 
In a recent right of reply to John Dunne’s argument for a closer relationship between the study 
of religion and neuroscience, Barrett refines Bering’s argument. Barrett is equally sceptical that 
neuroscience is currently able to enrich the cognitive study of religion.  
 
Barrett reminds his critics that psychology’s cognitive revolution was as much a break from 
behaviourism as it was from neurophysiology. Initially, cognitive psychology was formalised as 
an autonomous level of analysis charting the information processing of the biological mind. In 
Barrett’s research, this assumption endures. While neuroscience is going to be of increasing 
relevance to the study of religious belief and experiences, it is currently very limited because 
the technical apparatuses of neuroscience, such as Fmri mean that only very restricted 
behaviours such as stationary thinking can be analysed.  This is because the technology is still 
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too cumbersome to track behaviours in real life interactions, even in the artificial capacity of 
psychology’s experimental labs. The current state of technology is simply too intrusive and 
restrictive, encouraging him to wonder if cheaper, simpler technologies such as galvanic skin 
responses are of better service (Barrett, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, neuroscientists need to answer a set of critical questions before neuroscience 
perspectives will offer fertile insights for the study of religion. Unanswered questions include 
how exactly do complex activations map onto behaviourally or phenomenologically meaningful 
behaviour and affects? Similarly, how can neuroscience account for the ‘genres of experience’ 
and do the same brain areas predict certain experiences?  Another question relates to how 
neuroscience can account for correlations between contextual activations and non-contextual 
future activations (Barrett, 2009). Until such questions are answered, he doubts that 
neuroscience can really describe the role that experiences play in mediating cognitions and 
perceptions.    
 
Bering and Barrett’s criticisms of neuroscience tell us much about how Intuitive Model theory 
protects itself against explanatory intrusion from alternative methodologies. While calling for 
and engaging in theoretical ‘interactionism’ Bering and Barrett demand the explanatory 
superiority of the methods they employ. Yet, as I show below, it is these methods which have to 
open up  to alternative theories of cognition and culture if it is, as critics worry, these methods 
and/or metatheorical perspectives themselves which hinder the plausibility of Intuitive Model 
theories. It is now necessary to describe the second protective strategy before developing this 
claim further.  
 
The second strategy is to accommodate cognitive cultural theories while simultaneously 
isolating maturational cognition. Again, this strategy is dependent on a division between 
‘practiced’ and ‘maturational’ naturalness.  The division shifts the ‘naturalness of religious 
belief’ metathesis from a predictive developmental model to a model that merely studies 
immediate core knowledge and competences. This minimal application of the ‘naturalness of 
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religious belief’ metathesis only explains how competences and bias develop and stabilise; it 
does not account for developmental shifts throughout the life course. The probabilistic claim is 
only a plausible theoretical claim, while the actual experimental research involves a distinct and 
more limited set of claims.  
 
Reminiscent of Laidlaw’s thesis, Day, Geertz, and Markússon accuse Intuitive Model theorists of 
studying the preconditions of religion, rather than religious beliefs proper. Barrett sees such a 
claim as bizarre, as methodological reduction through developmental studies necessitates the 
study of the cognitively elementary forms of religious beliefs. Thus, it is a truism that 
developmental psychology studies the preconditions of religious belief and superstition. 
However, by limiting explanations to the preconditions of belief, Intuitive Model scholars leave 
open, beyond the secondary probabilistic claim, the role of culture in the maturation and 
normalisation of practiced religious beliefs.  Cultural causation may override purely cognitive 
causation but this does not refute the preparedness claim, as practiced natural beliefs self-
evidently interact with maturationally natural beliefs. In fact, the only way the subsidiary role of 
culture could be destabilised in Intuitive Model theory would be by showing that the most basic 
mechanisms, causal inferences and experiences are sensitive to the social and cultural niches a 
person develops within. Alternative theories do not provide evidence of this and Barrett and 
Bering’s use of the insular and autonomous method of classic cognitive psychology ensures that 
this option is not available, buffering intrusion from alternative theories of cognition and their 
methodologies.  
 
Critically, Day indirectly addresses this rhetorical defence in his subsequent writings. It is finally 
in this writing that he begins to introduce important theoretical and empirical insights for 
Intuitive model theory. His new thesis undercuts the Intuitive Model’s protective strategy.  It is 
to this I now turn.  
 
 
 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  123 
 
 
 
3.5 Consilience Revisited: Psychosocial Theory 
 
In this section, I constructively apply Day’s recent writing to Barrett and Bering’s work, I analyse 
the instances where alternative cultural and cognitive theory can offer important revisitations 
of assumed theory. I take seriously Day’s tentative psychosocial theory of religion though I 
argue against him that this requires the complete abandonment or marginalisation of 
developmental and/or classic cognitive perspectives. His revised goal is to show how ‘extended 
mind’ theory pragmatically re-orientates the study of religion. Day admits that his early 
propositions for the relevance of ‘extended mind’ theory maintained a false dichotomy 
between the inside and outside, the individual and the social, nature and nurture, and cognition 
and culture. He argues that the CSR ignores the greatest lesson and empirical insight of recent 
scholarship on religion. This insight is that neither religions nor the phenomena that comprise 
them are discrete entities. As Laidlaw affirmed, the category of religion and the study of it are 
thoroughly historicised and socialised.   
 
His writing is another example of consilience theorising. It aims to at bridge ‘the tired 
opposition between the social and the psychological’ and provide ‘the realistic foundations of 
religion in the process’ (Day, 2009: 734). Following Bloch (2008), Day believes that religion is 
not a self-referential, isolated reality rather it is one aspect of what has historically been 
described as the ‘transcendental social.’ Religion is a small but key part of this and should be 
examined in relation to the larger social totality. Looking at human social structures holistically 
debunks explanations by way of evolutionary adaptation because the latter is  like trying to 
explain the function of headlights while ignoring what motorcars are like and for’ (Bloch, 2008: 
2060, cited in Day, 2010: 6).  
 
Instead of revising the cognitive framework (as Whitehouse, Geertz and Markússon and Day in 
earlier writings do) Day looks to ‘externalist’ sociological theory to script an interactional 
theory, which materially grounds sociological theory and makes it incidentally amenable to the 
demands of CSR theory.   
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Day argues that the selective incorporation of the anthropologist Bruno Latour’s40 reworking of 
Durkheimian theory supports the central ‘extended mind’ argument that human cognition is 
radically shaped by the objects, no less than the immaterial ideas and ideals, projected within 
social environments. Day argues that Durkheim’s insight that religion is ‘eminently social’ is 
crucial to his own thesis, though it requires the simultaneous rejection of Durkheim’s belief in 
an autonomous ‘transcendental social.’  
 
Day contends that classic theory in evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 
1997) detrimentally focuses on Durkheim’s larger claims. The recurrent argument that 
Durkheimian theory ignores the causal role of the biologically shaped individual mind reflects 
this singular focus (Slone, 2004). While the ‘mind blind’ critiques of the social sciences are 
sustained and persuasive, Day argues that cognitive-evolutionary theories routinely miss a 
critical proposition in Durkhiemian theory:   the dynamic hybridity and interdependence of all 
thought. 
 
Day asserts that the most important insight of Durkheim’s writing relates to how historical, 
material, and sociocultural forces determine the categories of understanding. Uniquely, 
Durkheim provides a hybridised theory of conceptual development. Day notes that Durkheim 
                                                     
40
 It is necessary to comment on Day’s utilisation of Bruno Latour, as reference to Latour can quickly ignite debates 
between objective natural scientific approaches and postmodern relativism. For example, Edward Slingerland, like 
Alan Sokal before him (2008) rigorously challenges postmodern theory, seeing Latour as particularly representative 
of postmodern perspectives and, on occasion, suggests postmodernism is characteristic of the humanities’ project 
as a whole. Our review of Laidlaw, Oviedo, Ingold and now Day, highlight that Slingerland’s argument is 
misrepresentative if applied in this instance because not one of these theorists posits humanistic exclusivism, they 
merely voice concerns about the unavoidable limitation of cognitive theory and the tendency to oversell findings. 
Like Ingold and Laidlaw, Day challenges the excess of CSR’s thin evidence for thick ‘naturalness of religion’ 
narratives. Furthermore, Day’s consideration of Latour’s perspectives evidences a minimal and selective 
engagement with his theory. As such, Slingerland and Day are talking about two different ‘Latours.’ For Slingerland, 
he is a wayward critic of the objective instrumentalism of science, whereas Day believes some elements of his 
recent theory offer a potential bridge between psychological and sociological theory. Day’s point is that it makes 
little sense aligning anthropology and psychology with naturalistic science, if by doing so sociocultural factors are 
stripped down to a reflective skeleton of naturalistic study. By way of ‘extended mind’ theory he strives to 
naturalise the very fact overlooked in Intuitive and Standard Model research, that ‘agencies’ act on ‘agencies.’  
Distinctly, his theory overcomes critical dualism and looks to ways theories can compliment and interact against 
rhetorical extremes in both positions.   
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posits a hierarchical developmental model of conceptual classification. He separates first order 
immediate reflections derived from sensations and perceptions, which encourage assumptions 
between objects and things, and second and third order reflective categories of ‘genus,’ ‘class’ 
and ‘kind’ These higher order reflections distinguish initial perceptions. Durkheim reasons that 
sensations and perceptions are contentless on their own. He writes in the Elementary Forms: 
‘material things can only form collections, heaps or mechanical assemblages without internal 
unity… A heap of sand or a pile of stones is in no way comparable to the sort of well-defined 
and organised society that is a genus’ (Day, 2009: 723). 
 
‘Genus’ and ‘kind’ categories establish the boundary lines of membership and dictate which 
features form internal consistency and unity with category peers. Categories organise 
immediate sensations and perceptions and importantly, they place constraint on ordering. Class 
membership is structured and composed through social orders and is non-random. In 
Durkheim’s theory, objects can be related conceptually in many ways.  For example, a dog 
could correspond to a human because both have eyes or because humans in some locations 
feel an affinity to these animals. This is because socialised membership categories pick out 
those features that a society deems prominent and important.   Thus for Durkheim, if you want 
to seek the origins of kind’, ‘class’ and ‘genus’, you need to look at  the material dimension of 
social sorting, which is evident in the hierarchical social order itself. It is the social order that 
organises and composes the shared cognitive categories necessary for communication between 
minds. Durkheim’s thesis challenges theories that support core ontological classifications and 
more broadly the predictive power of core knowledge theory.  
 
The importance of this thesis is obscured by Durkheim’s problematic discussion of the 
transcendental social. However, Day believes that Latour has reformulated Durkheimian macro-
social theory in a way that escapes the long problematic claim that society is a unique, 
ontologically distinct entity and therefore avoids the tautology inherent to explaining social 
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collectives in terms of social collectives themselves (Day, 2009: 726).41 Day reads Latour as 
employing ‘extended mind’ theory to encourage the post-social turn in sociological theory. 
 
Latour argues that there is one shared perspective that unites all work in the social sciences: 
the fact that agency is overtaken by other agencies (Latour, cited in Day 2009: 727). The claim is 
that no ‘agent’ is ever autonomous; their interactions are affected by and seem to ‘overflow 
with elements already in the situation coming from some other time, some other place, and 
generated by some other agency’ (Latour, cited in Day, 2009: 727). Both macro-social and 
micro-social sociological theories are imperfect attempts to make sense of this basic fact.  Both 
theoretical schools attempt to ground agents in contexts or in some larger frame of reference, 
which constrains the autonomy of individual actors (Day, 2009: 727). Yet the problem with this, 
despite its empirical plausibility, is that the search for the ‘spatial metaphor of context’ 
constructs the same division between insides and outsides (nature and nurture, micro and 
macro, local and global) that naturalistic theory is prone. The construction of divisions corrupts 
balanced causal analysis and leads to rhetorical argumentation about which forced choice is 
more causally ‘responsible.’ Latour’s solution to the Durkheimian Achilles’ heel is to flatten 
normative hierarchical arrangements so that ‘causes’ are interactive rather than oppositional. 
This denies the circularity inherent to discussion of the ‘transcendental social,’ which CSR 
theorists criticise and Intuitive Model theorists find prolific in criticisms of their research.  
 
Day believes that Latour’s abandonment of the transcendental social encourages the 
application of ‘distributed’ understandings of human cognition (Day, 2009: 729). Latour’s own 
example of the modern consumer who requires the ability to calculate and choose is suggestive 
                                                     
41
 A traditional way in social science to overcome the limitations of Durkheimian top down macro-social theory is 
through micro-social methodological individualism, Methodological individualism seeks to incrementally explain 
the large-scale, through examining how human actors are constantly reformulating, contesting, assembling and 
modifying the groups that surround them. A seminal example is Max Weber’s theory of the capitalist social order.  
According to Latour, micro-social theory commits the same transcendental fallacy as macro-social theory. Both 
have remained separate fields of inquiry, and Latour contends, are flawed methodological programmes. Latour’s 
proposal is to give up the search for a bridge between micro-social methodological individualism and macro-social 
methodological holism. In his reading, methodological parsimony requires abandoning and reformulating both 
projects afresh.  
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of this application.  The traditional binary would align with one of two frameworks. Firstly, the 
‘nativist’ perspective may regard such competences as ingrained and merely exploited in 
supermarkets and modern institutions of the consumer experience.  In a second view, 
ideological domination of the economic infrastructure shapes such competences.  Latour 
proposes that there is a third way, which sees this competence as the result of ‘plug-ins 
circulating in social space and which the consumer subscribes and downloads on the spot to 
become locally and provisionally competent’ (Day, 2009: 729). Thus, the software analogy shifts 
from closed to open source. 
 
Day argues that the post-social turn in Latour’s theory leads him toward ‘distributed cognition’ 
theory because his solution is to direct attention to the ‘things’ that populate contextual 
environments.  Traditional social theory has focused on invisible, immaterial abstractions such 
as ‘systems,’ ‘functions’ and ‘structures.’ Yet human environments are rife with objects and 
‘would be virtually unimaginable without things’ (Day, 2009: 730). A focus on the objects that 
populate communities point to the fragility of the social order as collectives seems to be as frail 
or durable as the equipment the actors have for assembling it. In fact, society acquires the 
patina of the permanence from things (Day, 2009: 730). The material objects that compose 
collective spaces ensure that collectives do not have to recreate themselves; the 
‘transcendental social’ is therefore rooted in the material artefacts contained within a given 
society.  The goal then is to trace the associations between agents and elucidate the 
consequences that these associations have on dependent human actors (Day, 2009: 731). 
Latour suggests that the larger a collective the greater number of objects that will circulate 
within it. The size of the collective, and by association the amount of objects in it, informs 
human subjectivity because the larger the degree of objectivity in a society requires and 
encourages a much larger degree of subjectivity.  
 
Day believes that Latour’s naturalisation of the ‘transcendental social’ has major practical 
ramifications for the academic study of religion. Firstly, it suggests that all previous social 
explanations of religion, through their unwarranted trust in context, have merely substituted 
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one mysterious thing for another. The frequent treatment of religion as an illusion compelled 
by various supra-individual social processes encourages this mysteriousness:  
 
From this perspective, the non-theological study of religion has never existed, 
because we have yet to distinguish our faith in a pantheon of invisible agents 
(society, capitalism, power, field, culture, structure) that are actually pulling the 
strings. Religious Studies is still haunted by ghosts (Day. 2009; 732).   
 
Concisely, Day is seeking to make causal social variables viable in a naturalised study of religion. 
To overcome the tautology of the transcendental social requires religious studies theorists to 
treat gods as ‘things.’ In doing so, theorists can avoid explaining the social in terms of the social 
itself. Yet, ‘extended mind’ theory cannot merely be supplanted into existing social theories of 
religion: ‘The academic study will need  to take up a methodological principle of symmetry that 
allows us to explain truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, even science and religion, in 
the same basic terms’ (Day, 2009: 732).  
 
He argues that studies of religion should avoid generic taxonomic descriptions of religion. 
Importantly, ‘extended mind’ theories are able to explain how religious collectives are different 
from one another, without losing the material bedrock of theory. Unlike CSR universalism, it 
does not seek universalism at the expense of differentiation: 
 
One community charts a path of self-creation that includes a history of 
sumptuous materiality built around their interaction with the gods. Another 
proceeds to construct and regulate itself in the midst of a god who forbids such 
ornate (representational) practices. In these cases, it may be more fruitful to 
think of them as ontologically distinct entities (Day, 2009: 734).  
 
The material dimensions of the collective also build the actors within them, shaping the skills 
needed to assemble, maintain, modify, preserve, and challenge an established group.  Objects 
are not just cognitive scaffolds but are direct cognitions that shape actors competences.  The 
more ‘things’ a collective has, the greater the level of interiority: ‘just as the durability and scale 
of a collective seems to increase with the sheer number of things, the subjectivities that are 
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associated and assembled with these objects seem to grow in complexity and depth’ (Day, 
2009: 734). 
 
The study of religion should seek to track associations that promote religious competence with 
regard to piety, prayer, repentance, and sacrifice. The subjects of such investigations should be 
the most disciplined and competent of believers. This is because it is the same networks of 
associations that are involved in the production, maintenance and transmission of the ‘gods’ 
that are responsible for constructing and stabilising the subjective skills that an actor requires 
to competently act when intuitions manifest. 
 
We now need to ask whether Day’s thesis has any relevance to the Intuitive Model and 
whether or not it can overcome the Intuitive Model’s scepticism of alternative theories of 
cognition. In the next section, I show how the Intuitive Model can integrate some of Day’s 
psychosocial perspectives in a manner that was not available through the humanities’ 
frameworks and the alternative theories of cognition discussed earlier. Humanities frameworks 
demand a too radical conceptual shift, while Geertz and Markússon’s theory fails to undercut 
the Intuitive Model’s protective strategy. However, the minimal application of Day thesis, which 
still shares some similarities with the humanities’ positions, produces surprisingly fertile results. 
 
3.6 The Psychosocial and the Intuitive Model 
 
I will begin by discussing the pragmatic application of Day’s thesis to the Intuitive Model. In line 
with the constructive nature of my own thesis, I address the areas that I think Day’s theory is 
insightful, before discussing what needs to be excluded for his thesis to be amenable to 
Intuitive Model theory. Of course, this task is a little counterintuitive. Day makes clear in his 
recent writing (2007, 2009, 2010) that he has lost faith in the CSR to explain religion. The 
intended audience of his paper is not the CSR, but religious studies scholars. 
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Certainly, Barrett and Bering are unlikely to see why a naturalised sociological theory is of any 
relevance to their own work. Yet, surprisingly, in terms of the critical literature considered in 
the past chapters, Day’s psychosocial theory is the closest to resolving many of these, while 
offering a means to keep intact the insights of Barrett and Bering’s hypotheses.  
 
A direct outcome of dialogue between Intuitive Model and psychosocial perspectives is the 
resolution of recurrent criticisms of Intuitive Model research. The application of psychosocial 
theory is akin to a Trojan horse as psychosocial presents the Intuitive Model with the means to 
resolve persistent criticism and place it on a firmer theoretical footing. However, this gift horse 
sacks finally, the Intuitive Model’s highly problematic guiding metathesis.  
 
o Breaching the Intuitive Model’s Protective Strategy 
 
Importantly, Day’s theory destabilises Intuitive Model protective strategies because it forcefully 
denies that culture is merely an appendage that magnifies or suppresses core competences.  In 
fact, he would contend that the Intuitive Model is in radical error trying to track the non-
cultural causations of religious beliefs.  In contrast, Day offers a minimalist perspective on 
native mentalisers which challenges core knowledge theory relative to religious cognitions. 
While Geertz and Markússon argue along similar lines, their focus remains on the explanatory 
paucity of cognitive preconditions to explain recurrent behaviours and belief (e.g., atheistic 
belief should be seen as just as natural as religious beliefs). Bering and Barrett were able to 
defend the study of generic intuitions by arguing that the numerous theories of ‘cultural 
evolution’ such as the one Geertz and Markússon present are largely autonomous from 
Intuitive Model research.  
 
Yet, in the instance of Day’s theory, developmental psychologists of religion cannot as easily 
isolate the Intuitive Model from criticism. Day builds a new material theory of religion in direct 
opposition to the Intuitive Model’s ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis. I argue that by letting 
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culture into core cognition, the Intuitive Model may radically increase the empirical strength of 
its hypotheses. 
 
Day’s theory certainly presents a number of challenges to the Intuitive Model.  Psychosocial 
theory contests the isolationism of psychological methodology. Extending the scope of research 
so that cognitive attractors and culturally determined variables are indistinguishable collapses 
the predictive power of the Intuitive Model’s hypotheses and task designs. 
 
Recall Cosmides and Tooby’s distinction between metaculture, evoked culture and 
epidemiological culture (1992: 115–116). The Intuitive Model strives to account for 
metacultural beliefs and is heavily criticised for bracketing the developmental and immediate 
environmental contingences that feature in evoked and epidemiological culture. Day’s 
psychosocial theory would deny the isolated explanatory relevance of generic metacognitive 
preconditions in all religious beliefs.  
 
In Day’s model, it is false to separate inside cognitive causation (‘causes’) from external cultural 
causations (‘reasons’) as the binary distinction does not exist. I agree that by excluding the 
socialised dimensions of religious belief, the Intuitive Model promotes a conceptual error and 
an implausible separation of maturationally natural and practiced natural cognitions. 
 
Day’s emphasis on agencies acting on agencies requires the extension of psychology and 
psychological method and the removal of the distorting influence of the ‘naturalness of 
religious belief’ metathesis, because the metathesis is a product of artificial experimental 
evidence. Developmental theories of core competence will remain in error until a theory, which 
accounts for the variables that influence human belief in their multivariable complexity. 
Psychosocial theory rejects the isolated focus of individual cognition, which is present even in 
social psychology, which sees communication as an exchange between individual actors. 
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The focus should rather be on the socialisation of individual cognitions, with religious belief 
treated as emergent phenomena, which bind the practiced and maturationally natural in 
specific contexts inclusive of diverse agencies. Day is taking up, if unintentionally, the extremely 
difficult task of contextualising implicit subjectivities through a naturalistic methodology. Recall 
that Intuitive Model theories contend that contextually unique subjectivities are forms of 
practiced naturalness; they become intuitive through prolonged exposure to, and repetition of, 
behaviours, in response to the ideologies and norms that dominate a sociocultural space. The 
opposite claim is expressed in psychosocial theory: implicit subjectivities are structured by 
cultural norms and dominant traditions, not the underlying cognitive apparatuses themselves. 
 
Throughout his writing, he has laboured to show how traditional CSR theory has elevated an 
artificial dialectic at the expense of the causal influence of the other. Day’s aim is to violate the 
normative antimonies (e.g., subject-object, nature-nurture and individual and society) that he 
believes feature in CSR research.  He does this by arguing that the ‘naturalness of religious 
belief’ metathesis is false because all religious beliefs are ‘culturally scaffold’ and practiced 
natural intuitions. In his reading of Durkheim, he posits that unreflective intuitions are variant 
sensory-perceptual inputs or ‘cognitive noise,’ ordered and shaped by socialised categories. 
These socialised categories are variable and context specific, and regardless of biases in core 
cognition cannot be comprehended by individual minds without the ordering process granted 
by cultural socialisation. This makes sociocultural causations inseparable from core cognitions, 
because they are an essential ingredient of the core cognitive processes themselves.   
 
Thus, Day would assert that religious beliefs are unavoidably practiced beliefs. As such, Day’s 
blend of psychological and sociological theory leaves little space for linear probabilistic 
developmental trajectories. Development, Day maintains, occurs in the messy middle ground 
between these projected antimonies. Willis Overton notes that such forced antimonies 
resonate throughout psychology:  
 
In the nature-nurture battles, for example, while virtually all combatants these 
days acknowledge some type of interaction, it is a rare program that promotes 
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nature and nurture as co-equal reciprocally determined complementary 
processes (Overton, 2006: 18) 
 
Day would encourage Intuitive Model theorists to consider the situated, contingent and activity 
dependent aspects of any posited developmental trajectory. He would certainly also reject the 
Intuitive Model’s contention that an agent’s environment simply offers distal processes, which 
distort, supplement, and modify the maturational development of enduring implicit beliefs.  
 
In a psychosocial reading, religious beliefs (with both intuitive and reflective properties) 
develop through enactive relationship with other people and the thoughts and norms encased 
in the material artefacts of a believer’s cultural worlds. In Day’s reading, until Intuitive Model 
theorists accommodate such perspectives in their task designs, their research is incomplete and 
fragmentary.  
 
o Limitations of Psychosocial Theory 
 
Before I establish a dialogue between Day’s theory and the Intuitive Model, we need to 
consider the problems that Barrett and Bering would express with the psychosocial thesis. 
Many of these problems echo the Intuitive Model’s problems with research undertaken in the 
humanities.  The problems Intuitive Model theorists have with psychosocial theory are as 
significant as Day’s problems with the Intuitive Model. In my reading key problems would 
include that psychosocial theory: 
 
1) ignores evidence for the recurrence of concepts and intuitions based on generic 
mechanisms like HADD and theory of mind, as well as experimental evidence in 
support of cognitive constraints and core knowledge competences. These findings 
converge to support the thesis that there is a cross-cultural similarity in basic folk 
psychological thought and this has causal influences on human thinking behaviours;   
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2) is inadequate as a psychological theory of development. A generic theory of social-
cognitive normalisation is a theoretical regression, one in which the Intuitive Model 
has formalised itself in opposition to; 
3) evidences a lack of conceptual clarity about how to distinguish keys terms such as 
intuitive and semi-propositional religious beliefs;  
4) is far too board and thus extremely difficult to operationalise, test and falsify. For 
example, it is difficult for specific subjective beliefs to be empirically shown to 
correlate to specific material objects; 
5) Is overly theoretical. The Intuitive Model shows that there are more conservative and 
experimentally grounded means to account for variations in beliefs. Day’s treatment 
of belief and his approach to religious studies is simply beyond the purview of 
Intuitive Model theory; 
6) appears to re-enact a mind-blind tautology: religious beliefs are products of other’s 
religious beliefs mediated by material artefacts that transcend human generations. 
 
Bering and Barrett’s immediate concern would be that Day’s framework offers no clear 
conceptualisation of beliefs, which the study of implicit reasoning shows can and do often 
diverge at a intuitive level. Day’s theory also denies the causal efficacy of maturationally natural 
intuitions, which Intuitive Model theories depend on. Barrett and Bering would require Day to 
explain how his thesis can accommodate the fact that even the most competent believers 
revert to generic interpretations at odds with their practiced, disciplined knowledge and which 
are similar despite radical variations in reflective traditions. Hindu believers, like American 
Christian believers, anthropomorphise deity, while American children and Romani gypsies 
exhibit the same teleofunctional bias that also populate soteriological traditions.   Bering and 
Barrett would note that through Day’s rejection of the cognitive isolation of implicit processes, 
he appears to revive behavioural eliminativism because he cannot explain the psychological 
operationalisation of his theory other than at some extremely broad level.  
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Perhaps the biggest problem Intuitive Model theorists are likely to have with the model is that 
it is extremely hard to see how experimental settings could account for the subtlety of 
interactions between cognitions and culture posited. It is unclear how reliable developmental 
task designs could be composed and coded sensitive enough to bridge the development of 
distinctive subjectivities. 
  
This experimental alienation would fuel Bering and Barrett’s rejection of the theory. Barrett 
would assert that it is symptomatic of the critical problem of experimentally untestable social 
science theory. If the theory cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified and thus it becomes a 
rhetorical debate that denies precise, systematic refinement of hypotheses. As such, it falls prey 
to its own truism: religious beliefs are established by a many number of factors that shape the 
religious actor.  Not only does this not really tell us much but the thesis is simply too large in 
scope for it to be fractionated into the simple prediction needed for experimental science.   
 
Still, there are claims within the broader theory that do have experimental implications. For 
example, Day denies a generic platform for beliefs. His implicit hypothesis is that universal core 
cognitions do not have strong influences in shaping religious beliefs types.  Directed task 
designs and/or meta-analysis could encourage distrust in research on core competences. 
However, even with this kind of experimental success the theory must compete with the 
compelling findings of the Intuitive Model. Furthermore, the denial of core competences does 
not really get us to an experimentally motivated psychosocial theory.  
 
Given the radical differences between the two perspectives, we may ask if it is possible or 
worthwhile seeking dialogue. I argue that it is indeed possible and in the following section 
outline a framework for fruitful engagement. I develop a closer relationship between the 
Intuitive Model and Day’s psychosocial theory through a revisitation of key conceptual terms in 
the Intuitive Model and a highly selective reading of Day’s theory. 
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3.7 The Pragmatics of a Psychosocial theory of Intuitive Religious Belief 
 
Day’s theory attempts to integrate psychology and sociology but in the process 
methodologically alienates the relevance of developmental psychology. Despite Day’s incorrect 
conviction that a generic developmental framework will provide little more than trivial 
information for the study of religion, I pragmatically attempt to apply some key ingredients of 
his theory to developmental modelling.  By doing so, I hope to address and offer solutions to 
some of the limitations that developmental psychologists would see in the theory presented 
above. Interestingly, a contemporary overview of the developmental literature partially 
foreshadows Day’s interests. The authors, Rebekah Richert and Erin Smith, note: 
 
[A] developmental approach has helped researchers identify the cognitive bases 
for religious concepts, which can inform discussions about how and why people 
have acquired and transmitted religious concepts over the course of 
evolutionary history. However, from a cognitive developmental perspective, 
there is much more that needs to be explained in regard to individual beliefs in 
religious concepts. Though research has yet to address at what age and based on 
which input children begin to question the truth value to the concepts they have 
received. Without cultural input and support, it is unclear whether religious 
concepts would disappear or simply relegate to the fantasy realm. However it 
seems clear that the function of the concepts would drastically 
change…Although less studied in this area of research, the cultural factors that 
propagate the content and beliefs in religious concepts will be an important next 
step to further our understanding in this area (Richert and Smith, 2009: 191). 
 
Barrett acknowledges that classic CSR has not adequately explained practiced naturalness as an 
independent variable in the study of religion (2009). To address this he has proposed a typology 
where maturational natural cognitions and general cognitions inform cultural and religious 
schemata. In turn, practiced religious beliefs and action inform general cognitions. While this is 
a more robust and interactive model psychosocial theory predicts that the CSR’s separation of 
maturational and practiced cognitions continues to implausibly safe guard maturational 
features of cognition. Day maintains that a strong theory needs to place the individualisation of 
belief at the forefront of investigation and ultimately this must corrode the predictive power of 
broad universal trends.  
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However, drawing important inferences for Bering and Barrett’s respective theories does not 
require the acceptance of Day’s larger hypotheses (e.g., gods are material ‘things’). In my 
reading, a middle ground is possible. If we read Day’s theory as a theory about the subjective 
normalisation of cultural worlds, a space for correspondence arises. Critically, we do not need 
to deny cognitive universals; clearly, there are universal developmental regularities (such as 
imitative play, a bias toward anthropomorphism, false belief competence, and folk theories of 
gravity to name but a few). Thus psychosocial theory, as I present it, does not disregard the 
Intuitive Model’s focus on preconditions. Instead, it asserts that these preconditions (by 
themselves) are so causally weak to be inconsequential to robust studies of religious intuitions. 
Importantly, Day is careful not to fall into causally suppressive phenomenological 
interpretations. Like Sperber, Day believes that when considering why people ‘generally tend’ 
to hold the beliefs they do the cognitive sciences offer some structural insight into human 
cognitive architectures.   
 
Most importantly, and perhaps problematically, psychosocial theory entrenches practiced 
naturalness within maturational naturalness, expecting dynamic and interdependent relations 
between implicit and reflective beliefs. Of course, Intuitive Model theories also expect dynamic 
relationships, seeing reflective beliefs as constrained and interactive with the former. However, 
as we have seen in the case of Bering’s thesis, the non-maturationally intuitive beliefs that 
shape reflective beliefs are not analysed. Barrett, for example defers these considerations to 
broader theories such as ‘modes theory.’ To put it metaphorically, within the Intuitive Model, 
maturationally natural intuitions follow reflective beliefs like an ever-present shadow. The key 
difference is that Day would treat body and shadow as inseparable.  
 
The application of psychosocial theory to the Intuitive Model resolves a number of the 
recurrent criticisms of the Intuitive Model. By contesting the methodological and conceptual 
reduction of the ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis it expands the Intuitive Model’s 
investigative interests, accommodating ‘causes’ and ‘reasons’ expressed in alternate theory.  As 
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an alternative to the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis, the psychosocial theory of 
intuitive religious beliefs presents a heuristic explanatory model unburdened by questions of 
core ‘naturalness.’ Unlike the metathesis, it does not need to exclude obvious variables to 
maintain tractability with natural scientific research.  Importantly however, psychosocial theory 
can still include Barrett’s argument that implicit beliefs are simple and less complex than 
theological conceptualisations. 
 
 Thus, psychosocial theory would not regard Bering and Harris’ research as oppositional. By 
unifying the two theories more inclusive task designs may be formulated; psychosocial theory 
predicts that the role of testimony and core competences are interactive and complementary 
forces in the development of intuitive religious sensibilities.  So intertwined the theories offer a 
richer picture of the development of children’s understandings of human death and beliefs in 
psychological immortality. Day would insist that Bering and Harris’ experiments accommodate 
local variations. Similarly, he would argue that the intuitions of American children and Vezo 
children remain separate and treated as products of ontologically distinct cultures. As such, we 
would not necessary expect a ‘physic unity’ in the two groups reasoning behaviour.  This is 
important as it calls into question direct comparison between Bering’s work on American 
children and Harris and Astuti’s on Vezo children. 
 
The most difficult problem for Intuitive Model theorists is Day’s argument, shared by William 
James, that the appropriate subjects for investigations into religion must be the traditions most 
competent actors. These experts have gained the practiced natural competence that is 
necessary for Day’s entrenchment of subjectivities in social space. Through their close links to 
the supra-individual and cross-generational objects that compose traditions, competent actors 
are holders and arbitrators of a tradition’s norms and beliefs. Like public representations 
embodied in objects and rituals these actors are so competent that they are able to bring 
initiates, without direct maturational compulsion, into the fold.    
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Like Laidlaw, Day appears to believe that children cannot entertain religious beliefs as such 
belief requires a degree of reflectivity. ‘Competent’ believers are invariably adults whose 
religious subjectivities are the result of a long process of enculturation. Intuitive Model 
theorists may respond that the problem is perhaps a definitional one, as Laidlaw proposed 
when claiming that these scholars are not studying religion but human superstitions. Day’s 
psychosocial theory would insist on a development trajectory able to document how a ‘scripted 
person’ learns the lines of their particular faith.   This suggests that we should listen and 
examine more broadly the reasons children give for events.  In the Intuitive Model, this means 
that cognitive causations must blend with context based, learned reasons. 
 
Clearly, much work is still required to integrate the Intuitive Model and psychosocial theory.  In 
my reading, the best way to unify Intuitive Model and psychosocial perspectives is through a 
reworking of the Intuitive Model’s conceptualisation of beliefs. 
 
3.8 Revision of the Intuitive Model’s Conceptual Terminology 
 
Scratch an intuitive belief and it becomes reflective (Bloch, 2010). 
 
Uniting the ‘post-social’ theory of religious beliefs with the Intuitive Model requires a reworking 
of the Intuitive Model’s definition of belief. Thankfully, this is available through Sperber’s own 
conceptualisation of belief (1997, 2010). Bringing Sperber into the discussion is encouraged by 
the fact that Intuitive Model theorists credit Sperber with the foundational distinction between 
‘intuitive’ and ‘reflective’ beliefs. (Barrett and Lanman, 2008) The full inclusion of Sperber’s 
theory of beliefs means that Day’s argument for the inescapable ‘hybridity of thought’ appears 
far less drastic. 
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Sperber contends (2010) that ‘religious’ beliefs are unavoidably reflective beliefs with semi- 
propositional42 content. Recall that Intuitive Model theory defines belief differently as a ‘the 
state of a cognitive system holding information (not necessarily propositional or explicit form) 
as true in the generation of further thought and behaviour’ (Barrett and Lanman, 2008: 110). 
The Intuitive Model seeks to explain how general intuitive beliefs shape intuitive religious 
behaviour and beliefs. For example, HADD encourages inferences about invisible agentives that 
affect behavioural responses in ways that appear religious. 
 
Sperber would grant Intuitive Model theories their definition of belief but contest that the 
Intuitive Model can align generic beliefs and religious beliefs in this manner because even if 
beliefs are ‘implicit,’ religious beliefs are always propositional at a reflective level. Sperber 
would maintain that religious behaviours only occur because of communications about religious 
beliefs.  As such, the Intuitive Model needs to separate implicit beliefs that are only incidentally 
related to religious beliefs and intuitive religious beliefs that are.  
 
Sperber’s distinction between the two categories of beliefs has further nuance. He argues that 
there are two types of intuitive beliefs: intuitive beliefs with no propositional content and 
intuitive beliefs, which include semi-propositional content. The same is true for reflective 
beliefs, some have no propositional content, while others have semi-propositional content. 
However, key to Sperber’s theory of beliefs is the argument that the category ‘intuitive beliefs 
with semi-propositional content’ is an empty category, as no intuitive beliefs can house semi-
propositional content because as soon as they contain reflective assumptions they start to 
involve reasons rather than implicit causes. 
                                                     
42
 Sperber alternatively describes lay religious beliefs as’ half understood beliefs’ (2009, 2010). He argues that 
beliefs are always partially mysterious to the believer and are open to a variety of exegetical interpretations and 
reinterpretations. The clearest example of semi-propositional religious beliefs is the belief in the Holy Trinity. 
Despite high levels of commitment to the concept, lay believers, in ordinary situations, acknowledge only partial 
understanding of what it presupposes and entails. Beliefs in the Trinity or a guardian angel are reflective in the 
sense afforded by Intuitive Model theory but only vaguely so. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to describe such 
beliefs as practiced because, even when explicitly stated, the reasons for the belief often remain obscure and 
inconclusive to the believer.  Sperber, like Harris, contends that the source of many half-understood beliefs is the 
individual’s religious community. 
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Within the Sperberian framework, semi-propositional beliefs are the most common belief type 
and are highly variegated. They are not intuitive nor practiced as assumed in the Intuitive 
Model. Semi-propositional beliefs are beliefs about things, objects and entities partially 
occluded to the believer and frequently held in the absence of conclusive evidence. A believer 
holds a belief despite a lack of detailed and fully reasoned knowledge on the subject. Often 
‘commonsensical’ and believed with conviction, semi-propositional beliefs predominantly rely 
on reflective rather than intuitive plausibility.  Examples include Omar’s belief, derived from 
reading secondary scientific sources, that global warming is occurring and is an eminent threat 
to humankind; Sarah’s belief, informed by her doctor, that gluten causes choleric disease; 
Elton’s belief in causal psychic forces encouraged by readings of Alistair Crowley; and Milan’s 
belief, without knowledge of the intricacies of such processes that microwaves heat food. 
These beliefs are semi-propositional because the believer is unable to know everything about 
the subject they believe in. Such beliefs, while reflective, do not necessitate declarative 
expression and certainly do not need to be maturationally implicit.   
 
A focus on semi-propositional beliefs would necessitate that when Intuitive Model scholars 
consider religious beliefs their hypotheses examine the propositional content as much as the 
underlying cognitive bias of the belief.  Thus, when we talk of intuitive religious beliefs 
maturational and practiced natural beliefs are interdependent. In this way, a hybridised theory 
of conceptual development can gain empirical traction without requiring the full application of 
‘extended mind’ theory. 
 
Indeed, Intuitive Model theorists admit that intuitive religious beliefs must involve some 
propositional content; religious beliefs are not properly innate and varying degrees of cultural 
scaffolding are necessary. As Barrett and Lanman explain of HADD: 
 
We are not arguing that HADD experiences are directly responsible for belief in 
supernatural agents. We are arguing that HADD experiences, belief In MCI 
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agents and discourse about such agents are mutually reinforcing (Barrett and 
Lanman, 2008: 116, italics added).  
 
The problem that Day, as well as Geertz and Markússon, and now Sperber have is that the 
Intuitive Model methodologically separates the former from the latter in the search for implicit 
preconditions. The methodology encourages conceptual antimony despite the overt awareness 
that implicit beliefs are naturally nurtured. A robust model must accommodate the role of 
cultural discourse and the affective dimension of religious beliefs.  Psychosocial theory 
mediated by Sperber’s understanding of beliefs offers such a robust model.  
 
The Sperberian conception of belief allows space for the maturational and the practiced natural 
and thus merely requires a synthesis of the two belief types. So understood, belief is cognitively 
propelled but culturally mediated. The question then becomes: how do religious beliefs 
motivate behaviour?  
 
Psychosocial theory disrupts the easy linear association between belief and action that is latent 
in the Intuitive Model. A solution is to regard folk beliefs as always semi-propositional. This 
allows the incorporation of features typically positioned outside of a cognitive framework, 
including affects, habits, attitudes, values, situational constraints and the cognitive props that 
‘extended mind’ theory considers. These infest religious beliefs and account for the 
motivational features of beliefs. Yet even with the full application of Sperber’s theory, we need 
not lose sight of the inferential platform that the Intuitive Model is uncovering. 
 
With a reshaped theory of belief, Intuitive Model theory is only really mistaken in assuming a 
standardised universal trajectory for the implicit component of semi-propositional beliefs. This 
is the fundamental issue raised by Geertz and Markússon and again by Day. It is a by-product of 
the search for universal regularities in beliefs in the first instance. It is possible to maintain the 
universal preconditions behind propositional beliefs without assuming the structural similarity 
of religious beliefs themselves. For example whereas children everywhere develop false belief 
reasoning between the ages of 4 and 6, the richly variegated beliefs derived from these are not 
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causally predictable.  They are learned and culture-bound in accordance with the lessons of 
alternative cognitive theory.  
 
Day would point out that the contentless nature of intuitive beliefs is itself corrupted in 
Intuitive Model experimental designs because implicit task designs encourage children and 
adults to entertain reflective responses. Unavoidably Intuitive Model experiments push 
intuitive assumptions into reflective awareness and it is because of this they are correctly semi-
propositional. Certainly, as Westh notes, by relying on narrative based task designs 
developmental psychologists cannot claim to study naked intuitions.  
 
Taking Sperber’s typology of beliefs seriously requires Bering and Barrett to abandon a 
universal developmental model based on generic preconditions. Furthermore, the direct 
inclusion of cultural variations requires developmental psychologists to localise their findings. 
This is perhaps what Geertz and Markússon are trying to get at even though they occasionally 
fall into same antimonies they accuse Bering and Barrett. According to Day, recurrent beliefs 
share family resembles rather than universal similarities. We may not need to go as far as 
seeing religions and ideologies as ontologically distinct traditions because within the Intuitive 
Model, what would be of interest is how beliefs gradually diverge through contextual 
precedents.    Certainly, Bering and Barrett have not taken the contextual localisation of their 
hypotheses seriously enough. As Bloch and Whitehouse note, most of the intuitions Bering 
describes in the ‘folk psychology of souls’ are conspicuous to modern Western societies (e.g., 
place error – attempting to call a dead loved one on the phone).  Through contextually sensitive 
models of belief, developmental psychology can consider how children accommodate and 
normalise cultural particulars and traditions. 
 
Sperber argues that semi-propositional beliefs need to be ‘practiced’ (or ‘used’) in some way.  
Day would also argue that for the very reason we cannot have a universal folk psychology, we 
are even less likely to have a universal folk psychology of souls. The lesson is that folk 
competences are powerfully mediated by the propositional and reflective nature of religious 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  144 
 
 
 
beliefs.  As such, cultural variables in experimental settings should also accommodate different 
exegetical traditions and their respective interpretations of death, faith, and commitment. Even 
the strongest research, such as Kelemen’s research on teleofunctional reasoning bias, when 
viewed as one causal property in the advent of religious beliefs requires theorists to account for 
variations in traditions.  
 
Interestingly, when we examine Barrett and Bering’s research on children, their findings rest 
overtly on children’s explicit reasoning about an event or behaviour they have just witnessed. 
Thus, reflective propositional content unavoidably mediates implicit expressions. (Sperber, 
2010) In Bering’s case, children reason about the psychological abilities of a dead mouse; in 
Barrett’s research, it is how children reason about the abilities of different agent types. The idea 
is that the task demands of the experiment render these explanations tainted with implicit bias.  
If cognitive pressures are placed on the children (e.g., they are encouraged to quickly respond 
to a novel stimuli) then the reasons they proffer are likely to stem from core intuitions, rather 
than culturally bounded explanations of the behaviour. Intuitive Model task designs treat 
individuals as isolated reasoning devices. However, the realities of social learning and reasoning 
often involve interdependence and consensus between minds. Both Bering and Barrett infer 
greater significance to their experimental findings than are immediately discernable, and as 
chapter one highlighted, they deny important variations, despite the fact they are discussing 
these at the level of propositional reasons. ‘Reason’ explanations are thus central to the 
explanatory ambitions of the Intuitive Model.  
 
o A Psychosocial Approach to the Atheism 
 
Let us consider a psychosocial theory of atheism. A psychosocial theory of atheism is very 
different from the theories put forth by Barrett and Bering, and also Geertz and Markússon. 
Conceptually, psychosocial theory would immediately separate non-belief from atheistic belief. 
Atheistic belief is motivated belief; non-belief is the absence of belief. Whereas non-belief may 
be a default stance, atheistic belief can never be.   
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A psychosocial framework would view atheism as a unique ontological tradition with 
competent atheists the exemplars of the tradition. Even when conceived of broadly as a set of 
basic assumptions shared by all atheists regardless of historical or cultural settings, psychosocial 
theory would demand the explication of the specific variables that flavour such beliefs, 
expecting for example variations in Chinese atheism and Western secular atheism. As Laidlaw 
would reminds us, Chinese atheism would be incomprehensible without the geopolitical and 
domestic contingencies of State Communism. Similarly, the neo-atheist movement is similarly 
unintelligible without a discussion of September 11 and the threat of religious encroachment 
on secular spaces. Such ideological variables, as only one of potentially hundreds, ensures the 
mind of a Chinese villager and the mind of a IPod listening, Nietzsche reading, neo-atheist are 
very different.  
 
Not only does language (perhaps our peasant is even illiterate, while our Western adolescent is 
already two years into his philosophy degree) distinguish them so does life experiences, 
education, cultural norms and family roles. Such variables disrupt easy correspondence 
between the two beliefs. Furthermore, the beliefs that our two hypothetical participants hold 
are not practiced in the way that the Intuitive Model predicts, they are ‘downloaded’ through 
mere saturation in particular cultural spaces. Certainly, for our Ipod-listening Nietzsche reader 
atheistic beliefs may be practiced through study and discussion; for the peasant they are the 
result of the absence of such sociocultural practices. Furthermore, the Chinese atheist’s 
reflective beliefs may share no correlation to his private beliefs. Whereas Western atheism is 
individualistic, chosen and politically motivated, lay Chinese atheism is a response to communal 
norms and the active suppression of religious ideology.    
 
Similarly, psychosocial theory would reject Geertz and Markússon’s suggestion that atheism has 
ancient roots. The neo-atheist movement is thoroughly modern, a response to sociocultural 
and political forces that are historically novel. Again, there may be similarity in perspectives but 
these are the products of impossibly different social worlds. To strip the neo-atheistic 
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movement to a set of core propositions is unlikely to correlate to how these beliefs are 
experienced by the atheist.  Without elaborating these differences, the correlation is distortive 
and implausible.  More critically, the Carvākā movement only becomes an atheistic movement 
through the gaze of contemporary eyes. Psychosocial theory with its insistence on holistic 
considerations would caution against such radical correlations and demand that studies within 
the same cultures should not dictate the beliefs located in different historical periods and 
cultural settings. As Bloch and Whitehouse warned, this may encourage the ascription of 
unique perspectives onto cultures where the framework is distortive. 
 
This section presented a sketch of what the application of Day’s theory to the Intuitive Model 
might look like. I take seriously criticisms of the Intuitive Model and continue to develop a 
psychosocial developmental model that is not so constrained by but does not completely 
abandon cognitive psychological methodology. Through the minimal application of psychosocial 
theory and Sperber’s writings on propositional and semi-propositional beliefs the Intuitive 
Model can be revised.   This revision encourages the Intuitive Model to include the key 
psychosocial fact that agencies operate on other agencies.  
 
We can conclude this section by noting three critical points. Firstly, there is space for 
engagement with Day’s psychosocial theory from Intuitive Model perspectives, though 
currently at a theoretical level and only in the face of Day’s scepticism that interaction is 
possible and the gaps Intuitive Model theorists would see with the theory. However, I have 
shown that there is space for fruitful dialogue if Day’s theory is utilised selectively and if the 
conceptual typologies of belief are reformulated in the Intuitive Model. 
 
So revised, Intuitive Model theory can now begin to consider questions about the cultural 
magnification, and even infiltration, of core competences. I have demonstrated that the 
incorporation of psychosocial perspectives will revitalise the Intuitive Model though this 
requires a departure from some core assumptions. Secondly, and most importantly, I have 
shown how interactions between the Intuitive Model and psychosocial theory resolve some of 
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the lagging objections to Intuitive Model scholarship. Thirdly, the key problem remains that 
psychosocial theory, while challenging the appendage status of ‘cultural evolution’ theories, still 
does not manage to breach the experimental dominance of the Intuitive Model project.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter evaluated a select group of alternative theories of cognition that attempt to 
correct claims made in classic CSR research. As in the previous chapter, these alternative 
theories were concerned that the classic CSR encourages a constricted, even erroneous, 
understanding of the mind. Day, Geertz and Markússon offer as a solution cognitive theories 
that express dynamic relations between cognition and culture.  
 
Nonetheless, the point of this chapter was to clarify why alternative theories of cognition are 
problematic from Intuitive Model developmental perspectives. I have shown how Barrett and 
Bering protect Intuitive Model theories from alternative theories of cognition and culture. They 
do so by contesting the empirical basis of such claims, contrasting them with their own 
experimentally supported claims. As such, Barrett and Bering were able to uphold their 
distinction between maturationally natural and practiced natural beliefs by arguing that cultural 
normalisation is beyond the purview of Intuitive Model theory.    
 
Day’s psychosocial model strives to go deeper. Day’s work is of interest because he 
incorporates theoretical perspectives distinct from those expressed by Ingold, Laidlaw, Ingold, 
and the task design criticisms. However, his topic is not unique: it is again the explanatory 
consequences of ‘negative reductionism’ and the desire to establish dialogue between research 
domains. His attempt to apply sociological theory to core knowledge theory is potentially a 
highly fertile ground for further exploration. 
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In the following chapter, I develop with greater precision how the Intuitive Model and the 
‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ can incorporate some of the lessons of 
alternative cognitive theories without collapsing the developmental and experimental 
frameworks themselves.  Crucially, I add the experimental framework missing from my blended 
psychosocial theory of intuitive religious beliefs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  149 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Implicit Cultures: the Development of Religious 
intuitions 
 
 The social climate in which a child lives is for the child as important as the air it 
breathes. The group to which the child belongs is the ground on which he stands 
(K Lewin, cited in Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 7). 
 
In the last chapter, I theoretically demonstrated how the application of psychosocial theory 
resolves frequent criticisms of the Intuitive Model and may therefore enrich future empirical 
research. However, I agree with Barrett that theoretical models of cognition are futile if they 
collapse normative developmental methodologies in the process.  I have also established that 
the major reason Bering and Barrett have not incorporated alternative theories of cognition is 
due to perceived translation problems that arise when set with the task of constructing 
experimental designs based on alternative cognitive perspectives.   
 
Yet, the absence of cultural-cognitive experimental findings in Intuitive Model theory has other 
consequences. Firstly, as we saw in the last chapter, it protects Intuitive Model findings from 
the insights of alternative cognitive models. It also encourages experimental psychologists to 
treat such alternative models as ‘rhetorical’ rather than empirically grounded and therefore less 
scientifically persuasive than an experimentally driven developmental psychology dedicated to 
tracing the pre-cultural roots of religious intuitions.  
 
In this chapter, I attempt to make the psychosocial theory of intuitive religion palatable to 
empirical psychologists. To do this, I expose Bering and Barrett’s research to empirical findings 
from cultural psychology. Cultural psychology achieves the integration of the three bodies of 
criticism analysed in earlier chapters: 
 
1) It presents and utilises extant psychological methodologies. 
2) It incorporates the humanities’ interest in ’reason, imagination and will’ into scientific 
research. 
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3) It seeks to introduce more inclusive and dynamic relationships between core cognition 
and culture.  
 
However, introducing cultural psychology demands an empirical reworking of the Intuitive 
Model.  In the remainder of the thesis, the question I resolve is how to make the Intuitive 
Model inclusive of a psychosocial theory without, as the appropriate platitude expresses, 
‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater.’  
 
4.1 Cultural Psychology: The ‘View from Manywheres’ 
 
 *C+ulture is not a “thing” out there; rather, it is a loosely organized set of 
interpersonal and institutional processes driven by people who participate in 
those processes. By the same token, the psyche is also not a discrete entity 
packed in the brain. Rather, it is a structure of psychological processes that are 
shaped by and thus closely attuned to the culture that surrounds them. 
Accordingly, culture cannot be understood without a deep understanding of the 
minds of people who make it up and, likewise, the mind cannot be understood 
without reference to the sociocultural environment to which it is adapted and 
attuned. In significant ways, the field has since evolved by exploring the nature 
of the mutual constitution of culture and the psyche (Kitayama and Cohen, 2007, 
xiii). 
 
Cultural psychology43 examines the micro-psychological and macro-sociocultural processes that 
shape an individual’s beliefs, bias, talents, habits, interests and identity.  It directly correlates 
the internalisation of culture with the development of the self, arguing that a person comes to 
‘know’ herself through ‘knowing’ her culture. At the programme’s core is a search for mind that 
is phenomenologically sound (Bruner, 1990).  Foundationally, cultural psychology proposes that 
the sociocultural44 and the psychological45 are mutually constitutive46 (Shweder 1990: 24), 
                                                     
43
 Different theorists use different terminology to describe the same body of research. Cultural psychology is the 
most exacting way to define research sharing similar theoretical propositions. Alternative names include 
sociocultural psychology (which is the title Markus and Hamedani employ) and psychological anthropology.  
44
 Defined as ‘patterns of thought, feeling and action, sometimes also called the mind, the psyche, the self, agency, 
mentalities, ways of being or modes of operating’ (Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 3). 
45
 Defined as patterns in the social world, sometimes called socialites, sociocultural contexts, social systems, the 
environment, social structure or culture.’ (Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 3). 
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unable to be conceptually or empirically isolated from each other.47 Theory rests on two initial 
claims: 
  
4) Individuals are inseparable from the social contexts they live in, and 
5) Social contexts do not exist apart from, or outside of, people (Markus and Hamedani, 
2007: 6). 
 
Key theorist Richard Shweder argues that mental states and many mental processes are by-
products of the ‘never-ending attempt of particular groups of people to understand themselves 
and to make manifest their self-understanding through social practices’ (Shweder, 2003: 28). 
Correspondingly, the psychologist Jerome Bruner argues that psychology should base 
investigations on the fact that mind is shaped both by history and culture, and therefore 
questions of meaning and reality construction are central (Bruner, 1990, xi).  
 
Robert LeVine notes that the theoretical roots of cultural psychology are present in the 
anthropological theory of Francis Boas, Edward Sapir, Charles Seligman and Bronisław 
Malinowski (LeVine, 2007: 40).   He argues that these anthropologists were working through 
many of the same ideas that feature in cultural psychology, such as the individual or collective 
                                                                                                                                                                           
46
 While cultural psychologists agree about the inseparable correspondence between ‘mind’ and ‘culture’ they 
dispute exactly how it is mutually constitutive, as well as the mechanisms that compel the interaction. Markus and 
Hamedani’s review describes five different research strategies.  The first is a dimensional approach, which seeks to 
specify the dimensions of culture that explain differences in attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviours.  The second 
is a cultural models approach, which seeks to specify models that organise and account for links between 
sociocultural forces and the self. The third is a ‘toolkit’ approach, which seeks to specify how cultural meanings and 
practices can influence basic cognitive tendencies. The fourth is an ecological approach, which focuses on how 
ecological and sociopolitical forces influence psychological adaptations to a context. The fifth seeks to specify the 
boundary conditions that govern cultural influence (Markus and Hamedani, 2007, 15-23). These approaches are 
regularly combined in empirical research because the majority are complimentary perspectives. While all 
approaches are of potential interest (for example, the fifth approach considers how real time situational 
constraints can encourage a reliance on implicit culturally acquired intuitions), I limit discussion to the ‘toolkit’ and 
‘cultural models’ approach because it is these that offer direct correctives to the acultural approaches of Bering 
and Barrett.   
47
 Cultural psychology shares close similarities with indigenous psychology. Indigenous psychologists inductively 
build psychological theories relative to specific cultural settings (Kim, Yang and Hwang, 2006). There are also 
similarities between cultural psychology and situated cognition theory (Robbins and Aydede, 2009) but also 
important differences because cultural psychology has qualitative interests and posits close ties between reason 
and observation. Furthermore, a muted version of cultural psychology features in a number ‘cultural evolution’ 
theories. 
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role of culture and the methodological divisions between subjective and objective approaches 
to psychosocial culture. Anthropological theories of personhood are also influential, such as 
Berger and Luckman’s (1966) view that psychological and social formations are co-dependent. 
The developmental psychology of Leo Vygotsky, who argues that social interactions are the 
basis of cognitive development, also holds an esteemed place. Michael Cole argues that cultural 
psychology represents an attempt to develop Wundt’s ‘second psychology’ through a 
contemporary critique of cross-cultural psychology (Cole, 2006: 98-115). Thus the full extension 
of cultural psychology runs counter to the explanatory motivations of the classic CSR.  Whereas 
the latter seeks to ground anthropology within material theories of the human-brain, cultural 
psychology tries to reintroduce anthropology to psychological research because cultural 
psychologists believe that contemporary psychology is restricted by its focus on cognition. 
Indeed, the ‘interactionist’ model of cultural psychology is a straight reversal of both Sperber’s 
argument in Rethinking Symbolism (1975) and Lawson and McCauley’s in Rethinking Religion 
(1990).  Cultural psychology incorporates the anthropological treatment of cognition as a ‘state’ 
and cognitive psychology’s insistence on cognition as a ‘process.’  
 
Many cultural psychologists defend the standard definition of culture put forward by North 
American cultural anthropologists, like Kroeber and Kluckholin in the 1950’s and re-envisioned  
by Clifford Geertz (1973) and Roy D’Andrade (1984, 1995). Culture is interpreted as a 
symbolically structured environment wherein the sociocultural and the psychological exist in 
mutual and irreducible interdependence.  Shweder offers the following simple summary, which 
is in stark contrast to the epidemiological treatment of culture as public representations: 
 
Culture refers to the community specific ideas about what is true, good, 
beautiful, and efficient. To be cultural those ideas about truth, goodness, beauty 
and efficiency must be socially inherited and customary. To be cultural, those 
socially inherited and customary ideas must be embodied or enactive meaning; 
they must be constitutive (and therefore revealed in) a way of life (Shweder, 
2003: 10). 
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However, because of the ‘causally flattened’ psychosocial developmental theory of religious 
intuitions, we can bypass this transcendent view of culture because it not as important to us as 
the understanding of how culture’s ‘work.’ Theorists propose a developmental process that 
expects multi-directional consequences which actively enables the development of ‘cultural 
persons’ and which cements the tacit, implicit, and intuitive understandings those members of 
the same group, to varying degrees, share. As such, like Day’s psychosocial theory, cultural 
psychology collapses oppositional primitives such as self and society, belief and behaviour, 
nature and nurture, the individual and the environment and the universal and the contextual 
(Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 6).  Conspicuously then, cultural psychology is a consilience 
model. Yet it is a Consilience model based on what Shweder calls a non-consilient truth: 
 
[T]he human relationship to knowledge (including knowledge of human beings) 
is fundamentally non-consilient....The knowable world is incomplete if seen from 
any one point of view, incoherent if from all particular views at once, and empty 
if seen from nowhere in particular (Shweder, 2003: 300). 
 
The focus on transactions in contexts is a product of the contention that mind emerges as a 
mediated activity between people in specific contexts. This is similar to the view expressed by 
the anthropologist Christian Toren, who characterises the mind as a ‘function of the whole 
person, that is constituted over time in inter-subjective relations with others in an environing 
world’ (Toren, 2001: 155) and Ingold’s similarly philosophical contention that ‘to learn is to 
improvise a movement along a way of life’ (Ingold, 2010). Critically however, through the 
employment of the same psychological methods that CSR theory relies on, cultural psychology 
does not leaves us in the conceptual mess that Whitehouse believes Ingold’s and others holistic 
theories place empirical research.  
 
There are many points of agreement between cultural psychology and psychosocial theory. Like 
psychosocial theory, cultural psychology rejects the classic cognitive science treatment of a 
‘person’ as an autonomous agent with a bounded interiority. Theorists encourage psychologists 
to conceive of a more social or transactional model of ‘personhood’ and ‘mind.’ The mind from 
this perspective is a distributed and semiotic entity positioned beyond the confines of biology. 
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Mind is viewed as an interactive space between one cognate individual and another mediated 
by local and specific cultural artefacts and spaces.48 Crucially, theorists note that while 
individuals are active in their own development, they act in settings and are sensitive to the 
effects of agencies that are not of their choosing. All of these forces have powerful effects on 
mental development.   
 
 Such claims present a direct conceptual challenge to normative psychological perspectives 
present in the Intuitive Model. Cultural psychology requires psychologists to think ‘beyond the 
person’ (Shweder, 1996) and attend to ‘meaning making processes and how these are 
manifested and maintained in the worlds people inhabit’ (Markus and Hamedani, 2007:7). 
Thinking ‘beyond the person’ expresses analogous perspectives proposed in ‘distributed 
cognition’ theory. It entails sensitivities to how mind and behaviour are composed and 
mediated by the social elements of a person’s context, necessitating that theorists seeking to 
explain the individual go beyond the individual (Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 7).   
 
Cultural psychology extends the classic CSR contention that religious beliefs and behaviours 
stem from the normative operations of human cognition in everyday contexts. Theorists study 
the mind in situ, in relation to and as a response to its immediate everyday contexts.  Crucially, 
cultural psychology strives to integrate qualitative and naturalistic research. Ideally, it obliges 
theorists to gain qualitative information through an in-depth examination of the phenomenon 
under investigation (Shweder, 2003: 44). It demands that the search for psychological 
universals relative to the universal religious repertoire requires a simultaneous search for 
culture-bound features of psychology and religion. Cultural psychology echoes the framework 
elaborated by Day with both suggesting that variations go all the way down in human 
psychological processing. 
 
Like psychosocial theory, cultural psychology does not deny that there are a set of cognitive 
‘tools’ available to everyone (Heine, 2008, 17 - 41). This is an important feature of the 
                                                     
48
 Notably, despite the emphasis on qualitative analysis, cultural psychology aligns with the relativist sensitivities of 
evolutionary niche construction and ‘extended mind’ theory. 
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theoretical framework as it destabilises charges of relativism. Some less ‘interpretive’ cultural 
psychologists, especially those who posit ‘cultural evolution’ theories find core knowledge 
theories relatively unproblematic.  For example, Heine argues that theory of mind sensitivities 
develop normatively in all culture groups, as do emulative learning mechanisms (Heine, 2008).      
 
Cultural psychology utilises methods and theory from social psychology, the humanities, and 
the social sciences, as well as from the biocognitive sciences. The incorporation of interpretive 
methodologies has major methodological implications, highlighting that while theories of 
‘cultural evolution’ include aspects of cultural psychological theory they rarely include the 
variables prompted by Vygotsky, Bruner and recently refined by Shweder. In contrast to the 
theories of Sperber, Lawson and McCauley, cultural psychology downplays cause-effect 
explanatory science. Cultural psychologists do not dispute nor ignore the causal influence of the 
evolutionary dimensions (though posit no singular theoretical model) of human cognition: 
 
From a sociocultural perspective, individuals are biological entities (as well as, 
genetic, neuronal, chemical and hormonal entities and all behaviour has a 
biological, as well as an evolutionary foundation. Yet individuals are ineluctably 
social and cultural phenomena. The option of being asocial or acultural, that is, 
living as a neutral being who is not bound to particular practices and 
socioculturally structured ways of behaving is not available (Markus and 
Hamedani, 2007: 5) 
 
Crucially, despite the incorporation of qualitative and interpretive frames of reference, cultural 
psychology remains an experimental science. Through an alignment with cultural psychology, 
psychosocial theory gains the experimental traction that Bering and Barrett demand.  It also 
provides the precise psychological frameworks that the generality of psychosocial theory 
currently lacks.  
 
o Cultural Psychology’s Critique of Mainstream Psychology 
 
Cultural psychology arose in the 1980s as a reactive discipline dedicated to discovering whether 
theories posited in mainstream psychology (particularly cognitive and evolutionary psychology) 
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were generally universal or  culture-bound (Kitayama and Cohen, 2007, xiii). It has since 
emerged as an important alternative metatheoretical discipline that continues to present 
conceptual and empirical challenges to psychological research by critically assessing the 
limitations and fragmentariness of theories of universal psychological uniformity (Shweder, 
2003: 3049). A key goal is to define variations in psychological functioning across contexts and to 
discover the varied cultural meanings and practices with which they are linked (Markus and 
Hamedani, 2007: 7). Markus and Hamedani argue that sociocultural perspectives will 
strengthen psychology as a science. 
 
Significantly, like the alternative theories of cognition discussed in the last chapter, cultural 
psychology provides an empirical challenge to the reduction of the mind to an abstract 
processing unit that operates under a set of natural or universal laws, independent of context 
or content (Shweder, 1991; Cole, 1996; Heine, 2008).  Radically, Shweder argues that the 
‘prevailing Platonism’ of scientific psychology (including cross-cultural psychology,50 which it 
has developed out of) is based on such a major conceptual error that the whole project needs 
to be reformulated (Shweder, 1991, 79ff). 
   
Both Shweder (1993) and Bruner (1990) assert that the cognitive revolution encouraged 
psychologists to study the mind independent of extrinsic environmental properties. Both argue 
that many of the reductions to expose the hidden workings of cognition are in error. Reducing 
the ‘noise, clutter and messiness of the environmental context isolates the mind from its own 
mental supports.’ Yet, it is this very ‘noise’ that interests cultural psychologists. Axiomatically, 
‘the mind left to its own devices is mindless’ (Shweder, 1991: 83): 
 
                                                     
49
 See Norenzayan and Heine, 2005: 768) for a set of research methods and strategies such as generalising across 
three cultures and ‘the cross cultural survey’ to validate psychological universals. 
50
 Cultural psychology and cross-cultural psychology are distinct research programmes. Cross-cultural research 
involves the explicit comparison of a psychological theory in two or more contexts. In contrast, cultural psychology 
examines how local cultural practices shape and distinguish local psychologies.  This is a basic though radical 
distinction. 
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According to the principles of cultural psychology the effects of stuff will not go 
away, even in the lab, for there is no context-free environment. We are 
intentional beings who live in an intentional world of constituted and 
represented particulars – domain specific, concrete, subject dependent 
artifiactual things. Absolute transcendence is a great and marvellous thing, but 
not if we want to keep the psyche in psychology. 
The implication is, of course, that genuine success for psychological science will 
only come once we stop trying to get beyond the ‘noise’ and start trying to say 
interesting things about some of the more robust and patterned varieties of it 
(Shweder, 1996: 84). 
 
The focus on the multi-causality of socialised cognitions and perceptions stems from a 
contention that psychologists who employ cognitive and evolutionary frameworks are prone to 
‘universalistic fallacies’ by way of the empirically dubious claim that across all historic and 
cultural divides, human psychologies (bar the physiologically impaired) are foundationally the 
same. In contrast, cultural psychology argues that human psychologies are not ‘fixed’ or 
‘homogenous’ in this manner. We have previously seen how the Intuitive Model proposes 
universal cognitive developmental regularities that compel universal religious beliefs. In 
contrast, cultural psychologists note that many postulated universals stem from the 
experimental study of a very limited pool of participants. Henrich and Heine (2010) describe 
these as WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations. Cultural 
psychology contests the assumption that such particularised samples are cross-culturally 
representative of human psychological processes. Cultural psychology aims to disentangle 
culture-specific psychological processes from those that all humans share regardless of context 
(Norenzayan and Heine, 2005: 772). 
 
Cultural psychologists argue that many posited universals have been asserted prematurely. 
They contend that it is scientifically dubious to speculate universals without rigorous testing in 
diverse contextual settings. This is distinct from denying the reality of some psychological 
universals or exclusively focusing on differences between individuals and cultures. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a universal platform is reliant on sociocultural variation ‘because 
the actual workings…are contingent on and afforded by particular symbolic resources and social 
systems’ (Markus and Hamedani, 2007: 29).  
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‘True’ cross-cultural universals are dependent on measures and experimental tests that ensure 
that people from different cultures derive the same meaning from the questions asked of them 
and that the experimental setting itself is analogous across cultures (Norenzayan and Heine, 
2005: 766).  However, from the cultural psychological perspective, these tools, which are not 
used with the same frequency, or for the same purpose, are the products of the different 
experiences that people have in different cultures and time-periods.  
 
4.2 Universals in Psychological Research 
  
A foundational problem in cultural psychology is how to relate universal core mental attributes 
with unique localised cultural variations without separating psychological and cultural 
influences in the process. This problem is of immediate relevance of the Intuitive Model 
because cultural psychology has been at pains to analyse the very questions that featured in 
the critical literature discussed in the previous chapters.  Ara Norenzayan and Heine, who blend 
cultural psychological perspectives with ‘cultural evolution’ theories, provide the most robust 
conceptual model to date.  
 
Norenzayan and Heine present a heuristic hierarchical model that is based on a toolbox analogy 
of mind (cf., Piaget, 1951, Barrett, 2004b), arguing that psychological processes are like tools for 
thought and behaviour (Norenzayan and Heine, 2005: 772).51 A toolbox approach begs three 
critical questions: Are the tools in the cognitive toolbox the same across cultures? If the tools 
are the same, are they used or are different tools used in the same situation? If people use the 
same tools in the same situations, do they use them with the same facility or with the same 
frequency?  
 
                                                     
51
 Of course, Bering would not describe the mind in such a way but it suffices as a working model if we minimally 
employ the toolbox analogy above.   
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Norenzayan and Heine contend that these questions point to four types of psychological 
universality: 
 
o Accessibility Universals 
 
‘Accessibility universals’ are psychological processes that use the same cognitive tools in the 
same way, with the same frequency across cultures. ‘Accessibility universals’ are processes that 
people, regardless of culture, access in the same way. Probable examples include the mere 
exposure effect and analogue quantity estimation. 
 
o Functional Universals 
 
‘Functional universals’ are processes that are cognitively available to all people and function in 
the same way in all cultures. ‘Functional universals’ exhibit cultural variations at the level of 
accessibility. Possible candidates for ‘functional universals’ include the role of negative effect in 
depression, internal attributions of causality, the similarity-attraction effect, and attachment 
styles. 
  
o Existential Universals 
 
‘Existential universals’ are universals that are cognitively available to all mentally unimpaired 
people. However, ‘existential universals’ diverge strikingly in terms of their functionality and 
accessibility across cultural groupings. Even though all humans have access to these typically 
latent strategies, the conditions under which a strategy is utilised may vary greatly, as will the 
degree and strength the strategy depending on cultural context. Examples include differences 
between preferences for individual choice, different effects of talking on reasoning and the use 
of different reasons strategies; for example, one that relies on family resemblance in contrast 
to one that is rule based. 
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o Non-Universals 
 
‘Non-universals’ are psychological processes that do not meet the threshold for existential 
universals (and thus also for functional or accessibility universals). These processes are 
culturally specific and unique. However, like accessibility universals it is difficult to verify 
whether a phenomenon is unique to one culture. Norenzayan and Heine offer the example of 
abacus reasoning skills: such skills develop through engagement with the abacus. The necessary 
reasoning strategies appear to be absent, even latently, in non-abacus users. The abacus 
example is suggestive of a much larger historical problem for psychology. Numerical reasoning 
involves elemental and ubiquitous core competences and a host of ‘cultural tools [that] are 
exploited every time numbers are manipulated--tools that were invented, modified, and built 
upon by cultural predecessors’(Norenzayan and Heine 2005: 42).   
 
4.3 Distinguishing Universals in the Intuitive Model  
 
Consider the types four types of psychological universals in relation to Barrett and Bering’s 
research. Norenzayan and Heine’s model requires the conceptual separation of the kinds of 
psychological universals that feature in Intuitive Model research. Furthermore, the universality 
of each type needs to be established independently. To date this has not been undertaken by 
either Barrett or Bering. I contend that these different types of universals do need to be 
distinguished to accommodate psychosocial and cultural psychological perspectives 
 
 According to my reading, there are three kinds of universals in Intuitive Model theory. The first 
relates to elemental cognitive processing activities such as cognitive constraints in online 
reasoning, simulation constraints in processing information about physically absent people and 
normative developmental pathways for conceptual knowledge about other people’s minds. The 
second group are generic universals that are normative outcomes of universals systems, such as 
the teleofunctional reasoning bias and a tendency to anthropomorphise non-human agents as 
culture specific social agents. Recall that these inferential biases are normative responses to 
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objects and entities in any environment and are argued to lay dormant throughout the 
cognitive lifespan.  The third set of universals, which build on the previous two, relate directly 
to intuitive religious beliefs, such as beliefs in strategically relevant and influential invisible 
agents, psychological immortality, and/or purposeful design. 
 
Chapter one highlighted that Intuitive Model theory has not conclusively established the 
validity of its studied universals. Currently, the Intuitive Model cannot provide specific evidence 
of cognitive mechanisms other than general constraint boundaries due to processing 
limitations. Many postulated theories, even with detailed evolutionary explanations of their 
adaptive role, must remain hypothetical ‘accessibility universals.’ The closest candidates in 
Bering and Barrett’s research for ‘accessibility universals’ are the most elemental cognitive 
processes themselves. These processes compel the inferential behaviours that the Intuitive 
Model focuses on. However, until neuroscience is able to grasp the neuronal processes in their 
entirety these remain hypothetical constructs, derived deductively from the posited inferential 
biases themselves. This is not a terminal problem in itself because hypothesised cognitive 
universals such as theory of mind or Bering’s ‘existential theory of mind’ can be empirically 
examined in relation to their pancultural applicability. Consequently, however, these posited 
cognitive mechanisms must remain plausible hypothetical constructs rather than established 
‘accessibility universals.’ 
 
Furthermore, our revision of the Intuitive Model in the previous chapter necessitates us to 
consider the role of ‘practice’ in the modification of inferences over time. We need to examine 
these before we know whether Intuitive Model universals are ‘accessibility’ or ‘functional 
universals.’  Quite simply the necessary empirical work needed to test for cultural variations in 
these elemental processes has yet to be undertaken. A cultural psychological perspective would 
demand that this is done in the first instance.  
 
It is also unclear if the Intuitive Model’s second set of universals are ‘accessibly universals.’ All 
things being equal, the postulated generic intuitions and conceptual biases that give rise to 
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religious belief could be claimed to be accessed in the same manner by all people. 
Nevertheless, Intuitive Model theorists acknowledge contextual variations in core inferences 
(see Bering and Basili, 2005) as well as the tendency for the development of contradictory 
reflective awareness, particularly in cultures where default inferences are mediated by science 
education (McCauley, 2000).  Again, however, in the expectations of the ‘preparedness 
hypothesis’ and the childhood continuity scores about psychological immortality we are 
required to defer to the ambivalent nature of the current findings. Furthermore, a lingering 
problem is that Intuitive Model theories deny variation at an elemental level. 
 
Norenzayan and Heine’s investigative framework cautions against viewing processes of 
conceptual development or reasoning heuristics as equally accessible and employed in the 
same way by all humans.  It also shed serious doubts on correlating generic inference platforms 
with ‘functional universals’ because it is likely that different cultures employ different 
inferential procedures (Nisbett and Norenzayan, 2002). 
 
When we examine semi-propositional religious beliefs, we are clearly not dealing with either 
‘accessibility’ or ‘functional universals.’ We are dealing with what Heine and Norenzayan define 
as ‘existential universals’. Yet the religious beliefs that Bering and Barrett assert are encouraged 
by the meta-cognitive template are not straightforwardly ‘existential universals.’ Take Bering’s 
interest in the beliefs that feature in human meaning making.  While basic patterns are present, 
these beliefs are highly sensitive to contextual and individual variations with many becoming so 
culturally idiosyncratic they are closer to ‘non-universals’ even if initially a product of the same 
cognitive mechanisms. 
 
In my reading, many of the hypothesised inferences and beliefs in Intuitive Model theory are 
‘existential universals,’ regardless of their maturational naturalness. For example, consider 
Bering’s ‘folk psychology of souls.’   The ‘simulation constraint hypothesis’ locates intuitive 
beliefs in immortality in the cognitive failure of children to understand death. Even if the claim 
for inferential dualism is correct, the experimental evidence gets nowhere near the three-step-
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claim that 1) simulation constraints 2) encourage implicit beliefs in psychological immortality 
and 3), which appears culturally as religious dualism.  
 
 The difficulties in establishing the validity of the universal claims of Intuitive Model theory is 
resolved if the model incorporates psychosocial theory and the empirical findings of cultural 
psychology.  I now discuss the empirical evidence for elemental through to complex cultural 
variations in implicit-cum-semi propositional reasoning 
 
4.4 Cultural Variations in Basic Cognitions and Perceptions: Experimental 
Evidence 
 
Despite Shweder and Bruner’s insistence that scientific psychology is too restrictive to study 
human psychologies, Richard Nisbett and collaborators have managed to integrate theories of 
cultural psychology into scientific psychology. Nisbett’s research does not strive to include the 
full complexity of cultural psychology perspectives. The strength of his research, just like Bering 
and Barrett’s research, is that simple experimental studies iterate the same findings.  Nisbett’s 
empirical findings allow us to integrate a psychosocial theory of intuitive religious beliefs within 
the experimental methods of cultural psychology. 
 
There is now extensive and hardly contestable empirical evidence that people in diverse 
cultures employ memory processes in different ways, have distinctive attentional frames of 
reference, different perceptual focuses, differing conceptual categorisation systems, as well as 
divergent senses of time and space. The evidence suggests that socialisation processes in 
different cultures lead to divergences in basic psychological skills, which gives credence to 
Durkheim’s conviction that the socialisation processes lead to variation in fundamental 
psychologies. Indeed, Nisbett believes that Durkheim’s theory of the categories has motivated 
his own research: 
 
 [I]t has to be said that even if Durkheim's sociological explanation of the nature 
of mind and thought is deficient, his typology has proved to be of much use to 
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those sociologists or comparative historians of culture concerned with the 
variations among peoples of cultural perception. The perception of time, cause, 
space, and force does vary immensely among peoples despite fundamental 
likeness of native mental faculties, and it is in these terms, those of the sociology 
of knowledge, that Durkheim's treatment of the categories of the mind has 
proved to be fruitful (Nisbett, 1975: 10). 
 
Nisbett and collaborators’ research examines cultural differences in basic cognitions and 
perceptions. Their work has predominantly compared American subjects with East Asian 
subjects. Interesting, in light of the earlier claim by Whitehouse and Bloch that Bering and 
Barrett study a particularly ‘American’ or ‘Western’ conception of religion and religious belief, 
experimental studies suggest that it is American and other Western cultures which are 
peculiarly idiosyncratic when compared to many other cultures, such as East Asian and Eastern 
European cultures. 
 
Nisbett and collaborators’ research suggests that Americans utilise different reasoning 
strategies from East Asians. These different cognitive styles  have effects on decision making, 
folk psychology all the way down to fundamental categorisation schemas, perceptions and 
attentional frames of reference. Nisbett and Peng et al. define these culturally distinctive ways 
of ways of attending to the world as ‘holistic’ and ‘analytic’ reasoning (2001).  
 
 Nisbett and Peng et al. contend that Westerners think in analytical ways. Analytical thinking 
focuses on objects and their attributes, with objects perceived as detached from their context 
and categorised in relation to their intrinsic qualities. For example, they tend to view objects 
and agents as static and separate from other objects and agents. Analytic thinkers tend to 
understand and predict the behaviour of objects and agents in terms of their intrinsic qualities 
and/or through the application of abstract rules and principles (Nisbett and Peng et al., 2001). 
 
In contrast, East Asian people appear to reason in a more holistic manner. They pay attention to 
intimate connections between the contexts in which mutable objects or agents are 
encountered. Holistic thinkers focus on the relationships of an object to its wider context or on 
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the points of similarities between objects or entities perceived (See Nisbett, 2003 for extended 
overview and discussion). Summarising the empirical evidence Nisbett and Norenzayan state: 
 
Cultural differences in cognitive processes are so tied to cultural differences in 
basic assumptions about the nature of the world that the traditional distinction 
between content and process begins to seem somewhat arbitrary. 
….Cultural practices and cognitive processes constitute one another. Cultural 
practices encourage and sustain certain kinds of cognitive processes, which then 
perpetuate the cultural practices (Nisbett and Norenzayan, 2002: 562). 
 
 
Critically, the empirical research highlights that implicit cognitive processes are sensitive to 
cultural circumstances, contesting the generic and acultural basis of cognition that Bering and 
Barrett propose. Furthermore, the empirical research suggests that cultural variations are 
foundational and involve more than the cultural magnification or suppression of universal core 
competences. It highlights the need to treat maturational developmental as multi-causal. As 
Lloyd states:  
 
Their research shows how cultures structure tacit attention frames, reasoning 
heuristics and that people rely on and are affected by these when processing 
spontaneous information. Thus, when we talk of tacit, implicit, spontaneous, or 
online reasoning, we must also include discussion of cultural norms and 
socialisation processes as the evidence suggests that there are implicit cultural 
cognitions built into developing human mind (Lloyd, 2007). 
 
Nisbett and collaborators’ empirical findings complement Day’s psychosocial perspectives.  
Through a reassessment of Durkheim’s sociology of knowledge, Day has encouraged us to look 
deep into the structures of conceptual and representational development and to consider their 
effects on the intuitive and reflective beliefs people entertain. Serendipitously, Nisbett has 
provided the psychological evidence in support of this task. Nisbett’s research has also shown 
that there are cultural variations in what Bering and Barrett see as basic cognitive universals. 
This creates a problem for easy correlations between implicit cognitive processing and the 
probabilistic development of universal folk religious intuitions.  
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Holistic and Analytic Reasoning Schemas: Experimental Evidence 
 
Attention 
 East Asian and Western subjects exhibit different frames of attention. The experimental evidence documents that 
when attending to a scene East Asians focus their attention on the whole scene (field dependence), while analytic 
thinkers direct their attention to individual components (field independence). 
A study by Ji and Peng et al. (2001) found that East Asian participants were better at detecting relations among 
different events compared to the American participants. In other studies, East Asian subjects performed poorly on 
the rod and frame test, which requires subjects to separate the ‘rod’ from background information. In contrast, 
Americans performed well on this task (Ji and Peng et al., 2000; Kitayama and Duffy et al., 2003). 
Other studies examined the cognitive styles in relation to recall. These studies found that East Asian subjects were 
less likely to remember a particular object amongst a grouping of very similar objects when they were shown the 
same object with a different background. However when the object was shown with its original background, 
Japanese participants were better at recalling the object than their American counterparts (Masuda and Nisbett, 
2001).  
 
Perception 
Experimental evidence supports the claim that cultural contexts influence both low and high level perceptual 
processes. 
 It shows that people from Western cultures tend to use context-independent and analytic perceptual processes. 
Western people focus on a salient object (or person) independent of the context in which it is embedded. On the 
other hand, people in East Asian cultures tend to engage in context-dependent and holistic perceptual processes 
by attending to the relationship between the perceived object and the context in which the object is located. 
Experimental evidence finds that cultural differences are both chronic and temporary. Perceptual differences are 
derivative of different attentional focuses. Specific evidence includes: 
- Cultural differences in visual awareness: Masuda and Nisbett (2006) use of the change blindness task 
found that Japanese subjects are more likely to detect changes to the background. They focus on the 
whole visual field while Americans are relatively more likely to detect changes in salient objects, ignoring 
background details (see also: Ji, Peng et al. 2000; Masuda and Nisbett, 2001; Kitayama and Duffy et al. 
2003). Masuda and Gonzalez et al. (2008) also found that the cognitive styles influence aesthetic 
preferences. 
- Perception and memory of social behaviour: In a free recall task involving written narratives about 
personal experiences of events that happened to other people, American participants focused on the 
protagonist of the event in contrast to Taiwanese participants who did not (Chua and Bollard et al., 2005). 
(See Nisbett and Miyamoto (2005) for overview) 
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Holistic and Analytic Reasoning Schemas Continued 
 
Categorisation 
American and East Asian peoples organise their worlds in strikingly different ways. Evidence suggests that East 
Asians group objects in accordance with perceived similarities and relationships among the objects. In contrast, 
Americans tend to group objects in relation to formal categories and rules.  
In a word association task, Ji and Nisbett (2000) found that Chinese subjects made strong association if the words 
had thematic (either functional or contextual) relationships (for example pencil-notebook). Americans were more 
likely to link words based on category relationships (notebook-magazine).  
Other studies (Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2002) required subjects to group objects (such as a schematic flower) 
either in terms of family resemblance or in relation to a consistent rule (such as a straight stem). East Asians 
favoured relating the object in terms of family resemblances, while Americans favoured categorising the object in 
relation to a stable rule.   
In another study (Norenzayan and Smith et al., 2002), East Asian subjects exhibited:  ‘naïve dialecticism.’ This 
confabulated their ability to learn rule based categorisation strategies, interfering with their ability to complete 
tasks demanding logical strategies. 
 
Folk Psychology 
Analytic thinkers tend to focus on internal or abstract dispositional characteristic when making sense of the 
behaviour of other people. In contrast, East Asian people tend to focus on how situational circumstances and 
contextual variables influence the behaviour of the observed person.  
- The cultural relativity of the fundamental attribution error: Experimental evidence is a product of cross-
cultural studies on the fundamental attribution error (a bias encouraging people to focus on the internal 
characteristics rather the external circumstances in explaining another person’s behaviour). An early study 
by Shweder and Bourer (1982) established that Indian participants were less prone to engage in this error.  
Indian participants accounted for behaviours in situational rather dispositional terms (See Heine, 2008: for 
overview of complementary research). Importantly, cultural variations between dispositional and 
situational attributions increase as people age (Miler, 1984; see also Morris and Peng, 1994; Masuda and 
Nisbett, 2001). The same cultural variations are involved in interpreting emotion (Masuda and Ellsworth 
et al., 2008)  
- Cultural variation in social inference is context sensitive: Studies by Norenzayan and Choi et al. (2002) 
found that Korean subjects rely on dispositional attribution in behavioural predictions as often as 
American subjects do if the experimental task suppresses available situational attributions. Korean 
participants were also more prone to situational interpretations if situational attributions are salient. 
Explicit vs. implicit communication: Experimental studies indicate chronic cultural variations in Japanese 
and American sensitivities to nonverbal cues (Ishii and Reyes et al., 2003; Kitayama and Ishii, 2002). In the 
experiments, American subjects predominately relied on word meaning rather than the tone in which a 
word was expressed. Japanese participants displayed the opposite tendency. 
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Holistic and Analytic Reasoning Schemas Continued 
 
Decision Making and Reasoning Styles 
East Asians reason about logical problems in very different ways than Westerners. For example, they are less likely 
to decontextualise objects. Despite an identical problem, East Asian people employ substantially different decision-
making strategies. In comparison to Westerners, they have a greater tolerance for contradiction and regularity 
display the hindsight bias (Choi and Nisbett, 2000). Importantly, East Asians do not see contradiction as a logical 
problem. Americans rely on logic based judgments and solutions while East Asians rely on dialectical reasoning 
strategies. When presented with a perception task, Americans relied on rule based reasoning behaviour, while East 
Asian participants were more likely to base their reasoning on perceived similarities between the stimuli. When 
the task presents a conflict between strategies subjects uniformly defer to the dominant cultural strategy 
(Norenzayan, Smith et al., 2002).  
 The different reasoning strategies inform preferences for argumentation styles involving contradictory 
propositions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999) and conflict solutions. East Asians were more likely to say that both sides in an 
argument had reasonable motivations. They also examined background features before reaching a conclusion 
(Choi and Dalal et al. 2003). 
- Toleration of Contradiction: East Asian subjects exhibit a far greater toleration of contradiction than do 
American subjects. An experimental task required Chinese and American subjects to rate the strength of a 
short argument. The participants were then presented with a weaker oppositional argument. Overall, 
both groups stated that the first argument was stronger than the second argument. However, when 
presented with the oppositional argument, American subjects increased their belief in the plausibility of 
argument A, while East Asian subjects tended to decrease their preference for the stronger argument and 
increase preference for the weaker argument. Peng and Nisbett believe that the East Asian toleration of 
contradiction points to profoundly different ways of perceiving the world (Peng and Nisbett, 1999; 
Spencer-Rodgers and Peng et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers and Williams et al,, 2010). 
 
Linguistic Relativity 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis proposes that the language people speak shapes their thoughts. There is a lot of 
experimental evidence to support this claim.  For example,  evidences includes cultural differences in the cognitive 
effect of linguistic differences in number marking (Lucy, 1992), the coding of spatial location (Levinson, 1996), and 
even colour categorisation (Roberson, et al.,2000). 
(See Heine, 2006, 355ff detailed overview of this same research) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  169 
 
 
 
Research in cultural psychology shows how empirical psychologists can incorporate the 
theoretical claims of psychosocial theory. Thus cultural psychology strengthens psychosocial 
theory, as Day offers no plausible developmental theory other than a vague argument for the 
abstract ‘saturation’ of children in cultural worlds.  Cultural psychology’s empirical findings 
provide a more complex framework than the Intuitive Model, demanding local traction before 
universal generalisation. In fact, by overcoming the desire for universal theory, the Intuitive 
Model may begin to tell us precise details about the psychological processes of belief formation 
in different traditions and cultural locations.  
 
The introduction of cultural psychology credits anthropology and comparative religions a 
foundational position in the study of religious intuitions without having to collapse the 
methodological norms of nomothetic psychology. Critically, it is possible to integrate cultural-
cognitive theory without losing the science (prediction and testing of implicit assumptions) in 
the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ that Barrett argues is lost in alternative 
theories of cognition.  
 
Burdening Intuitive Model hypotheses with Nisbett’s body of empirical research dramatically 
reconfigures the focus of Intuitive Model research. I now examine this newly empirically 
grounded psychosocial developmental model. 
 
4.5 The Developmental Psychologies of Intuitive Religious Beliefs  
 
It is important that our theories of development be sufficiently comprehensive 
to accommodate evidence from the range of communities in which children are 
raised and the breadth of community-held beliefs that figure in each. This is not 
simply a call for methodological consistency or for broader and more 
representative sampling. It is also a petition to consider carefully the 
contributions of children’s culture and experience as they acquire systems for 
reasoning about the biological world (Medin and Waxman, 2010: 10). 
 
The developmental process of any individual can only be understood in light of 
the practices and situations of the cultural community (Roggoff, 2003: 4).  
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I now construct an alternative metatheoretical perspective based on the psychosocial 
conceptual model developed in the last chapter. I show that this does some justice to 
sociological, phenomenological as well as evolutionary and cognitive perspectives in relation to 
the development of children’s religious ideations. It remains a difficult, enduring and open 
question as to how to best integrate culture and social norms into cognitive developmental 
psychology. My focus is still quite narrow. I examine how cultural and psychosocial theory 
complicates the Intuitive Model’s search for generative core cognitions.  
 
A psychosocial theory of cognitive development accommodates socialisation processes, cultural 
traditions, and universal core cognitions. As such, the theory is much more inclusive in scope 
than the Intuitive Model, questioning the need for such extreme methodological reduction in 
the very first place.  A psychosocial developmental model shifts focus from acultural cognitive 
development to a focus on the processes of acculturation through socialisation. 
 
My earlier re-formulisation of the Intuitive Model from a psychosocial perspective suggests that 
when we arrive at the level of semi-propositional beliefs it is not possible to isolate the deep 
cognitive continuities and the contextual influences on cognitive development. To study one we 
necessarily must study the other. Psychosocial theory expects that it is possible to consider 
simultaneously core knowledge structures and culturally determined implicit psychologies in 
making sense of historically shaped, highly socialised and evolutionarily suggestive intuitive 
beliefs.  
 
The psychosocial viewpoint offered a number of important modifications to the Intuitive 
Model. Most importantly, psychosocial theory asserts that the Intuitive Model’s conception of 
intuitive belief needs to be changed so that intuitive religious beliefs are conceived of as always 
reflective and semi-propositional in content. Inferences may themselves be non-reflective but 
religious beliefs always are. Because of the focus on ‘thinking,’ the Intuitive Model already 
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devotes itself to the study of semi-propositional beliefs.52 Nisbett’s research suggests the same 
thing. Cultural psychology encourages Bering and Barrett to expect that cross-cultural implicit 
assumptions are not as stable or as bio-cognitively mediated as they have tended to assume.  
 
Crucially, cultural psychologists do not deny that the mind has basic conceptual and 
motivational primitives. However, they also assert that these are highly plastic and undergo 
dramatic changes through socialisation.  While there is debate about how far cultures go into 
minds and the inferential forces of these conceptual primitives, cultural psychology predicts 
that the development of intuitions respond to, are shaped by and cannot be separated from the 
cultural norms and socialisation processes that a child is born into. Thus from a cultural 
psychological perspective the methodological separation of the cognitive and the cultural is in 
error, especially given the focus is on cultural level representations or reasoning behaviours. 
Furthermore, cultural psychologists would contest the separation of mental cognitions from the 
study of affective states, desires, and cultural morals; all interact and are critical to 
development from a baby to a ‘person.’  
 
As Norenzayan and Heine’s framework highlights, the Intuitive Model is prone to distortive 
hypotheses by way of conflating inferential beliefs with intuitive religious beliefs. The four 
universals also work as developmental model because the path from accessibility universals 
through to the culturally specific (or non-universal) requires increasing social cultural mediation 
and the of development cognitive skills needed for such interactions.  At each drop on the 
hierarchical scale, cultural reasons gain greater relevance. 
 
Psychosocial theory insists on the developmental importance of the fact that children grow up 
in variegated contexts. Development involves the active participation of a child in a particular 
cultural community. A culture’s beliefs, behaviours, and norms, mediated by the child’s primary 
                                                     
52
 By acknowledging this fact, Intuitive Model theorists bypass important claims in ‘embodied cognition’ theory 
that the origins of non-declarative beliefs lie deeper than the heuristic reasoning behaviours of children (See 
Hutto, 2009, 2010; Slingerland, 2008b). 
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caregivers and wider educational apparatuses encourage the development of localised 
psychological identities. This focus on variegated developmental trajectories contests the 
universalisation of developmental periods common to any give culture. For example, 
popularised North American developmental periods such as the ‘terrible twos’ during which 
many children of this age present oppositional and noncompliant appear to be largely cultural 
specific (Heine, 2008, 162ff). Heine notes that studies on this developmental period conducted 
on the Aka Pygmies of Africa, the Ziancantecan’s of Mexico and the Japanese show that their 
children do not go through this period. Rather Heine supposes this behaviour is a culture bound 
syndrome derived from parental strategies that try to encourage the child’s individuality and 
self-reliance.53 
 
What is crucial to psychosocial research is the proposition that differences in experiences 
account for differences in implicit psychologies. In a culturally sensitive developmental theory 
experiences such as sleeping arrangements, formal and informal educational practices, 
attachment styles, the different ways children interact with their parents and the parent’s use 
of different parental strategies are all critical to understanding the development of intuitive 
religious beliefs.  Psychosocial theory expects that there are many developmental pathways. 
 
This framework provides a number of insights. Firstly, the psychosocial perspective expects that 
there is a psychic diversity in religious intuitions; different traditions will correspond to different 
religious intuitions. Cultural psychology expects that the developmental route will be different 
across cultures and that intuitive beliefs will be sensitive to both evolved dispositions and the 
interests and content of particular cultural environments.  This means that some cultures may 
continue to lie closer to the spontaneous conceptualisations while others diverge markedly. A 
                                                     
53
 A similar pattern is evident in the tumultuous period of adolescent rebellion. Schlegel and Barry’s analysis of the 
ethnographic database highlighted that while all cultures see adolescence as important and distinctive period of 
transition, only 44%  of cultures assumed that adolescence is marked by a period of antisocial behaviour (with only 
13% believing that adolescence encouraged violent behaviour in boys, and 3% that it did for girls). Again, this 
research does not contest the existence of developmental periods but argues that when we get to behavioural 
expressions these are culturally determined in what Michael Cole describes as ‘developmental niches’ (Cole, 1996: 
190). 
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critical task in a psychosocial theory of intuitive religious beliefs is documenting these 
divergences and accounting for the factors that impinge on them. 
 
Because religious beliefs are always reflective and semi-propositional a robust theory needs to 
account for local, culture-bound norms and customs. Similarly, we need to know how people 
come to believe in their beliefs.54 As such, tracing universal preconditions is insufficient to 
account for religious intuitions and biases as the maturationally natural is always practiced to 
some degree.  Thankfully, despite what Day seems to be suggesting, and as the search for 
accessibility universals highlights, there is no need to deny the existence of genuinely basic and 
foundational cognitive and conceptual structures. Pointedly however, this does not mean that 
there is a ‘psychic unity’ in human intuitions nor does it mean there is similarity in the intuitive 
religious beliefs that arise out of them. 
 
A psychosocial theory of cognitive development relative to religious intuitions charts how core 
competences interact with and constrict the socialisation process. Consider some of the posited 
inferential causes of religious intuitions. These include anthropomorphism, multiple theories of 
mind, simulations constraints, belief in the purposeful self, and hyper-agency detection.  Yet 
cultural psychology’s focus on ‘meaning making’ or self-construction requires Bering and 
Barrett to go beyond the implicit intuitive platform, to see a particular religious belief as part of 
wider process of meaning making. In fact, Bering argues that his focus on self and meaning 
distinguishes him in the CSR. Yet, psychosocial theory would argue that Bering is unjustified in 
universalising features of existential psychology to account for relationships between self and 
religion.  
 
Awareness of the mutually constitutive nature of religious beliefs demands that new 
experimental designs are constructed and previous findings reinterpreted.  We can expect two 
basic universals that can guide future research. Future experimental designs need to include 
normative arrangements within the child’s cultural space. For example, puppet shows are 
                                                     
54
 See Gervais and Henrich (2010) on this topic. 
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appropriate for children familiar with the representational characteristics of cartoons and dolls, 
however Vezo children however may require the presence of human actors.  Thus, in contrast 
to the Intuitive Model the aim is to reduce the artificiality of the experimental designs.     
 
Importantly though, a psychosocial revision of the Intuitive Model does not mean that the 
experimental data that Barrett and Bering have gathered is ipso facto invalid. For example, it is 
reasonable to assume that a division between spontaneous beliefs and beliefs expressed 
through sustained meditation will diverge as the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ predicts. 
Clearly, spontaneous beliefs are cognitively constrained in ways that reflective beliefs are not. 
Acknowledging this however, does not demand we also automatically accept Barrett and Keil’s 
claim that spontaneous beliefs are typically anthropomorphic as Medin and Atran (2004) and 
Medin and Waxman have previously contested (2010). The ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ 
as a developmental theory only expects that reflective beliefs will diverge from intuitive, 
simpler conceptualisations. It asks us to accept that there are powerful constraints on cognition 
that encourage deference to inferential heuristics.  Such a general theory accommodates both 
cultural psychology and my revised psychosocial theory of religious intuitions. It provides a 
platform from which to add and test specific variables.  
 
4.6 Empirical Predictions: Analytic vs. Holistic Theological Correctness 
 
It is now time to sketch a simple empirical study that makes explicit the kind of answers that a 
psychosocial study of intuitive religious beliefs will provide. With this goal in mind, I construct a 
dialogue between Nisbett’s research on cognitive styles and Barrett and Keil’s research on 
‘theological correctness.’  
 
Interesting, Nisbett has not empirically examined how the two types of attendance schema 
influence religious beliefs. However, he expects major differences in the religious traditions of 
people with predominantly holistic and analytic cognitive styles. Nisbett speculates that the 
Greeks were the first to adopt an analytic cognitive style of thinking, while Confucian China 
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formalised holistic modes of thinking. The enduring presence of analytic and holistic thinking 
styles informs the religious traditions of both cultures. Heine describes how the holistic 
tolerance of contradiction informs East Asian religious thought: 
 
In addition to the holistic view that everything is fundamentally interconnected, 
East Asians seem also to share a corresponding view that reality is continually in 
flux. The sense of the ultimate fluidity of reality is chaptered in the Tai Chi, the 
symbol that encompasses the Yin and Yang. The Yin and Yang represents 
opposites (literally they mean the moon and the sun), and they indicate that the 
universe is constantly in flux, moving from one opposite pole to the other and 
back again…This belief in a fluid and cyclical reality is perhaps evident in the 
writing of Lao Tzu, the legendary founder of Taoism. In the Tao Te Ching, he said, 
“To shirk something, you need to expand it first. To weaken something, you need 
to strengthen it first. To abolish something, you need to flourish it first. To take 
something, you need to give it first. This view not only highlights that reality is in 
flux but it also indicates that opposing truth can be simultaneously accepted 
(Heine, 2008: 378). 
  
It is likely that one of the major reasons Nisbett has not directly conducted experimental 
research on religious beliefs  is the perception that variations between Eastern and Western 
religious tradition are so well established that psychological studies will not offer much of 
interest. Indeed, Nisbett may assume that religious beliefs are a result of more basic cultural 
reasoning behaviour. 
 
It is only when Nisbett’s research is considered through the gaze of a psychosocial perspective 
that focuses on implicit cognitions and perceptions that his research on the attendance schema 
becomes novel and exciting for the study of religion. The analysis of early emerging variations in 
intuitive religious beliefs directly compliments Nisbett and collaborators’ research on 
categorisation, perception, and reasoning.  For example, unifying Nisbett’s research on 
attendance schemas with Barrett and Keil’s research on ‘theological correctness’ encourages 
the following predictions: 
 
1) Believers’ ‘online’ tacit responses will diverge from their reflective and expressed 
beliefs. 
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2) East Asian and Western believers’ intuitive and reflective responses will diverge. This 
difference will increase as the believer ages. 
3) Westerners’ semi-propositional intuitive responses will be closer to East Asian reflective 
responses.   
4) Intuitive understandings of supernatural agencies will diverge in significant ways. East 
Asian believers will focus less on agency characteristics and more on the themes 
embedded in the narrative recall task.  
 
An interesting developmental question refers to the age that religious thinking accommodates 
culture specific attendance schema, while another considers whether subtle cultural 
differences are already evident before children pass the false belief test. Another interesting 
research question relates to how the two attendance styles influence the religious ideas that 
are believed and those that are rejected.    
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter ties to together the goals of this thesis. My aim throughout has been to present a 
constructive model that is able to resolve some of the conspicuous blind spots in Intuitive 
Model theory. Extending and reformulating the critical literature, I have argued that Intuitive 
Model theories must acknowledge that cultures influence core psychological processes such as 
cognition and perception and that socialisation affects the cognitive behaviours of culturally 
‘naturalised’ people. I provide the bridge between depreciative criticism and the constructive 
enrichment of Bering and Barrett’s hypotheses. Crucially, I separated their experimental work 
from a contentious metathesis that I argue is the root of the critical problems with Intuitive 
Model theories. Without the restrictive grasp of the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis, 
Intuitive Model theories are open to the incorporation of alternative models of cognition and 
culture. Critically, this requires the refinement of developmental models and task designs, 
without the full-scale demolition of the project that Day and others, like Ingold, have deemed 
necessary. This also requires the re-assessment of universals in Intuitive Model theory, and the 
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introduction of perspectives now analogous, rather than contradictory, to developmental 
research. To emphasise the empirical potential of this reworked developmental model, I 
blended Nisbett’s research on attendance schema with Barrett and Keil’s research on 
‘theological correctness.’  This framework offers a fruitful way to begin the psychosocial study 
of intuitive religious beliefs.    
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Thesis Conclusion 
My thesis deals with some very old through enduring sets of questions about binary relations 
(relativism vs. universalism, nature vs. nurture, reductionism vs., holism) about how to study 
human beings and their religious worlds. The bulk of the thesis locates criticisms of Barrett and 
Bering’s theories from a number of scholarly perspectives.  The critical literature highlights that 
these old questions are very much alive and richly contested. In this thesis, I have sought 
correspondences between three bodies of criticisms of the Intuitive Model. Yet I have done this 
with an aim to constructively enrich the developmental project at a metatheoretical level, 
highlighting where the ‘naturalness of religious beliefs’ metathesis falters and encourages 
methodological reductions, untenable to theorists working in associated fields of research. 
 
Chapter one highlighted that there is a ‘causal weakness’ in Intuitive Model theory due to the 
presence of contradictory empirical evidence on some of the universal psychological biases 
argued to structure recurrent intuitive beliefs. This encouraged us to approach the claims of 
Intuitive Model theories with some caution, including the claim that the experimental evidence 
should have precedence over theories and findings in related disciplines. In calling attention to 
the corresponding themes in the critical literature, I made the potentially controversial, though 
sound, relation between recent cognitive theories and ideas that feature in cultural 
hermeneutics and sociological theories of knowledge. I have suggested that alternative theories 
of cognition and culture are positing a natural-scientific framework recalling pre-cognitive 
theory in anthropology and social sciences. I have shown that while contemporary research in 
the CSR rejects such binaries and is minimally open to qualitative research, the case is not the 
same in the CSR subfield: the ‘developmental psychology of religious belief.’  This resistance is 
partially justified because, as Day himself admits, many alternative theories of cognition and 
culture fail to propose empirical models that can be utilised by the developmental theorists. 
 
Thus, the integration of holistic research into the cognitive science of religion and the 
‘developmental psychology of religious belief’ was stalled by the requirement of empirically 
testable development models. The problem lies in the difficulties in constructing experimentally 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  179 
 
 
 
grounded methodologies that trace the interactive relationships between maturationally 
natural intuitions and practiced reflective religious beliefs. As such, Intuitive Model theorists 
bracket their research on acultural intuitive religion from ‘speculative’ cultural theories in the 
cognitive study of religion.  
 
I also noted how alternative theories of cognition and culture fail to penetrate the Intuitive 
Model’s focus on maturationally innate cognitive systems. By introducing and mediating 
Intuitive Model theory through the theory and method of cultural psychology, I have managed 
what ‘distributed’ theories of cognition, and also criticisms from the humanities and 
contradictory findings in developmental psychology have been unable to do. I have provided a 
model, based on the experimental data itself, which presents the opportunity for research 
along the lines repeatedly expressed in the critical literature.  
 
I agreed with Day that a key problem was the constrictive understanding of ‘natural’ in the 
‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis. The developmental model I propose is not 
attempting to deny or buttress psychosocial theory from evolutionary psychology and related 
fields of research. Thus, a focus on natural cognition should not in itself mean that cultural 
causations are ‘unnatural.’ To the contrary, my framework suggests that calling such cognition 
natural is tautological and no longer of meaningful theoretical relevance. If Intuitive Model 
theorists continue to insist on excluding or minimally considering cultural variables, they must 
also accept that their hypotheses have only marginal relevance to the formation of intuitive 
religious beliefs despite the fact that these intuitions and inferences are the focus of their 
studies.  
 
I finish by presenting a simple empirical model to begin the psychosocial study of intuitive 
religion. 
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Appendix 
  
To aid thesis comprehension, an overview of Justin Barrett and Jessie Bering’s research is 
offered below.  
 
Justin Barrett 
 
Barrett’s experimentally driven research holds a central place in CSR scholarship. It is significant 
that Barrett studied under Frank Keil, the developmental psychologist whose reworking of 
Sommer’s ontological tree (1963) informs Boyer’s writing on the ontological categories (Keil, 
1979; Boyer, 1994). Barrett emphasises that religious concepts are necessarily mediated by the 
processing limitations and reasoning biases of the human-mind brain. He has proposed three 
major hypotheses. The first, coined the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ argues that 
maturationally natural intuitions about intentional agency frequently taint theological 
understandings of deity. These tacit ‘natural’ conceptions are exposed in real-time 
computations and lead people to present understandings that diverge with learned 
‘theologically correct’ articulations.  His second thesis argues that cognitive specialisations 
dedicated to policing agency encourage belief in supernatural agency, especially when these 
interact with another specialisation dedicated to perceiving and responding to other human 
beings. His most recent work contends that ‘god concepts’ are cross-culturally ubiquitous 
because they closely correlate with default assumptions about agency. Barrett’s experimental 
research suggests that children can conceptualise and reason about agents with different 
properties and abilities from as early as the age of three. He argues that distinct non-human 
concepts (such as ‘god’ and ‘animal’ concepts) of agency develop alongside human concepts, 
becoming increasing specific and distinct from one another as children mature. Furthermore, 
concepts about supernatural agents are acquired without difficulty, because these concepts are 
similar to, and capitalise on, the non-reflective assumptions children have about intentional 
agency generally.  
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o Theological Correctness 
 
To date, Barrett’s most important contribution to the CSR is his and Keil’s ‘theological 
correctness hypothesis.’ The ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ proposes that a religious 
person’s spontaneous and/or time pressured (’online’) reasoning about religious ideas and 
agents differs, often drastically, from their explicitly professed, reflectively pondered, and thus 
theologically bounded (‘offline’) beliefs about such ideas and actions.55 Their research starts 
from the perspective that all conceptions about the divine must conform to the processing 
activities in the human mind-brain:  
 
Specifically, divine beings that are represented as intentional agents are subject 
to the cognitive intuitions that govern all intentional agents. These intuitions 
may include psychological and physical attributes not endorsed by a given 
theological tradition’ (Barrett, 1998: 608). 
 
Barrett and Keil argue that people exposed to theological discourse employ two distinct 
conceptualisations of deity during real-time activities.  The first  is ‘theologically correct’ – a 
conceptualisation learned through theological education and experience; the second is an 
intuitive ‘anthropomorphic’ conceptualisation, based on an evolved agency detection bias, 
coupled with the unavoidable necessity to reason about supernatural beings through natural 
ontological categories. The theologically correct conception is often tenuous precisely because 
it is a learned conceptualisation, whereas anthropomorphic conceptualisations arise 
spontaneously and normatively. Testing this hypothesis on subjects from American Christian 
traditions, Barrett found that Christian believers tend to conceptualise religious agents in highly 
anthropomorphic terms, despite the emphasis on God’s vast ontological difference from 
humans in many Christian traditions and cultures. 
 
                                                     
55
 Ilka Pyysiäinen (2005) correctly cautions against distinguishing normative ‘theologically correct’ reflexive 
statements from ‘theologically incorrect’ non-reflective statements, in the manner of Jason Slone (2004). To do so, 
introduces unnecessary normative judgements when the emphasis should be on the shifts in conceptualisations 
that cognitive processing demands incur. 
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Barrett and Keil propose that the disjunction between implicit and reflective beliefs is a result 
of cognitive constraints in real-time reasoning. Habitually, processing biases lead to the implicit 
attribution of psychological and physical properties not endorsed in explicit ‘theological correct’ 
conceptualisations. For example, people appear to struggle to adhere to God’s ‘ontologically 
unnatural’ atemporality and omniscience. Much of the meticulous theological discourse that 
believers acquire via the communication of specialists, the study of important texts, ritual 
engagement and other institutional intervention require cognitive effort to memorise and 
recall. Theology presents complex and abstract reflective representations and explanations that 
remain partially inaccessible to people in everyday real time computations. In contrast, the fast, 
reflexive computations that feature in everyday thinking encourage people to utilise simple 
concepts and representations that are implicit, intuitive, inferentially rich and thus 
comparatively straightforward to cognitively process.  
 
Barrett and Keil’s experimental design, replicated in American Secular, American Protestant and 
Indian-Hindu populations involves a narrative recall task, which encourages implicit ‘intrusion 
errors’ (Bransford and McCarrell, 1974) in subject’s responses to the narrative. Participants 
either read or listened to a battery of short stories staring a culturally significant divine agent.  
Participants were asked to recall whether the stories included particular information and to 
elucidate ambiguous features present in the story.  
 
The first experimental test of the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ remains the most 
significant. American participants were split into three groups and then asked to respond to 
narratives that introduce group specific variables. In the first variant, Barrett and Keil compared 
participants’ responses to a questionnaire examining their explicit religious beliefs with how 
they conceptualised God in a story-recall task. A control group tested whether the storyline 
and/or language used encouraged people to anthropomorphise God.  To this end, the control 
storyline replaced God with a fictitious character named ‘Uncomb;’ a sentient computer from 
the future.  In the final condition, participants completed the story-recall task as in condition 
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one but were asked beforehand to respond to a question encouraging them to reflect on, and 
express explicitly, their understanding of God.   
 
Barrett and Keil’s results supported their hypothesis that people routinely anthropomorphise 
god (in the sense of imbuing ‘him’ with human limitations) despite their expressed theological 
beliefs/conceptions that express no such physical and/or psychological constraints in ability.  Of 
those that completed the questionnaires 96% proposed that God is omnipresent, omnipotent 
and has omniscience. Yet in the story recall tasks over 60% participants attributed human-
typical constraints (such as the inability to be in two places at once and the need to be close to 
something to receive its sensory cue) not expressed in the story itself.  The fictional computer 
‘Uncomb’ was also anthropomorphised but to a lesser degree. Barrett and Keil maintain that 
participants humanised God in ways was that were at odds with their expressed theological 
proclivities.  They appeared to use anthropomorphism to aid the processing of and recall of the 
narrative. Participants in the third condition, who completed questionnaires that intentionally 
primed against anthropomorphising God, did so anyway.  According to the researchers the low 
processing demands of the questionnaires (e.g., the task was not time sensitive and set out in a 
direct question/ answer format) allowed people room to express their more thoughtful (and 
thus more cognitively burdensome) theological understandings.  In contrast, the real-time 
narrative recall task placed greater demand on processing and exposed cognitive ‘shortcuts’ 
which lead to comprehension mistakes and inaccurate recreations of the themes, events, and 
characters involved.  
 
The participant’s online responses to the narrative recall task were compared with a 
questionnaire they subsequently completed about the qualities of the supernatural agent they 
profess belief in. Subjects, routinely anthropomorphised God (or Krishna etc) during narrative 
recall (e.g., viewing his actions sequentially and/or as spatio-temporally and psychologically 
limited) tasks, even when answering yes to whether God ‘can read minds’ or God ‘can do 
multiple mental activities simultaneously’ (Barrett and Keil, 1996: 122/123). Clearly, in the recall 
experiments believers were contradicting what they professed to believe.  
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To summarise, the ‘theological correctness’ experiments highlight that contextual demands 
result in strikingly divergent religious conceptualisations. Barrett believes religious ideas are 
part of a spectrum with the abstract and cognitively complex at one extreme and the basic and 
cognitively simple at the other. Offline cognition allows people to draw on practiced or learned 
knowledge in a cognitive task, a luxury not available in rapid real time non-reflective 
computations.  The experiments suggest two key findings 1) humans readily anthropomorphise 
non-natural agents and 2) that this default tendency can be subdued in certain contexts. 
 
 Barrett argues that basic intuitive representations and beliefs are never completely overridden 
by divergent theological discourse.  Religious people appear to hold two understandings of their 
important deities. He states about the narrative recall task outlined above: ‘It appears that the 
greater computational demands of the on-line task require adults to use concepts with which 
they have greater processing fluency: in this case, a human-like concept’ (Barrett, 2007:3).  
 
o HADD: Agency Detection and Folk Psychology 
 
Intuitive understandings of intentional agency are a central focus in Barrett’s studies. The 
importance of intentional agency56 in religious beliefs features throughout the CSR literature 
(Lawson and McCauley, 1990, Guthrie, 1993, 2008, Pyysiäinen, 2001, Boyer, 1994, etc). 
According to Standard Model CSR, a belief in intentional supernatural and/or superhuman 
agents is the clearest feature of any and every religious tradition (See Pyysiäinen, 2001, 2004 
and Slone, 2004 for a discussion of ‘godless’ Buddhism). Barrett’s early work on a HADD (2000) 
integrates ‘selectionist’ and Intuitive Model CSR explanation via evolutionary psychology.  
 
Barrett contends that two interactive systems compel the inferential richness of intentional 
agents in human minds: Hyper-agency detection and theory of mind. HADD is a cognitive and 
                                                     
56
 Intentional agency refers to any object or entity that is perceived to initiate action. Agents initiate actions 
because they are inferred to have beliefs, desires and intentions. Agents therefore include people, but also 
animals, cars computers and so on (Barrett and Richert et al, 2001: 55).  
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perceptual sensitivity to the recognition of other agents in an environment. It is a mechanism 
found in all animal species and there is an obvious evolutionary logic behind such a system. 
HADD involves the rapid perception and computational processing of agency, thus granting the 
perceiving organism the ability to consider the best course of action (classically: fight or flight) 
in response to the perceived agent. These fine-tuned ‘hypersensitive’ responses present a clear 
fitness advantage in the presence of threatening predatory and social agents.  Yet 
hypersensitivity readily encourages cognitive and perceptual errors, routinely resulting in false 
positives, particularly in ambiguous settings. Experimental research and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that humans have an extremely low threshold for activating the HADD. Unexpected or 
ambiguous events with no clear physical cause routinely evoke the system. For example, a 
person walking down an alleyway at night may mistake a black shape in the distance for a 
human or an animal. Similarly, a gust of wind rustling leaves in a tree may be mistaken for the 
movement of an agent. In his 1993 work Faces in the Cloud Stewart Guthrie, reframing David 
Hume, argues that the tendency to over-infer agency, particularly human agency, is a key origin 
of religious beliefs. He extrapolates that religion is a systematised form of anthropomorphism. 
We perceive the world as littered with human-like agents because other humans are an 
essential and basic parts of our lives. However, the frequent experience of incorporeal human 
agency compels a belief that the world is populated with intangible beings.  This ‘cognitive 
noise’ present in the system does not undermine the adaptive advantage it offers. It is a better 
‘bet’ to over-infer agency than to fail to perceive it. Strategically, it is less costly to have one 
hundred false positives than to fail to respond to the one time it is actually a predator, thus 
selection is unlikely to weed out the over-stimulus of agency.   
 
Barrett places less emphasis on specific anthropomorphism57 in the HADD and more on generic 
intentional agency. For Barrett, (2000 and belatedly for Guthrie: 2008) it is the interaction with 
theory of mind systems that humanises the HADD inference system. Barrett believes the onset 
of theory of mind may mark the pivotal point when god,’ ‘human,’ and ‘animal’ concepts are 
distinguishable in young children’s minds. 
                                                     
57
 Though anthropomorphism is central to his work on god concepts. 
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Unlike Guthrie’s theory, which appears to blur the boundaries between the HADD and theory of 
mind, Barrett’s can better explain why supernatural agents are not literally human-like,  
embedded with many X factor qualities and talents (such as immortality, disembodied 
presence) strange to ‘people’ concepts. The theory of mind system grants non-agent-specific 
HADD ascriptions human-like beliefs, desires and intentions that are immediately salient and 
meaningful to the perceiver. Thus, the invisible agencies that HADD encourages awareness of (if 
no counter-evidence is available) motivate perceptions of communicative intent.  Enter Boyer’s 
theory of religious representations and the non-humanlike attributes of supernatural agency 
are explicable (Barrett and Lanman, 2007: 117).  
 
 Barrett contends that his data presents emendations to Boyer’s counterintuitive theory of 
religious representations. Firstly, only unreflective or spontaneous deity representations fit the 
cognitive optimum of the minimal counterintuitiveness thesis. The complexity and abstractness 
of theologically correct conceptualisations undermines the recall and transference of 
theological propositions. Secondly, the anthropomorphism of ‘god concepts’ arises from 
interactions between the physical and psychological domains, which promote a normative 
natural category for ‘god concepts’ (Barrett, 2000). Barrett combines his work on HADD and 
implicit anthropomorphism in his recent work on ‘god concepts.’ 
  
o God Concepts and the Preparedness Hypothesis 
 
 Barrett’s recent Intuitive Model research has focused on the relationship between implicit 
panhuman intentional agency concepts and Christian ‘god concepts.’ Like his work on 
‘theological correctness’ and the HADD system, the focus of his experiments is on how the mind 
explains the behaviour and thought processes of non-human agents. He expands his work on 
the ‘theological correctness hypothesis’ to include the actual causal cognitive structures that 
encourage belief in supernatural agency.  
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Barrett and his collaborators’ research is motivated by a perceived gap in the extant 
developmental literature. They note that there is very little research on how children 
comprehend the actions of non-human agents. This is due to the prevalence of the Piagetian 
proposal that children liberally and normatively project human qualities onto non-human 
agents. Piaget assumed that people’s ‘god concepts’ are radically constrained and distorted by 
early emerging and tacitly enduring childhood artificalism. Piaget treated ‘god concepts’ as 
isomorphic outgrowths of childhood concepts about humans, which comprise inferences about 
human, particularly parental, infallibility. Such close ties between human and god concepts 
make research on how children understand non-human agents largely redundant or of a 
secondary significance.  
 
Barrett hypothesises that the earliest conceptual structure for representing agency is non-
specific, representing any perceived intentional agent, whether ‘human’, ‘superhuman,’ or 
‘animal.’ Thus the ‘preparedness hypothesis’ reverses the Piagetian explanation by arguing that 
differentiated concepts about ‘humans’ and ‘gods’ derive from a default and generic intentional 
agency base, allowing children to perceive early that gods and humans not only have different 
empirical abilities, they also have different desires, intentions and beliefs. Thus, non-human 
concepts appear to develop alongside (rather than out of) human concepts, becoming specified 
as children cognitively and experientially mature.  
 
Barrett outlines a three stage developmental model of childhood understandings of agency. In 
the first stage (roughly around the age of one) children presume that agents are engaged in 
goal based activities, with actions dedicated to the achievement of these goals. During the 
second stage (roughly between the ages of two and three) children begin to develop mentalistic 
understandings of goal directed behaviour, such as an awareness that action is mediated by 
desires.  The third stage, which occurs in the fourth to fifth year, evidences the development of 
a mature representational theory of mind. Four-year-olds begin to grasp that agents act in the 
pursuit of goals that stem from their beliefs and desires. Critically, they simultaneously learn 
that agents can entertain beliefs and desires that are false and may encourage the pursuit of 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  188 
 
 
 
inappropriate goals. In the cognitive literature, this is considered the development of a basic 
theory of mind and is experimentally observed by the ability of the child to pass the false belief 
test (Wellman and Cross et al., 2001). They found that up until the age of four, children 
overrate the knowledge and mental reach (in particular, adult beliefs are infallible) of other 
people. Barrett, like Piaget before him, views this as a kind of childhood omniscience in which 
children assume that parents and other adults know everything that the children seeks to know 
(Richert and Smith, 2009). In Barrett’s reading, this bias leads children to normatively grant all 
agents superhuman and/or supernatural qualities. 
 
 Barrett and collaborators maintain that the onset of mature theory of mind capabilities allows 
children to infer that different agents perceive different realities; this development is critical to 
the stabilisation of mental concepts about different agents. By the age of four children may 
hold a number of theories of minds about different classes of agents, whether an animal, 
human or non-natural agent. They appear to understand that these different classes have 
different knowledge potentials (Barrett and Richert, 2003). As the false belief test evidences, 
children’s understanding of human concepts undergoes a substantial revision between the ages 
of four and five. Functionally accurate human concepts appear to require an extended 
developmental period, until the basics of folk-psychological reasoning, which includes 
knowledge of human fallibility, and mentalistic intentions are in place. A developing awareness 
of human fallibility evokes a dramatic conceptual reworking of human agent concepts; one that 
is radically different from the understanding of self and others prior to this development of 
mature theory of mind skills (Barrett, Newman, and Richert, 2003).  
 
What is also remarkable to Barrett and collaborators is that prior to the onset of mature theory 
of mind skills, a child’s ‘default’ agency representations are closer to ‘theologically correct’ 
Judaic Christian representations about deity than they are about human agents. Barrett’s 
experimental research suggests that children can distinguish between gods and humans from at 
least the age of three (Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga, 2003). Children may thus be cognitively 
prepared to develop concepts of gods that are distinct from the concepts they hold about 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  189 
 
 
 
people and animals. Furthermore, if representations were strictly anthropomorphic, then ‘god 
concepts,’ which assume omniscience and omnipotence, should collapse in light of this 
emerging awareness about the absence of such abilities in humans (Barrett, Richert and 
Drisenga, 2003; Barrett, Richert and Newman, 2003; Richert and Barrett, 2005). Yet, in contrast 
to human concepts, ‘god concepts’ are notable for their developmental stability, which 
suggests they may be categorically distinct and resistant to the striking changes in reasoning 
about human agency.  
 
Barrett and collaborators speculate that assumptions of omniscience may be present in the 
formative agency concept. If so, ‘god concepts’ which feature omnipotence are easy to acquire, 
and are acquired early on. They make intuitive sense because of their extremely close 
association with the foundational intentional agency template. ‘God concepts’ are therefore 
cognitively optimal:  rather than violating ontological expectations, ‘god concepts’ exploit them, 
ensuring they are easily accommodated in a child’s mind (Barrett and Richert, 2003).  
 
Of course, ‘god concepts’ are not generated out of thin air. As noted earlier, Barrett believes 
that ‘god concepts’ develop normatively because of the interactions between intuitive domains 
(HADD and theory of mind) and culturally proscribed theological traditions. With ‘god 
concepts,’ unlike human concepts, children need not abandon intuitive conceptualisations; 
rather they learn to inhibit and/or refine these assumptions, as they increase their empirical 
knowledge and start to process disembodied theological propositions about god.  
 
Barrett believes the cognitive optimality of ‘god concepts’ is only a partial explanation of the 
cross-cultural presence of supernatural agents in human minds and cultures.   In a recent article 
(2008) examining why Santa Claus58 is not a candidate for a successful god, he emphasises that 
‘god concepts’ cannot just capitalise on intuitive bias, mnemonic advantages, and default 
assumptions about intentional agency. A successful god concept must also offer pragmatic 
                                                     
58
 Offered by critics to highlight that the ‘preparedness hypothesis’ is unable to differentiate between believed 
religious agents and culturally recurrent mythical agents that are not believed. 
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utility, typically through the possession of important strategic information about a person, 
which encourages a believer to change his or her actions in the real world. 
 
As his early work with Keil should make clear, Barrett is not arguing against the 
anthropomorphism theory of deity.  He agrees that childhood and ‘online’ adult conceptions of 
god appear highly anthropomorphic and constructed through the lens of human limitations. 
Anthropomorphic properties emerge only ‘when relevant properties of God are either 
unavailable or not salient, in much the same way as people will occasionally treat computers or 
animals in strikingly anthropomorphic ways’ (Barrett and Richert, 2003). The intentional agency 
template encourages both intuitive acceptance and reflective elaboration of deity concepts. 
Nevertheless, people still tend to make anthropomorphic category mistakes in their real time 
reasoning about god. The recent findings of Barrett and collaborators suggest that both child 
and adults conceptions of deity involve foundational agency intuitions, theological abstractions 
and anthropomorphism.  
 
Barrett’s key claims are: 1) Childhood agency attributions are not of one human-centric kind. 
The generic agency base encourages the development of distinct concepts about particular 
agents.  2) Because of an overlap between the default intentional agency concept and ‘god 
concepts,’ at least as understood in Abrahamic traditions, children are cognitively prepared to 
believe and accept applicable theological teaching as plausible. 
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Jesse Bering 
 
My second case study is Jesse Bering’s experimental research. His work is motivated by an 
ambitious and increasingly nuanced theory about the evolutionary function of theory of mind 
(and similar social communicative adaptations) in relation to the genesis of the hominoid 
species and the causal role it plays in the advent of existential-cum-religious cognitions. He 
asserts that the human mind is a ‘reality bending prism’ and believes God is a scratch on our 
psychological lenses rather than a phenomenological enigma.  
 
Bering argues that natural selection operates on both the structure of the mind and the 
resultant psychological dispositions. His research is thus controversial because of his insistence 
that some psychological dispositions are adaptations. This argument conflicts with the logic of 
the CSR and mainstream evolutionary psychology, which asserts that only the cognitive 
architecture is prone to selection pressures. Uniquely, he seeks to account for human 
existential concerns through the cognitive sciences; he describes his research as ‘a bit Sartre, a 
dash of Darwin and a lot of cognitive science’ (Bering, 2009: 1).  
 
Bering emphasises the evolutionary foundations of human psychological dispositions. His early 
research examined theory of mind capabilities in primates. This research has encouraged him to 
consider a long view about human cognitive proclivities. He proposes that humans developed a 
series of unique and species-specific adaptations (language, theory of mind and the 
intentionality system) to deal with the escalating complexities of group living. Put simply, 
individuals with these social facilitation adaptations fared better (were biologically more 
successful) than those without them. Bering believes human consciousness is the result of 
these (and possibly other) adaptations. In fact, Bering routinely conflates theory of mind with 
subjective consciousness because in his reading, theory of mind inadvertently introduced 
existential reflections (why am I here? what is my purpose? do I matter? what happens after 
death?) and are intimately tied to religious cognitions that build on biases in the psychological 
dispositions themselves. Straying from normative CSR theory he speculates that humans share 
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an organised ‘cognitive system’ committed to the construction of illusionary representations of 
psychological immortality, belief in the intelligent and purposeful design of the self and  beliefs 
concerning the symbolic meanings behind natural events (Bering, 2006).  
 
Noting a ‘culturally ubiquitous’ tendency to attribute psychological states to dead agents and to 
view unexpected events as platforms for supernatural communication (Hinde, 1999; Boyer, 
2001; Bering and Bjorklund, 2004), Bering undertook a number of experimental studies to 
discover whether, and if so how, implicit folk psychological biases predispose people to 
perceive the world in such a manner. As a corollary, he investigated whether this psychological 
system aids immersion in prevalent socio-cultural concepts and discourses.  
 
He proposes that these beliefs stem from normative intuitions bolstered by a panhuman 
inability to simulate psychological non-existence, as well as a causal reasoning bias, which 
produces belief in a purposeful self-engaged in a conditional relationship with the world and its 
designer(s). Also important to the acceptance of such beliefs is the habitual entertainment of 
disembodied, and physically absent people during thinking. These folk intuitions account for 
two recurrent religious beliefs: belief in strategically influential, omniscient supernatural agents 
and beliefs about the psychological immortality of self and others. While the intuition of 
immortality makes supernatural agents believable, it is the theory of mind mechanism and the 
teleofunctional reasoning bias that makes them meaningful.   
 
Beliefs about a meaningful relationship between a person and his or her designer are enhanced 
by the projection of theory of mind communicative intents onto the alleged deities. 
Disembodied and invisible, supernatural agents require novel means to communicate their 
desires and intentions. Experimental work by Bering and collaborators suggest that children 
from the age of seven intuitively see unexpected and/or unusual natural events (a cyclone, the 
presence of a blackbird after a loved one’s death, the birth of triplets, or a ongoing drought) as 
such communicative attempts. Supernatural agents are interpreted as strategically meaningful 
guardians of the moral order. Through natural events, an agent articulates their pleasure or 
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displeasure. A complementary quality of supernatural agents is that they have superhuman 
abilities: the ability to know and influence the future course of events, as well as access a 
person’s private thoughts and deeds. This is akin to Boyer’s depiction of supernatural agents as 
‘full access strategic agents.’ That is, the gods know what you have been thinking and whether 
you have been living up to the ethical norms of your particular culture; they are able to punish 
or reward you in accordance.59  As self-interested actors, believers who perceive a supernatural 
communicative attempt will change their behaviours in accordance with the supernatural will. 
That morality appears closely associated with religion should come as no surprise as both are a 
product of a consciousness arising from social cognitive adaptations. 
 
In opposition to the epidemiological argument that religious beliefs are cognitive spandrels, 
Bering proposes an adaptive account of afterlife beliefs via their effects on social cognitions. 
Through a fusion with the work of Dominic Johnson, Bering asserts that such illusions may have 
solved a number of cooperation dilemmas faced by early humans and thus may have become 
an evolutionary advantageous by-product of the ability to reason about the minds of others. He 
argues that such beliefs are ex-adaptations: they arose as by-products of dialogues between 
different cognitive systems (such as those that process social information and those that 
process information about physical kinds) but had unintended prosocial effects. Thus, though 
belief in supernatural morality is an illusion, Bering believes it may have been an illusion 
exploited by evolutionary processes.  
 
Bering’s theory moves expertly between various levels of naturalistic explanations, arguing for 
coherence between the cognitive and biological via an ambitious synthesis of ethology, 
cognitive linguistics, and neuroscience. It also binds comparative, developmental, evolutionary 
and, uniquely and provocatively, existential psychology.  While this exploratory reach is not 
unique in the CSR, his use of these research fields is.  Like Barrett, Bering places foundational 
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 Unlike Boyer however, he contends that beliefs such as the assumption that ancestors are watching you directly 
aids social cooperation by inhibiting anti-social activity. While clearly, this is by no means a new idea; Durkheimian 
functional theories are often reworked by adaptationist accounts of religion (see Sosis and Alcorta, 2003; Bulbulia, 
2004, Wilson, 2002), Bering similarly translates social solidarity accounts into the language of contemporary 
evolutionary psychology.  
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importance on empirical testability and reification. Yet he openly admits his hypotheses, while 
grounded in the available data, freely mix the hypothetical and speculative.  
 
o The Folk Psychology of Souls 
 
 Bering’s early research on the advent of theory of mind and human self-consciousness feeds 
directly into his theories about religious belief. Like many others (notably, Freud and 
Dostoyevsky) he places existential concern about mortality at the centre of religion, though he 
goes a step further by arguing that existential predilections about death themselves stem from 
distortions in human reason.60 He contends that the belief that the self continues in some form 
after physiological death is a ubiquitous aspect of everyday implicit thought and behaviour.  
 
Bering contends that afterlife beliefs are explainable by way of a number of socio-cognitive 
processes that encourage reasoning errors. Furthermore, these intuitive reasoning mistakes 
account for the emotional and existential salience that such beliefs evoke. Bering’s ‘folk 
psychology of souls’ incorporates six major hypotheses; while they all build on each other some 
clearly have more empirical support than others. It should also become clear that the 
hypotheses demand a substantial amount of prior hypotheses for validation, particularly those 
that utilise the developmental and evolutionary literature. These hypotheses comprise a ‘folk 
psychology of souls’ which pinpoints why such beliefs are intuitive and prolific in diverse 
populations. 
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 Bering rejects the proposition that afterlife beliefs, such as a belief in the existence of souls, are the 
consequence of a psychological need; a wish fulfilment and projection that sustains a person in the face of the 
transitory nature and ultimate meaninglessness of existence. He notes that the experimental research conducted 
on this finds that this is not the case; and in many traditions, the afterlife is not a particularly desirable place to be. 
Thus, it is hard to see how religious beliefs ameliorate existential anxiety.   
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o Afterlife Beliefs as Normative Reasoning Biases 
 
Bering’s theory diverges from another central developmental theory of religious beliefs put 
forward by Paul Bloom. Bloom argues that children distinguish between physical and mental 
objects and agencies from a very early age. He defines this as ‘commonsense dualism’ (Bloom, 
2005). It is this ability to distinguish between explicit physical causations and imperceptible 
mental causations that Bloom believes is the hallmark of theory of mind skills and therefore, 
human sociality. For Bloom, quite simply, most religious beliefs are by-products of this adaptive 
dualism.61 Though Bering’s thesis is more complicated, he agrees this bias promotes beliefs 
about dualistic selves and leads to a conviction that death is a Rubicon where the body and the 
immaterial self part company.  
 
Bering argues that beliefs in psychological immortality are partially buttressed by simulation 
constraints. He notes that death provides a particular simulation problem because it is 
impossible, or at the very least extremely difficult, for a person to simulate a permanent 
psychological state of nothingness. He proposes that preschool children have a basic grasp of 
the concept and implications of biological mortality much earlier than the age of seven that 
developmental psychologists have assumed since Piaget (Barrett, 2004: 83). Bering believes 
such knowledge arises earlier. He asserts that previous research has not been duly sensitive to 
the peculiarities of children’s beliefs about death. Work by Slaughter and collaborators 
(Slaughter and Lyons, 2003) suggest that children find some aspects of non-existence harder to 
process and imagine than others.  Provocatively, Bering’s study found that children learn at a 
very early age that certain activities (eating and drinking) are necessary for the healthy 
maintenance of mammalian organisms and thus death correlates to the absence of such life 
supporting activities. Perceptual states like seeing and hearing have direct biological correlates 
(eyes and ears), while emotional states do not have such direct relations. Bering proposes that 
children have better phenomenological grasp of the former; they can imagine times when they 
have been without perceptual qualities of a certain form (like sight during darkness) and are 
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 It is adaptive because it allows functional distinctions between agents and objects. 
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thus able to simulate such an absence. Imaging an absence of intention proves more difficult.  
The absence of psychobiological (thirst) and perceptual qualities (sight) is easier to grasp than 
the absence of emotions, knowledge, and desires.  
 
Bering’s experimental studies overcome limitations in the majority of early research. Early 
research focused on explicit biologically based understandings of the finality of death (i.e., can a 
dead agent still drink?). His research distinguishes children’s psychobiological (does a dead 
agent know it is dead?) and related psychological understandings of death (can a dead agent 
feel it is dead?) in tandem with children’s biological understandings of death. Bering tested the 
theory that as children mature belief in the psychological continuation of life decreases, 
regardless of cultural ambiences that support belief in souls and life after death. Once children 
have a working understanding of the biological finality of death and begin to see that the mind 
is encased in, rather than distinct from a body, then their assumption that people continue to 
psychologically exist, as souls or as disembodied objects like ghosts, should lessen. This is 
because children should extend their understanding of biological causality to mental causality; 
empirically perceiving that mental states, relative to beliefs and desires, are entirely absent in 
deceased organisms. 
  
In fact, Bering had little faith in the above hypothesis. He believes it is more likely that 
children’s understandings of biological mechanisms remain fragmented and develops 
incrementally.  Children do not just socioculturally acquire beliefs about the psychological 
continuation of minds after biological death; rather such assumptions are compelled by a naïve 
or more correctly deficient ontological understanding of biological beings, which allows for the 
projection of nascent theory of mind abilities onto deceased organisms. Critically, Bering 
believes that the interaction between specialisations dedicated to processing biology and other 
specialised tacit domains like theory of mind and folk physics infest assumptions about 
biological agency. 
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In his most widely cited study, Bering presented children between the ages of 3 - 12 with a 
puppet show featuring a narrative with an unexpected twist. Tested individually, participants 
were presented with a show involving a mouse wandering around aimlessly, lost in a forest.  In 
one of the puppet show variations, the children were told it was hungry, thirsty, tired, thinking 
about its mother, and angry with its brother. Part way through the show it eats some grass as 
an alligator unexpectedly appears and kills the mouse.  
 
The sudden death of the mouse was essential to the experiment as Bering speculates that 
corpses place a great strain on inference systems dedicated to evaluating and responding to the 
concealed motivations of other organisms. It is possible that such a shortfall in the evolved 
social cognitive mechanism encourages belief in ‘disembodied’ souls. On completion of the 
puppet show, the children were then asked questions about the posthumous abilities of the 
dead mouse: Is the mouse still hungry? Can he still taste the grass in his mouth? Is he still angry 
with his brother? Is he still thinking about his mother? Does he still want to go home?  
 
The experimental results suggest that the younger the child the more likely he or she was to say 
that psychological states survive biological death. Though three-year-olds generally understood 
that the mouse was biologically dead (it would no longer taste grass in its mouth), they 
struggled to reason that the mouse’s psychological processes simultaneously ceased. They 
stated that the mouse was still able to feel and know things despite physical death. For 
example, it still missed its mother and wanted to go home. Bering believes these results are 
startling because most of the youngest test subjects were stating that the mind survives death. 
It was only the oldest children who stated that psychological states cease at biological death. 
This challenges the thesis that afterlife beliefs are acquired through culture or because children 
are taught to believe in them, or have an emotional yearning for it. Indeed, it was extremely 
rare for three-year-olds to express notions about heaven or god when explaining the mouse’s 
behaviour.  Rather such statements were more likely from the older children who had greater 
religious acclimatisation. Bering suggests that the lack of such cultural intrusions in the 
reasoning of the three-year-olds may pinpoint an early reasoning bias that senses that minds 
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achieve a degree of psychological immortality regardless of the biological termination of the 
body. 
 
The experiment lends support to the ‘simulation constraint’ hypothesis. Simulation constraints 
produce biases in the way people reason about human death through ‘type 1 errors’ (aka 
rejecting the null hypothesis). That is, because humans intuitively struggle to imagine 
psychological non-existence they defer to what they perceive to be close experiential analogies. 
Bering cites a 1973 study that found that children describe death as state of resting, sleeping, 
and feeling peaceful – perspectives, which presume the psychological continuation of the self 
after death.  Bering contends that these children are engaging in ‘type 1 errors’ by erroneously 
ascribing familiar mental states to the unknowable state of death.  Adults also present ‘type 1 
errors’ when reasoning about psychological cessation. In his most recent experiment, American 
undergraduates who claimed to be material ‘extinctivists’ contradictorily stated that a dead 
protagonist in a story they were asked to read, knew that he was dead (Bering, 2010). This 
finding echoes Barrett’s ‘theological correctness hypothesis.’ The ‘extintivists’ have learned, 
most likely through exposure to scientific knowledge, that death necessitates psychological 
cessation, yet real time intuitive simulation constraints continue to produce reflexive reasoning 
behaviours that  undermine this learned knowledge. 
 
o Ancestors and Place Error 
 
The second important socio-cognitive error is the place error.  Bering frames human 
relationships in terms of ‘online’ and ‘offline social events’ and argues that both employ the 
same theory of mind faculties. Online social events occur in the physical presence of a person. 
They include sharing a dinner at a restaurant or attending a seminar by one’s thesis supervisor. 
Yet, we are only periodically in the physical presence of the people we have social relationships 
with. In their physical absence we tacitly assume that others are engaged in goal directed 
behaviour of one sort or another, whether sleeping, walking to work, preparing a subsequent 
seminar, or holidaying in the Ureweras (Dunbar, 1997). Just as we reason about the intentions 
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of those we are directly interacting with we also reflect on the intentions and motivations of 
others in their absence. For example, we ruminate on their intentions in a specific instance or 
more generally recall a shared experience or mentally prepare for a future meeting with them. 
When we think of a physically absent significant other, we assume they are doing something 
(e.g., at work) and thinking something (e.g., longing for the vacation in two weeks time or upset 
with us for not hanging out the washing).  
 
Just as inferences may not be accurate during online interactions, our inferences may not 
necessarily be correct in offline relationships. For example, I assume that a friend of mine in the 
UK is asleep right now, it is two in the morning there and he will probably have to get up for 
work in the morning. Of course, I do not know this and in fact, he has decided to have a night 
on the town and plans a sick day tomorrow. It is this uncertainty that makes theory of mind a 
theory. The point, Bering is making is that during offline social events, we routinely extract a 
person from their physical bodies and conceive of them in purely mentalistic terms. Even in 
such disembodied a state, we implicitly assume they are intentional and motivated. 
 
 The death of someone with whom we have had offline social interactions poses a problem to 
regularities in folk psychological reasoning. Accustomed to inferring intention in a person’s 
absence, their sudden non-existence through death is difficult for the system to process. Just as 
death proves a simulation blind spot, the human mind appears to struggle to update its social 
register about the deceased, particularly when a social protagonist dies in an unforeseen 
situation.  The unexpectedly dead continue to activate our offline social cognitive capacities and 
thus remain alive to us mentally. These intrusions persist, if merely by force of habit, and the 
living person continues to treat a dead person as an intentional being with goals and desires. 
This is especially so if the deceased person has played a significant role in a person’s life.  Bering 
cites casual examples of people who pick up the phone to call a recently deceased relative only 
to remember the person they are calling is deceased. 
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 This quirk in social reasoning promotes a place error wherein people continue to consider a 
dead person as an agent and locate him/her in the world of the living:  ‘*t+his place error is 
seemingly compounded by nonnegotiable simulation constraints that tempt us into reasoning 
about these dead agents’ continued psychological functioning’ (Bering, 2006: 456). Bering 
thinks that it is unsurprising that people tend to project immaterial souls onto deceased people 
who have played significant roles in their lives. Habituated to engaging in offline social 
cognitions when a significant other who is physically unavailable this process merely continues 
after this person’s death. This social cognitive activity problematises reasoning about biological 
finality. Even if funerals are elaborate and explicit, the automatic intuitive tendency to reason 
about the activities of socially absent people continues (Bering, 2006: 455).   
 
o Teleological Design and the Purposeful Self 
 
The second cluster of reasoning errors involves teleofunctional biases in human reasoning.  The 
bias toward teleological causation is a central hypothesis in the ‘developmental psychology of 
religious belief’ and the one, after commonsense dualism, and the advent of theory of mind 
abilities in four-year-olds that has the greatest empirical support. According to this literature, 
teleofunctional reasoning is a foundational characteristic of human thinking.  Bering cloaks his 
argument in the research of Margret Evans (2000, 2002) and Deborah Kelemen (2004, 2005, 
2009). Kelemen et al.’s numerous experiments establish that children exhibit a clear bias 
toward teleological explanation for not only human behaviour but also the behaviour and 
purpose of animals, artefacts, and natural objects. In her most famous studies, she asked 
children what mountains and clouds were ‘for’. The children strongly favoured the idea that 
mountains are for climbing and that clouds are for raining. This tendency was so recurrent that 
Kelemen describes the children as ‘promiscuous teleologists, ’even ‘intuitive theists’ (Bering 
2006: 458; Kelemen, 2004, 2005). Additionally, she found that the children would reliably reject 
mechanistic explanation offered by the experimenter, for example that a cloud may not exist to 
do anything and is the result of condensation.  
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Kelemen hypothesises that intuitive reasoning in teleological terms endures throughout the life 
course, though is routinely overridden by scientific knowledge and experiential observations. To 
test this hypothesis, Krista Casler and Kelemen (2008) sought teleological ascriptions in Romani 
gypsies, who were prime candidates because they only had marginal scientific education. The 
study uncovered that teleological reasoning was as common for Romani gypsies as it is for 
American children. Similarly, another study found that people in progressive stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease reasoned more teleologically than normal populations or people in less 
severe stages of the disease.  Margret Evans, who it should noted is critical of Bering’s findings 
for misrepresenting the developmental literature, has also found that children prefer 
creationist accounts of species origins to naturalistic or mechanistic ones.62   
 
Bering contends that teleofunctional reasoning biases may also encourage afterlife beliefs in 
other ways than those hypothesised by Evans and Kelemen. He emphasises that teleology 
implies creationist reasoning (i.e., something was designed for a purpose) and if people are 
maturationally prone to perceive their world as purposefully created, then they will 
normatively question their place in a designed world. Such existential reflection is 
developmentally normative and encourages belief in the theological authorship of the self 
because the belief in an intelligent designer logically necessitates belief in the teleological 
purpose of the self. He argues that the belief in the purposeful self is particularly resistant to 
counterhypotheses. He cites experimental evidence that people struggle to conceive of 
themselves as purposeless and inconsequential (Bering, 2006: 459). One particular experiment 
found that while scientific education reduces teleological ascriptions to artefacts and to natural 
properties the teleofunctional understanding of the self appears protected from such 
mechanistic knowledge. In fact, it appears to get stronger, perhaps because of the accrual of 
autobiographical purpose. Belief in the purposeful self remains stable and differentiated from 
belief in a purposeful human species. The question, what am I here for? is of a different kind 
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 This is not strictly true. The youngest children actually prefer spontaneous generation perspectives (Aristotle’s 
argument that species arising spontaneously). 
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than the question what is the human species here for? Even with awareness of the materialistic 
operations of the species as a whole, people continue to individuate themselves as purposeful. 
While this clearly is an important and beneficial feature of human psychology, its origins lie in 
mistaken inferences about the natural world and our relations to it.     
 
Bering contends that we are born budding existentialists prejudiced to perceive ourselves as 
purposeful and special agents we formatively ask the categorical question: Why do I exist? Such 
a question framed within a strong cognitive predilection toward teleofunctional ascriptions 
induces a contractual relationship between the self and its presumed creator. We perceive that 
we have been designed for a purpose. It may be because of this relationship that pancultural 
afterlife beliefs are nearly always intimately tied with morality; a folk morality that is invariably 
prosocial involving deference to establish customs, laws, and hierarchical structures.  
 
This link to morality dictates what we ought to and ought not to do in this world. Via this 
intuition, supernatural agents are able to act as moral agents, punishing and rewarding 
believers in accordance with their actions.  If we adhere to our purpose, we are to be rewarded, 
either in this world, or in the afterlife. If we stray from the path that the creator has given us 
then we will suffer misfortune. Teleofunctional ascriptions when mediated through the self 
promote a belief in the moral agency of a designer of the self. Even the Karmic cycle implies an 
intelligent designer of this system. This intuitive assumption explains why people expect 
retribution for actions that breach the dictates of the supernatural agent. 
 
Bering sees this vividly evidenced in the existential torment individuals experience during the 
loss of a loved one. He cites a number of studies, which show that despite professed religiosity, 
people who are grieving display a heightened sense of meaninglessness and question the value 
and purpose of life (Bering, 2006: 459). Bering suggests that grief induced existential despair, 
confronts implicit assumptions that people entertain about relationships between the self and 
some purposeful agency.  Grief, temporarily at least, threatens the intuitive assumption of 
teleological purpose granted by an engaged agency. In short, grief, particularly that stemming 
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from personal misfortune or the premature death of loved one, betrays the implicit teleological 
authorship of self, encouraging a reflective awareness that this relationship is illusionary. A god 
that lets horrible things happen breaches the implicit contract between self and designer, which 
supposes a reasonable security from dire misfortune.  The sufferer becomes attentive to the 
lack of control they have over their own life.  Through the death of the person close to them, 
they become conscious of the role of chance and random forces in their own lives. The 
emotional investment in the supernatural agent or agencies is re-evaluated as people reason 
that these agencies do not care whether the devotee suffers misfortune or not.  
 
This state of grieving is typically temporary. The sense of the privileged and purposeful self is 
regained typically through subsequent reasoning that the deceased was somehow different 
from them, either through ‘just world’ philosophies (e.g., ‘it was their time’ etc). Suicide also 
exposes intuitive assumptions about the designed and purposeful self. In Western traditions at 
least, believers who believe God governs their life will find the intentional taking of life through 
euthanasia, suicide, or abortion anathema. Bering argues that the moral repugnance to such act 
is a product of the teleofunctional bias. God has designed life, so he is in control of it.  Suicide is 
thus ‘a form of intellectual theft’ (Bering, 2006: 459) because the immortal self is intuitively 
believed to be a purposeful creation with a moral contract to its creator.  
 
These beliefs are intimately relevant to the self’s sense of meaning, identity and emotional 
health. Yet Bering believes that selection may have stabilised these cognitive illusions because 
they were functional; they curtail selfish and antisocial action and encourage fitness by way of 
prosocial actions.  
 
o Just World Philosophies and Unexpected Events as Supernatural Communication 
 
The final set of reasoning errors encourage people to see random natural events as meaningful 
communicative attempts by supernatural agents. Bering’s theory extends Barrett’s work on the 
role of HADD and theory of mind in religious reasoning. Bering similarly argues that people 
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perceive that supernatural agents are not just observing them; they are actively trying to 
communicate with them. Unexpected natural events, such as tsunamis, droughts, or 
earthquakes are frequently interpreted as meaningful communication attempts. Bering 
believes that the perception of symbolic communicative intent in unexpected or uncanny 
events arises from an intuitive bias to over-ascribe human intentionality; because of this bias 
people invariably treat their gods like special types of people.  
 
Thus, gods, like people, are intentional; they have beliefs, desires, and act according to goals. 
The actions of deities evoke the same search for the desires, belief, and goals that humans 
normatively use to track human and animal minds. A review of the Human Relations Area File 
database by Bering and Dominic Johnson found that the prolific cross-cultural belief in immortal 
beings is entwined with a belief that the dead held some responsibility for natural events. 
Humans appear to employ theory of mind skills to explain and predict supernatural agents’ 
beliefs and desires. The key difference is that human and animals behave through their actions, 
while supernatural agents; having no perceived body in which to act through, act through 
events. The telelofunctional bias interacts with theory of mind and leads people to sense that 
things happen for reasons.  Unexpected or ambiguous events perceived through the lens of 
theory of mind encourage a search for communicative intent.  
 
Bering and collaborator David Parker (2006) tested whether theory of mind (in particular 
second order reasoning: understanding that an agent may know something that you do not 
know) is central to these illusionary inferences experimentally. Children aged between three 
and nine were recruited to play a forced choice game. The children were randomly split into 
groups. The first group of children were told that an invisible agent, named ‘Princess Alice’ 
would attempt to communicate with them in some way if they were making mistakes during 
the task. The second group received no such prime. Princess Alice’s communicative attempts 
included a picture unexpectedly falling from the wall, and the lights suddenly turning on and 
off. As expected, it was only at the age of seven (when second order representational ability 
has developed) that children reliably inferred that flicking lights and the falling painting were 
IMPLICIT CULTURES  205 
 
 
 
symbolic communicative attempts by Alice and modified their behaviour in accordance.  Five- 
year-olds grasped that the events were most likely caused by Alice but failed to register their 
communicative intent and therefore did not change their game play. Three-year-olds failed to 
perceive invisible agency and to register communicative intent. Bering argues that the 
significance of the study is in the close tie between the developmental advent of second order 
reasoning and the ease in which those that have developed this ability will infer symbolic 
communicative intent. There is a cognitive ease to causation inferences.  
 
According to Bering’s reading of the ethnographic data, believers assume that their 
supernatural agents actively communicate their pleasure and displeasure. A review of the 
Human Relations Area File database found that beliefs in immortal beings are tied to a belief 
that they hold some responsibility for natural events (Bering and Johnson, 2005: 126). It is 
through this communication that a person learns the specifics of their social contract with the 
deity.  This is typically combined with a ‘just world’ moral philosophy (Lerner and Simmons, 
1966) as people presuppose that the world is ‘just’ and that people get what they deserve. The 
presence and prevalence of ‘just world’ beliefs in children’s reasoning was established in a 
famous study by Piaget.  Children were presented with vignettes about a child who steals 
apples from an orchard and then experiences a causally unrelated event, falling into a river 
from a bridge he was crossing. 86% of the youngest children believed the unfortunate fall was 
because of the theft (Piaget, 1932). In opposition to Piaget, Bering believes this ‘immanent 
justice’ philosophy endures into adulthood. He concludes that ‘just world’ beliefs are so strong 
that calamities and hardships are routinely interpreted as the result of earlier actions.   
 
o Adaptative Function of Supernatural Illusions 
 
Incorporating Dominic Johnson’s research, Bering hypothesises that the afterlife beliefs 
discussed above are functional illusions that have salient real world consequences that may 
have been exploited by natural selection (2006, Bering and Parker, 2005, 2006; Bering and 
Shackelford, 2005). Bering and Johnson speculate that beliefs in witnessing souls (i.e., invisible 
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agents that can observe, assess, and respond to your behaviour) may provide a genetic 
advantage to the believer by encouraging the self-inhibition of socially undesirable behaviour. 
They contend that in all cultures supernatural agents are granted privileged and intimate 
epistemic access to mental states. He suggests that a cognitive system or systems dedicated to 
producing belief in supernatural agents with privileged epistemic access may have encouraged 
the suppression of ancestral selfish acts. This is important because antisocial acts produce a 
fitness disadvantage in socially complex groups that are able to communicate information 
about such actions due to the emergence of language.  
 
The maintenance of social relations is crucial to an individual’s survival and reproduction.  
Accordingly, Boyd and Richardson propose that evolution may have designed humans to be 
deeply concerned about their reputation among their social group. Humans do invest a great 
amount of time in monitoring their behaviours to ensure that they are giving off the right 
‘signals.’ Concern with how others perceive us is tied to mature theory of mind skills but also to 
the advent of language. Language allows rapid communication between third parties. If 
someone wrongs us we can warn others about these breaches of social etiquette. Dunbar 
(1997) has noted that gossip is intimately tied to the policing of social norms and etiquettes. 
 
Knowledge of other people’s subjective mental states (their beliefs, desires, and intentions) is 
of strategic importance to all normally functioning humans. Equally important is the protection 
of the thoughts and actions that a person entertains or engages in which run against communal 
norms and customs. Humans have evolved a specialised theory of mind ability in the pursuit of 
such information. Such inferences aid the co-operative exchange of resources, as well as the 
policing of deceptive intent and antisocial behaviour. Humans are experts at discerning 
information that affect the subjective states of others. This information has causal effects on 
the perceiver’s own behaviour, encouraging them to modify their behaviour through their 
inferences. For example, if you and I were involved in an exchange of resources and I infer 
through your behavioural cues (lack of eye contact, distracted manner) that you intend to cheat 
me of my share, I would change my own exchange behaviour accordingly. 
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 However, as research on the fundamental attribution error reminds us, our inferences about 
others’ minds are often misguided or erroneous. While we have direct epistemic access to our 
own desires and beliefs, we must rely on indirect cues to account for the mental states of 
others. We are forced to infer unobservable mental states from the observable behaviours and 
appearance of the person whom we seek information about. The balance between accuracy 
and error in theory of mind inferences is unavoidable. If we were able to directly and precisely 
access other people’s mental states the value of theory of mind abilities would become 
redundant. We would be mere mental ethnologists. The imperfection of our inferences about 
others stem from selection pressures against such strategic knowledge. An individual who is 
able to deceive in theory of mind exchanges will have a fitness advantage, resulting in a pay-off 
for imperfect knowledge. Our intuitions are reliable but are exploitable. It is the hyperactive 
concern for our social reputations and a desire for privileged knowledge of others that informs 
the moral qualities invested in supernatural beings. However, unlike our cospecifics who must 
rely on folk psychological intuitions to infer intentions, supernatural agents are uniquely perfect 
mental ethnologists; they can literally read our minds. Whitehouse defines Bering and 
Bjorklund’s thesis neatly as the ‘good citizen hypothesis’ (Whitehouse, 2006: 486).  
 
As Barrett also contends, it may be the quality of omnipotence that grants deities such as the 
Judaic Christian ‘god’ a central position in the religious pantheon.  While folk religious 
pantheons also host a number of limited access agents, such as ancestors, ghouls, and demons, 
it is only those with strategic access that matter the most to the lay believer and theologian 
alike (Bering and Johnson, 2005: 120). Indeed, strategically relevant supernatural agents that 
influence realities in this world and the next are closely correlated with human morality. This 
belief leads to inferences that a person is observed and assessed by these agencies. Such beliefs 
control a person even when they are alone; causing them  to recheck antisocial behaviours that 
without such a policing mechanism may seems like a rewarding, even sensible, decision to 
make if they could have gotten away with it. 
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Citing the epidemiological literature on concept acquisition, Bering and Johnson suggest that 
full access strategic agent concepts may be more cognitively successful than supernatural 
agents without such qualities. As Boyer and Barrett argue, omnipotence itself makes 
supernatural agents more salient and memorable to believers (Boyer, 1994; Barrett, 2004). It is 
not only significant that people perceive natural events as communicative attempts; it is also 
that these communicative attempts are expressions of verdicts based on the supernatural 
deity’s assumed epistemic knowledge. Moreover, Bering sees a clear developmental trajectory 
behind this tendency. In his own study, it was not until the age of seven that children began 
thinking in superstitious terms and inferring communicative elements are present in 
unexpected events (compare: Evans, 2000 and her findings on the late development of 
existential creationism).    
 
Bering and Bjorklund (2004) also examined this relationship via an experiment with college 
students. Tested individually, the students were given one of three primes. All students were 
told that the computer task (a difficult spatial intelligence test) they were requested to 
undertake had been temperamental recently and that it was possible that answers for each 
task may inadvertently pop up on screen. The experimenter explained that if this happens it 
was important that they did not look at the answers and quickly push the spacebar to remove 
them. The first prime was a memorandum that appeared on the computer screen at the end of 
the instructions for the task. This memorandum was dedicated to a fictitious researcher who 
had been involved in preparing the experiment and had recently died.  The second group of 
students were presented with the memorandum and were casually informed that the dead 
researcher’s ghost had been seen in the room the experiment was being conducted in. The 
third group were given no prime. Just as each participant was beginning to undertake the test, 
the experimenter explained that she has just been called out of the room and would be back 
shortly, leaving the student alone in the room. The test measured the response speed in which 
participants cleared the answers from the screen by pushing the space bar.  
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Those students who had been primed about the sightings of the dead experimenter pushed the 
spacebar quicker than those who were not primed. Those who only received the memorandum 
were in the middle range. Bering contends that his experiment supports the thesis that beliefs 
in supernatural agents (even if compelled by suggestion only) are enough to restrict antisocial 
or norm violations.  Bering argues that this study and the earlier Princess Alice experiments 
lend credence to the theory that belief in supernatural punishment facilitates in-group 
coordination.  
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